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Tab A

(JbK'llMllD U J F Y
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

i

WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW,
JR. ,

Case No. 950900441 and
Judge Stanton Taylor

5
Plaintiffs,
6
vs .

DEPOSITION OF

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, et al.,

JAMES E. SPARROW. JA

7
8
9
Defendants.
10
11
12
13

The deposition of JAMES EDWARD

14

JR., a witness in the above-entitled cause, taken

15

before LANETTE SHINDURLING, Registered

16

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of

17

Utah, at the law offices of PARSONS, BEHLE &

18

LATIMER, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt

19

Lake City, Utah, on the 19th day of August, 1996,

20

commencing at 9:00

a.m.

21
22
23
24
25
AssnriafpH Professional Reporters

SPARROW,

Professional

Q

What was your address in Twin Falls?

A

182 F Street North.

Q

And how long did you live at that address

in Twin Falls?
A

Two years.

Q

And where did you live before that?

A

Before that, 196 Van Buren.

Q

Is that in Twin Falls as well?

A

In Twin Falls.

Q

And how long did you live at that address?

A

Ten years.

Q

Okay.

Are you currently employed, Mr.

Sparrow?
A

Yes .

Q

And where are you employed?

A

Barclay-- actually, it's Express

Personnel, temporary service.
Q

So you're working for a temporary service?

A

Uh-huh

Q

And it's called Express Personnel?

A

Uh-huh

Q

And where is it located?

A

In Burley, Idaho.

Q

And how long have you worked for Express

(affirmative).

(affirmative).

Personnel?

9

1

A

For one year.

2

Q

And where are you currently

3
4
5

your

performing

work?
A

I am contracted

out to Barclay

Mechanical

Services.

6

Q

And where

7

A

It's in Paul,

8

Q

I'm

9

A

Paul,

10

Q

And how long have you been w o r k i n g

11

is that?
Idaho.

sorry?
Idaho.

Barclay Mechanical

at

Services?

12

A

One month.

13

Q

And where did you work before

14

A

At Rain for Rent.

15

Q

I'm

16

A

Rain for Rent.

17

Q

Where

is that?

18

A

Paul,

Idaho.

19

Q

What kind of company

20

A

Irrigation p i p e .

21

Q

And how long did you work

22

A

Five m o n t h s .

23

Q

And what did you do

24

A

We would make pipe, then load

25

and deliver

that?

sorry?

is that?

there?

there?
it on

trucks

it to farmers.

10

1
2

Q

Okay.

And while you were working there

you were still working at Express Personnel?

3

A

It's all through Express.

4

Q

Okay.

5

And prior to that job where were

you working?

6

A

Koch Agri Services.

7

Q

Coke?

8

A

Yeah, it's in Rupert, Idaho.

9

Q

C-O-K-E?

10

A

It's K-O-C-H.

11

Q

And where is it again?

12

A

Rupert.

13

Q

What did you do there?

14

A

I loaded rail cars up with grain.

15

Q

And this, again, was while you were at

16

Express Personnel?

17

A

Uh-huh

18

Q

And how long did you work at Koch?

19

A

Three months.

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

I didn't.

22

(affirmative).

And where did you work before that?
Oh, no, through Express I

worked at Oreida in a potato cellar.

23

Q

So your job before Koch was--

24

A

At Oreida.

25

Q

And were you working at Express Personnel

11

at this time?
A

Yes

Q

And what were you doing at Oreida?

A

Running a-- what do they call them, a

piler.
Q

And how long did you work there?

A

One month.

Q

And did you have any work before Oreida?

A

No .

Q

So was Oreida the first job you had

through Express Personnel?
A

Yes .

Q

And you said that you had been at Express

Personnel for about a year?
A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

Q

Okay.

And before you went to Express

Personnel, did you have another job?
A

No.

Q

So were you unemployed prior to going to

Express Personnel?
A

Yes .

Q

Okay.

Were you unemployed from the time

you were terminated by Amalgamated Sugar until you
went to Express Personnel?
A

No.

I worked two weeks at a Jerome Cheese

12

Factory.
Q

What was the name of that company?

A

I believe it's Jerome Cheese.

Q

Okay.

And this is a job you had directly

with that company as opposed to going through
Express Personnel?
A

Yes .

Q

Did you have any other job since you left

Amalgamated Sugar?
A

No.

Q

So did you go through a period of

unemployment before you went to Jerome Cheese?
A

Yes.

Q

And how much time was there between when

you left Amalgamated Sugar and when you started at
Jerome Cheese?
A

One month.

Q

And then how long did you work at Jerome

Cheese?
A

Two weeks.

Q

And why did you leave Jerome Cheese?

A

I quit.

Q

Why did you quit Jerome Cheese?

A

Because of their unsafe practices.

Q

What were the unsafe practices at Jerome

13

call it?
A

Rain for Rent?

Q

Yes .

A

I went there, it was their busy season and

it was a seasonal job and when we got laid off there
I went to Barclays.
Q

With your current job at Barclay, do you

know how long that will last?
A

It's just a temporary job.

They're saying

two to four weeks, but they're trying to get me on
full-time as a bulk loader out there to fill green
cars up with sugar because Barclays is a grain
storage facility and that's what they'll be doing
out there.

They're trying to see if they-- some of

the bosses are trying to see if they can get me on
full-time out there.
Q

So it may happen that you'll become a

full-time employee at Barclay as a bulk loader?
A

Yes .

Q

When do you think that will happen, if it

does happen?
A

I would say two to four weeks.

Q

Does that mean you would become a regular

employee of Barclay as opposed to working through
Express Personnel?

16

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Do you think

3

you got that

regular

that your pay would

change

job?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Do you know what you would get paid

6

got that regular

if you

job?

7

A

I would

8

Q

Is that what

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Have you applied to work at any plant

11

Amalgamated

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Where did you

14

A

It was for a beet dump.

15

Q

I'm

16

A

It was at a beet dump in Paul,

17

Q

What

18

A

Where they store their beets for

19
20
21

if

say

$8.50.
someone has told

you?

of

Sugar since you were tired.-'

apply?

sorry?

is a beet

Idaho.

dump?
their

plants.
Q
this beet

Okay.

And when did you apply

for work

at

dump?

22

A

The day after

23

Q

Okay.

24

you applied

25

A

I got laid off at O r e i d a .

And what response did you get

for a job at this beet

when

dump?

The response w a s , the lady I talked

to

17

No. 3 and you just don't recall it now?
A

I just don't recall it, but

it-

Q

Is it possible that you received Exhibit

No. 3?
A

Yes .

Q

Does the contents of Exhibit No. 3 seem

familiar to you?
A

Yes.

It sounds like something they would

Q

Looking at the second section of Exhibit

say.

No. 3 which is labeled Attendance and then looking
at the last sentence of that paragraph, you see tha
it says, "The maximum number of unexcused absences
you can receive before being terminated is three."
Do you see that?
A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

Yes.

Q

Do you recall being informed of the rule

that you could have no more than three unexcused
absences?
A

Yes .

Q

When do you recall being informed of that

A

All the time.

Q

All the time?

A

Uh-huh

rule?

(affirmative)

27

1

Q

You mean it was said to you--

2

A

W e l l , people were always talking

3

you know,

foremen,

about

supervisors.

4

Q

Could you elaborate on that?

5

A

Uh-huh

6

Q

When did people talk about

7

A

At

8

Q

So you're

9

supervisors

(affirmative).
it?

work.
saying your co-workers

and

regularly talked about this rule

10

you could have no more than three

11

absences?

that

unexcused

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

So you knew or you were familiar with

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

After you began working at

14

17

it,

this

rule?

Sugar did you join a union at some

Amalgamated

time?

18

A

Right

away.

19

Q

Was that

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Or 1993 when you were

22

A

Part-time back in '89.

23

Q

And so you were a member of this

24

during

25

A

in 1989 when you were

part-time?

full-time?

the entire time you worked at

union

Amalgamated?

Yes.

28

1

Q

Are you still a member of this

2

A

No.

3

Q

What

4

A

Grain M i l l e r s .

5

Q

Was there a contract

6

agreement

is the name of the

between

union?

union?

or a laborer

this union and A m a l g a m a t e d

Sugar?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And did this labor agreement

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Okay.

11

agreement?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Is this something that was p u b l i s h e d

14

little

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And did every union employee get a copy of

17

this

cover

Did you have a copy of the

you?

labor

in a

booklet?

contract?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

So you were familiar with the

20

A

Uh-huh

21

Q

Did you read the

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Was there a representative

24

Amalgamated

25

A

(affirmative).

contract?

Yes.

contract?

of the union at

Sugar?

Yes.

29

1

A

No.

2

Q

Why was it that you never spoke to the

3

union

president?

4

A

About

5

Q

W e l l , about

6

A

I never had to.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

No.

9

Q

You're

10

what?
anything.

Were you

enemies?

saying you just never had

reason to talk with

him?

11

A

N o , no reason.

12

Q

I take it you didn't have any bad

13

experience with

14

A

With

15

Q

Yes.

16

A

No.

him?
him?

He was a coward.

I thought he was a

17

coward and he wouldn't do anything anyway.

18

why I wouldn't

19
20

Q

What

any

go to him

That's

anyway.

is it that makes you think that

the

union president was a coward?

21

A

22

employees.

23

Q

24

employees?

25

A

All the other talk from the

other

And what was the talk from the

Not

other

good.

31

Q

But you just don't recall--

A

I j ust don' t - -

Q

You don't recall reading that portion of

the contract?
A

I did.

I remember reading it, but I don't

think I understood it at the time.

I understand it

a little bit now because of the way you're bringing
it out, but-Q

Okay.

Going down to the last sentence of

paragraph 14.1 it says, "An employee who believes
his discipline or discharge is not justified shall
have recourse to the grievance procedure under the
agreement."

Do you see that?

A

Yes .

Q

Did you know that an employee who is

discharged who does not think it's fair or justified
can have a grievance filed?
A

Yes .

Q

You knew you could file a grievance upon

being discharged?
A

Yes .

Q

And did you know that there was a

grievance procedure?
A

Yes .

Q

And, in fact, it's a three-step grievance

43

and arbitration procedure?
A

I'm not quite sure what the steps are, but

I knew they were there.
Q

You knew there were some steps?

A

Uh-huh

Q

And did you know that it not only was

(affirmative).

steps for filing a grievance, but that there was at
the end of the process an arbitration procedure?
A

Yes .

Q

And did you know these things in May 1995

when you were discharged?
A

Yes .

Q

Now, this union agreement, labor agreement

says that the company has the right to fire people
for just cause, to discipline or discharge employees
for just cause.

Do you think you were discharged

for just cause?
A

Yeah, could you explain that for just

cause?
Q
contract.

Well, I'm just like you reading the
I don't have any secret meaning in mind.

I'm just reading.
A

I know what they've told me and just

cause, it's two different things.
Q

So what I'm asking for is what you

44

Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

I don't care whose

definit ion.
A

Just cause, I'm trying to think.

I would

say no.
Q

That's what I'm asking.
MR. CARR:
MR. GAVRE:

That's his answer.
Mr. Carr, I'll ask the

questions, he'll answer.

You don't have to comment

that that was his answer.
MR. CARR:
Q

It's on the record.

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Now, when you say that you

believe there was not just cause for your discharge,
Why do you say that?
A

Can you repeat that?

Q

Well, I'm not trying to put words in your

mouth, but I believe you testified that in your
opinion there was not just cause for your
discharge.

Is that correct?

A

Correct.

Q

Okay.

A

Because there were things going on at the

Why do you believe that?

factory.
Q

Can you elaborate on what you mean by

there were things going on at the factory?
A

Illegal shipping of sugar.

46

Q

Okay.

What do you mean by "illegal

shipping of sugar"?
A

Contaminated.

Q

Okay.

So you believe there was

contaminated sugar being shipped by the company?
A

Yes .

Q

And how was the idea that there was

contaminated sugar being shipped by the company
connected to your discharge?
A

Because they knew I was there when the

comment was brought up to them and I was just in th
room at the time so they knew I knew or thought I
knew.
Q

Okay.

cryptically.

You're referring to something very

Could you explain what you mean by th

comment was brought up to the company and you were
in the room?
A

We asked them if they sent some

contaminated cars, if it was destroyed or actually
shipped to customers and they didn't give us an
answer.
Q

Okay.

When you say "we," who are you

referring to?
A

Blake Waddoups and me, and I.

Q

And you're referring to some particular

47

1 I the bagging area.
2 | right.

We were

3 I That's about
4

6
7
8
9
10
11

loading

Q
this

Okay.

not

cars at the time, you

the only thing

a thorough check.

5

I told Darwayne, That's

I said.

know.

He's not

That's what he told

doing

him.

Can you pin down when in

particular

occurred?
A

It would have been like February

20th.

was like four days after his death.
Q

Are you sure about the exact date or is

that just kind of an approximate
A

time?

It's real approximate, but

I can't

sure because

13

We waited more or less a day after the accident

14

clean it up and we waited three days after

15

accident

17

Q

it took us three days to clean

say

12

16

was being pushed

through the

Yes.

19

Q

And some of the sugar that was

20

pushed

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And you're

25

A

to

the

through the system was

being

bagged?

saying the microbiologist

some of that bagged
U h - h u h , because

sugar

system?

A

24

it up.

So you're talking about a time when

checking

for

and then started right back up.

18

23

It

was

sugar?

I was the one who went

and

got the bags to him and took it to where he was at.

64

head down and close my eyes for a while there,
especially on the graveyard shifts.
Q

When you say Otto threatened you, can you

take me through that.
A

I can remember about two weeks before I

was terminated, Otto wouldn't show up to work until
around eight o'clock, we had to be there at six.

I

was sitting at my desk filling out some paperwork.
He walked in and slapped me up to the side of the
head with that yellow notebook and he said, Well, i
today the day I get to fire you?

I said, What for?

He said, For messing up.
Q

And that's what he said?

A

Uh-huh

Q

Did he say any more than that?

A

No.

Q

Did you say anything in response?

A

I just-- What for?

Q

And he said, For messing up?

A

Something like that.

Q

Do you recall exactly what he said?

A

No.

(affirmative).

I don't recall, just something

similar to that.
Q

So he came into the office and asked, Is

today the day I get to fire you?

98

A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

Q

And you said, What for?

A

Uh-huh

Q

And he said, For messing up?

A

Or something similar to that.

Q

Did you say anything further?

A

No.

Q

Did he say anything further?

A

No.

Q

Did he stay in the office or leave, or

(affirmative) .

what happened after that?
A

He probably stayed in the office.

Q

And then what did you do?

A

I think I got up to go check my rail ca

Q

Do you remember when that happened?

A

About two weeks, if that long, right

before I got fired.
Q

Okay.

Was that the only time Otto said

something like that to you?
A

There was one other time, but it was th

death and it has nothing to do with this.

It had

something to do with where they thought I had
flunked a car.
Q

Tell me what you mean by flunked a car.

A

I loaded up a rail car, I think it went

99

1

day we went there to turn in our stuff.

2

Q

What day are you talking about?

3

A

It would have been May 31st, I believe.

4

It was after we were fired.

5

Q

This is after you were fired? •

6

A

Uh-huh.

Because we said, We'll just tell

7

the customers what you did.

He said, Well, you're

8

fired and we'll just say you're a disgruntled

9

employee.

10

Q

After you were fired you saw Vic Jaro?

11

A

Uh-huh

12

Q

What did you say to Vic Jaro?

13

A

I didn't say nothing.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

Blake Waddoups.

16

Q

And what did Blake Waddoups say?

17

A

He demanded to see the shipping reports of

18

(affirmative).

And you were with Blake Waddoups?

where those cars went.

19

Q

By "those cars" you mean the two rail

21

A

The two rail cars, yes.

22

Q

That were being filled on the day of Mike

20

23

cars?

Davis's death?

24

A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

25

Q

And did he, in fact, get to see what he

126

wanted to see?
A

Yes .

Q

And what did those records show?

A

They show that it was shipped to a

customer instead of being destroyed.
Did it show what customer it was shipped
to?
A

Yes .

Q

What customer was that?

A

Some pet place.

I can't remember.

He

just-- we just got to glance at them, he just showed
them.
Q

And it showed that it was shipped to a pet

food manufacturer or animal feed manufacturer?
A

Something.

I just looked up there.

standing next to him, I just glanced at it.

I was
He just

showed it real quick and closed it.
Q

Okay.

And after the two of you got to see

this shipping record, then what happened?
A

Nothing.

He told us to get off the

premises.
Q

You said that--

A

Blake said, We'll just tell the customers

what you've been doing.
Q

Is that all that Blake said, We'll tell

127

1

Vic

Jaro?

2

A

Blake demanded

to.

I was just with

3

Q

So where did you meet with Vic

4

A

It started

inside the lunchroom

5

out by the-- on the outside of the office

6

the way out to the front g a t e .

7
8
9

Q

So was this a conversation

him.

Jaro?
and

ended

there,

as people

were

walking or what?
A

Blake was kind of hollering, demanding

10

see certain p a p e r w o r k s , you know, wanting

11

wanting to see that and things like that.
in the

this

Q

So it started

13

A

Uh-huh

14

Q

And who was

15

A

I know Bill Stewart was because he was

lunchroom?

(affirmative).
there?

16

trying to calm Blake down.

17

and just Blake and Otto-- I mean V i c .

I believe Dan Taylor

18

Q

And you said that Blake was

19

A

Uh-huh

20

Q

What was he hollering

21

A

Demanding to see paperwork,

was

hollering?

(affirmative).
about?
the

shipping

reports.

23

Q

Did he say why?

24

A

Because he knows the sugar-- he

25

to

and

12

22

all

already

knew by then for sure the sugar had been sold

to
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somebody else besides being destroyed.
Q

How is it that Blake already knew this?

A

Because a week before that he was

suspended and I guess when he was being suspended
Otto brought up the fact-- Otto said something about
the sugar was shipped to a pet supply.
Q

Okay.

A

Something to that effect.

You'll have to

ask him for sure, but that's what it was.
Q

How did you learn this?

A

He told me.

Q

Who is "he"?

A

Blake.

Q

When?

A

After he got suspended.

Q

Okay.

So at this meeting when the two of

you went back-A

And it was what we speculated before just

came out the truth when Otto mentioned that to Blake
when he got suspended.

It was just something that

we always thought and felt.

And I don't know, if I

had any questions I would ask Blake or if I wanted
something fixed up there, I was always the quiet
one, Blake, get this fixed, and Blake would get it
fixed because he wouldn't stop until it was done one
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1

way or another.

2

them that, and he would.

3

Q

Okay.

So it was Blake, ask them t h i s ,

But going back to this meeting

ask

that

4

you had when you and Blake Waddoups went back

to the

5

plant,

May?

6

A

I believe

7

Q

Okay.

8

I think you said it was on the 31st of
it w a s .

You said Blake was hollering

some kind of shipping

records?

9

A

Uh-huh

10

Q

And this started out in the

11

A

Uh-huh

12

Q

Then someone showed him the

13

to see

(affirmative).
lunchroom?

(affirmative).
shipping

records?

14

A

Vic

15

Q

And where did this take

16

A

That took place out by the front g a t e .

17

Q

So how did you move from the lunchroom

18
19

the front
A

did.
place?

gate?
W e l l , at one time they were telling us to

20

get off the premises because

21

so we were moving out.

22

and Vic

23

went and got them and showed them to u s .

24

a quick glance at

25

Q

to

it was private

property

Blake is hollering as we go,

finally must have give in and said okay

Okay.

and

I just

had

them.
And after Blake was showing

you
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1 I

Q

Just

focusing on yourself, at any

2 | after the Mike Davis accident

time

did you bring up

3 I concern you had about possible

contaminated

any

sugar?

4

A

No.

5

Q

You never brought

6

A

No.

7

Q

You didn't mention it to

8

A

No, because he said it was going to be

9

destroyed

10

Q

so I figured
Okay.

it up to

anyone?

Darwayne?

they would destroy it.

But whether

it's about those

rail

11

cars or those two rail cars or any other area,

12

you at any time bring up any concern

13

contaminated

14

death?

15

A

Once about the

16

Q

Explain that to me.

17

A

The humidifier

did

about

sugar at any time after Mike

Davis's

humidifier.

is a hose we hook up

into

18

the bottom of the cars that blows warm air into

19

cars.

20

your hand

21

particles.

22

at and it's blowing

23
24
25

the

You can stand there and turn it on and put

Q
getting
A

in front of it and it's
It's taking particles
them into the

shooting
from where

it

cars.

So some kind of dust particles could
into those cars through the
Uh-huh

sits

be

humidifier?

(affirmative).

172

Q

And did you raise that concern with

anyone?
A

I just told Darwayne about that, you know,

What good does that do?

You know, Why do we have to

do this?
Q

But did you tell Darwayne about dust

particles getting into the car?
A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

He went out and

stuck his hand in front of it and he could feel it.
Q

What did he say?

A

Yeah, but there was nothing he could do

about it .
Q

Did you tell anyone besides Darwayne about

A

No.

Q

Are you saying that there's some

this?

connection between your telling Darwayne about the
dust particles and the humidifier and your getting
fired?
A

Did I say that?

Q

Are you saying that?

A

No.

That had nothing to do with the death

so I didn't .
Q

So with respect to Mike Davis's death, did

you raise any issue of contamination with anyone?
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A

No .
MR. CARR:

Just a point of clarification,

I apologize because I did miss some here.

It's my

understanding from his previous testimony that he
was in the presence of Mr. Waddoups when Mr.
Waddoups brought these things up about the
contamination from the accident.
MR. GAVRE:

I was only asking about what

Mr. Sparrow himself did.
MR. CARR:

I understand, but they were

together when this happened.
MR. GAVRE:

I haven't disputed that.

I'm

just trying to get information down.
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Sparrow, I'm not

trying to argue with you about anything.

I'm

trying

to learn what you know and what you think happened.
So I'm asking a lot of questions just so I can get
the story down in the level of detail I need, that's
all.
When you had that final meeting out at the
plant after you and Blake had been fired and the two
of you came back and you've described that Blake was
hollering and asking about the shipping records and
about those two rail cars and that eventually Vic or
someone showed him the shipping records--
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A

It was Vic.

Q

Vic, okay.

A

Not that I can recall.

Q

Did Vic point out what the shipping

Did Vic say anything?

records showed?
A

No.

Because he just opened it and I can

remember-- I just had a chance to glance at it, he
didn't have it open very long, and just kind of
asked us to leave.
Q

Okay.

Did Vic show any reluctance to show

either you or Blake those shipping records?
A

Uh-huh, yes.

Q

Did he say why?

A

No.

Just something like it was company

property and, you know, we were no longer an
employee-- you know, employed there, you know,
something like that.
Q

When you got fired did you file a

grievance with the union?
A

No.

Q

Did you think about filing a grievance?

A

Yes .

Q

Why did you not file a grievance?

A

Because it would have been, I believe, May

26th when I talked to Bill Stewart on the phone, I
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there's no mystery there.
A

Yes .

Q

So you knew that.

So why didn't you file

a grievance to see whether you would get some
success through the grievance process?
MR. CARR:

For the record, I want to voice

an objection as asked and answered.

He's already

told you he talked to his supervisor who told him it
wouldn't do any good.
Q

Can you answer?

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Aside from the fact that

Bill Stewart told you whatever he told you, why
didn't you file a grievance?
A

Because we feel like it wouldn't do any

good .
Q

When you say "we"?

A

Blake and I.

Q

I'm really asking about you.

A

I didn't feel like it would either.

Q

Why is that?

A

Because I felt they wanted us gone.

We

were looking for any little excuse, they got one and
they're got going to let go of it.
Q

Any other reason?

A

No .

Q

Can you briefly describe to me your duties
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as a bulk
A

loader?
Briefly describe.

to put sugar

Just be a bulk

in the rail cars and make

loader,

sure

they're

in g r a d e , proper sealed, paperwork, and take
samples

like you're supposed

Q

What

A

You're

beginning,

to.

samples are you supposed

to

supposed to take one at

take?

the

the start, depending on the c u s t o m e r ,

take one every 500 or even every 2 0 0 , every
bags,

your

you

200

I m e a n , and you take them to the lab and be

sure they're

in g r a d e , your sugar is in g r a d e , it

has to be between certain s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .

And I

don't know, proper placement of the seals and

the

sanitation of the sugar.
Q

Okay.

other samples
200 or 500

Did you do any sampling, take

than the one you just described

any
every

bags?

A

No.

Q

Is there another sample that's taken to be

tested

for purity or anything

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Everytime

like

that?

It's called a composite.
The composite

bit of that and put

sample?

I take a sample

I take a little

it into your composite

bottle.

When you're done you have a little bit of sugar

from
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the beginning, the middle and the end and you take
it to the lab and they run the pads over it and
check for ash or whatever.
Q

So the second sample, what you called the

composite sample, is that test for purity of the
sugar?
A

Sure, yeah.

Q

And any contaminants and that kind of

thing?
A

Sure .

Q

How is that composite sample taken?

A

A little wand that you hold under the

spout where the sugar is coming out.
Q

The wand is something that collects it?

A

Yeah, it has a little bucket on it and you

fill it up and pour it into these little plastic
bottles .
Q

If you're filling a rail car, how long do

you take a sample with this wand?
A

To start, every 500.

Okay.

When you get

to going, you take one at the start, then every 500
or 150, or it could be at the start or every 200,
depending on the customer, depending on what they
want .
Q

Are there two different sampling
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some lab people to do the testing of the sugar?
A

Yes .

Q

And for the composite test, you don't do

any of that testing?
A

No.

Well, some of them will sit there all

weekend long before somebody comes in Monday and
does it .
Q

So I take it that you're not in the

position yourself to judge the quality or the purity
of the sugar of any one shipment?
A

No .

Q

And as a bulk loader, do you fill out any

forms?
A

Yes .

Q

You fill out just one form or multiple

forms, or how do you do that?
A

We fill out three.

Q

Okay.

Can you describe the three forms

you fill out?
A

One of them is your shipping report.

Q

What do you fill out on a shipping report?

A

The seal numbers, what cell are you coming

out of, the car number, the seals, the numbers you
put on the car, what time you started, finished.
Q

And this is on the shipping report?
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A

Yes .

Q

Okay.

or second

What's the other form you fill

form you fill

out

out?

A

Inspection

Q

Okay.

A

T h a t ' s when you write down each n u m b e r

What

report.
is that?
of

the seals you put on the car, then you check, and on
the bottom--

the top portion

is supposed

filled out by somebody else.
filled out by the foreman.
time and

It's supposed

one

The

that you fill out, was your car

ready

to be

I used to do it at

I was told not to do it no m o r e .

bottom part
cleaned,

to be

ready,

for loading, you write down y e s .

Q

So do you check out the car and then you--

A

Some cars you check more closely

than

o t h e r s , but yes .
Q

Okay.

A

Well,

And what's the third

form you

fill

out?
I used to fill it out but

sign it, I would get it ready
would be the seal

I wouldn't

for my foreman, and it

report.

Q

This

is another

report?

A

Uh-huh

Q

A n o t h e r piece of paper?

A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

(affirmative).
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And on the seal report do you put down

3

each seal number?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Is there anything else that goes on this

6

seal report?

7

A

No.

8

Q

Is there a place for you to sign it?

9

A

Not for me.

10

Q

And the bulk loader doesn't sign the seal

11

report?

12

A

No.

13

Q

And what do you do with this document, the

14
15

seal report document, when you're finished?
A

16
17

I just set it out for my foreman.
(Exhibit 5 marked for identification,)

Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Sparrow, let me show

18

you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 5.

19

take a minute to look at it?

20

you anything about this particular document, but I

21

was hoping you could identify for me the kind of

22

document it is.

I'm not going to ask

23

A

It's the inspection report.

24

Q

Okay.

25

Will you

So is this one of the three

documents that you, as a bulk loader, fill out?

186

A

Uh-huh, yes.

Q

And I notice at the top it's labeled

Initial and Final Inspection, Bulk Shipments.

And

then it's got several categories, the first one
being Initial Inspection, the second one being Car
Cleaning Report and the third being Car Loading
Report.

And does a bulk loader like yourself or Mr

Waddoups fill out just the Car Loading Report
section of this?
A

Yes .

Q

So this is one of the three reports you

regularly fill out?
A

Yes, down here.

Q

Is that correct?

A

Yes .

Q

And you only fill out the section of the

page that comes under the title Car Loading Report;
is that correct?
A

Yes .

Q

And then after you check the boxes yes or

no you put the date and time, and do you p u t excuse me.

You don't put the date and time, that's

under the next section, but would you normally put
your signature where it says Signature - Bulk
Loader?
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1

A

Yes.

2

MR. CARR:

3

talking only about

4

Report and Final

5

Shipment; is that

Just so I'm clear,

the 15 lines between Car

Inspection and Approval

THE W I T N E S S :

7

MR. G A V R E :
15.

9

at least numbers

Well,

I don't know

if

it's

it looks

like

1 and 2 appear to b e - -

MR. CARR:

11

MR. G A V R E :
Q

for

Yes.

I do see the numbering, although

10

12

Loading

correct?

6

8

we're

You're

right.

-- above the heading.

(BY MR. GAVRE)

But let me ask Mr.

13

Sparrow, just looking at this document, N o . 5, you

14

see along the sides there is a place

15

numbers and I see on the left-hand side

16

numbered

1 through

15 for top of car and then

17

numbered

1 through

15 for bottom of car, and

18

that some seal numbers on this particular one

19

filled

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Do you, as the bulk loader, have any

22

seal
it's
it's
I see
are

in?

in putting

in these seal numbers on this

23

A

On this side, no.

24

Q

You're

25

for

role

page?

talking about, just so the

record

indicates - -
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A

On the left-hand side, no.

on the right-hand side, yes.

These are the seals

that we'll be putting on the car.
seals.
Q

On this side,

These are inbound

When the car comes in they should be sealed.
Okay.

So

in filling out t h i s r e p o r t ,

which is Exhibit 5, you fill in the seal numbers of
the seals you put on-A

Yes .

Q

-- is that correct?

Both on the top of

the car and the bottom of the car?
A

Yes .

Q

So there's more openings to be sealed on

the top of the car than there are on the bottom of
the car?
A

Yes.

Q

So you put these numbers in on the

right-hand column, but on the left-hand column over
here, you don't do any of that?
A

No.

Q

Is that correct?

A

No .

Q

And then when you're through you would

sign your name as bulk loader; is that correct?
A

Yes .
(Exhibit 6 marked for identification,)

189

Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Sparrow, let me show

you what's been marked as Exhibit 6.

Again,

I'm

just using this as an example of perhaps the kind of
form you were testifying about.

I'm not going to

ask you any questions about this particular one.
But this looks to me like a shipping report or
perhaps part of a shipping report.

Does it look

familiar to you?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

It's a customer order.
Is this one of the three documents

you were describing before that you filled out?
A

Yes .

Q

And is this what's called an SR or

Shipping Report?
A

Yes .

Q

And I notice on this form or on Exhibit 6,

on the bottom third of the page there's something
that's labeled Bulk Car Loading Chart.

Do you see

that?
A

Yes .

Q

And as a bulk loader do you fill out part

of this chart?
A

Yes.

Q

And what part do you fill out?

A

All of it.
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Q

Okay.

And you put your name down as the

bulk loader?
A

Yes .

Q

And do you just put your name down or do

you go ahead and sign it the way you sign the other
form?
A

You just write down Sparrow.

Q

So you don't actually sign it, you just

indicate that you were, in fact, the bulk loader?
A

Uh-huh

(affirmative).

Q

Okay.

Now, in addition to these two

documents, Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6, there's a third
document that you fill out; is that right?
A

You don't have to.

I used to just do it

to help my foreman.
Q

And that's a form--

A

The seal numbers, and you just write down

the seal numbers.
Q

But that's not a form as bulk loader

you're asked to fill out?
A

No .

Q

But you used to do it for a while?

A

Yeah.

Q

As a favor to your foreman?

A

Yes .
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MR. CARR:
MR. GAVRE:

Don't argue with me.
Just make your objection.

That's all have you to do.
MR. CARR:

I can go on.

Let me finish it before you

keep talking, okay?
MR. GAVRE:
MR. CARR:

Go ahead.
The objection is you're asking

him to interpret a legal document and he's not
qualified, it would be pure speculation on his
part .
MR. GAVRE:

I didn't ask him to interpret

any document.
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Sparrow, you testified

earlier about an occasion in which you called in and
spoke with Bill Stewart and said that you would be
in at a certain time and it turned out you fell
asleep and you didn't get in until later.

Do you

remember that?
A

Yes .

Q

And you were testifying about that in

connection with your working for the Target store.
I believe you said that in fact you told Bill
Stewart that you were tired and that's why you had
fallen asleep?
A

Yeah.
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Q

Is it your understanding

unexcused

that that was an

absence?
MR. CARR:

Same objection.

You

can

answer.
THE W I T N E S S :

That

it was an

unexcused

absence?
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

A

Yes.

And that should have been my first one.

The one dating back to September
recollection

8 marked

(BY MR. GAVRE)

you a document
Again,

no

at all on that.

(Exhibit
Q

10th, I have

for

identification.)

Mr. Sparrow,

let me

that's been labeled as Exhibit

show
8.

I assume you have not seen this b e f o r e .

Let

me just state for the record that this is a
h a n d w r i t t e n note that Bill Stewart made about
incident,

I believe, Mr. Sparrow that you

talking a b o u t .
A

the

were

If you want to--

"I talked to James Sparrow about

not

being"- MR. CARR:

Wait a minute.

I interpose

o b j e c t i o n , again, he has not seen this
MR. G A V R E :
MR. CARR:
don't

I didn't

document.

say he had.

It's hearsay.

need to argue with m e .

an

Listen,

you

This is just a
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deposition, I can put my objections on the record.
MR. GAVRE:
this down.

I know, you're just slowing

No one is asking him to authenticate or

corroborate this.

This may be--

MR. CARR:

He can read it silently, he

doesn't need to read it into the record.
MR. GAVRE:

That's true, but I asked him

too and he did.
MR. CARR:

Make it an Exhibit.

Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

A

"I talked to James Sparrow about not being

to work on time.

It is an Exhibit.

He called at 7:15 a.m.,

would be here at 8:00 a.m.

said he

He fell back to sleep

and did not show up until 10:00 a.m.

He was given

four hours unexcused and explained what would happen
if he had any more unexcused absences."
Q

Does that refresh your recollection of

this incident?
A

Not the September 10th.

what it's dated.

I know that's

As far as that's what more or less

was said between Bill Stewart and I when we talked,
but I thought it was at a later date.
Q

That's fine.

But there's no question that

this event happened?
A

Yes .
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A

I didn't drive.

I rode.

Q

But your sickness, whatever it was, didn't

prevent you from going to Nevada?
A

No, it didn't.

Q

So you could have gone to work that day?

A

No, I couldn't have.

Q

You were well enough to go in a car to

Nevada-A

That's also almost ten hours later.

Q

Okay.

So are you saying you felt better

by the time you went to Nevada?
A

Some better, but I was still in bed,

though.
Q

Tell me again, how did you feel, what kind

of illness did you have that led you to call in
sick.
A
stomach.

I just-- it was just nerves in my
I just felt really queasy and I just

didn't feel like going to work mostly.

It was just

the place had gotten to me and I just didn't feel
like being there.
Q

So you called in sick?

A

Yes.

Q

And then you got on the road with your

ex-wife; is that what you said?
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A

Yes .

Q

And the two of you drove to Nevada?

A

Yes.

Q

And then at some point you were stopped by

police; is that correct?
A

Yes .

Q

And were you driving at that time?

A

The first time, no, the second time yes.

Q

So the car was stopped twice?

A

Yes.

Q

And the first time it was stopped it was

ex-wife driving?
A

Yes .

Q

And why was the car stopped?

A

Speeding.

Q

And then did your ex-wife get a speeding

et?
A

Yes.

Q

And then did you take over driving after

•?
A

No .

Q

Okay.

At some point later you took over

driving?
A

I took over, yes.

Q

And then you were stopped by the police

A

Yes .

Q

And they saw that there was a bench

warrant out for you and so you were taken to the Ely
jail; is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

And that was because there was a bench

warrant out from a prior incident and you hadn't
paid the fine?
A

Correct, yes.

Q

So when you were in the Ely jail, did you

ask someone to call in for you?
A

My sister.

Q

Did you tell her what you wanted her to

say to the company?
A

I told her to say I'm in jail.

Q

And you spent four nights in jail?

A

Three or four.

I can't say for sure.

know I missed the last three days of work.

I

I think

it was only three, but by the time I got back to
Twin-- three nights for sure, it might have been
four .
(Exhibit 10 marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Okay.

Mr. Sparrow,

I've

handed you what's been marked as Exhibit 10, which I
assume you have not seen before, although you may
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1

have.

Have you seen

2

A

No.

3

Q

This

this?

is what we obtained

4

of Elko, the record of the court

5

involving you that you've just been

6

about.

7

document - -

If you would

8
9

MR. CARR:
document

10
11
12

County

proceeding
testifying

turn to the second page of

Again, same o b j e c t i o n s ,

this

That's

(BY MR. GAVRE)

fine.

You see that there

are

dates running down the left-hand column and if we

13 I get to the last two dates on the page you'll
14

that one says 5-21-95

15

was arrested

16

Elko. State of Nevada."

17

after you called

18

were arrested

19
20

the

is hearsay as to this w i t n e s s .
MR. G A V R E :

Q

from the

A

and then it says,

and booked on warrant

"Defendant

in Ely, County of

So the 21st is the

day

in the first time so perhaps

around

see

you

midnight?

It was something

like that.

Probably

by

the time they booked me or whatever.

21

Q

It was the next

22

A

The time

23

Q

The next entry down,

24

on cash bail

25

indicates

day?

I come in from the p o l i c e , yeah.
"Defendant

in the amount of $675."

So

released
that

that you were released on the 25th of
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1

May.

Does that sound right to you?

2

A

Yes .

3

Q

What time of day were you released?

4

A

Was I released?

It's about a four or

5

five-hour drive.

6

morning because I got back to twin at six o'clock

7

because I went straight to the sugar factory and my

8

shift had just gotten over at 6:00.

9

Q

About one or two o'clock

in the

So on the 25th of May you drove back to

10

Twin Falls?

11

A

Yes .

12

Q

From were you in Elko or Ely?

13

A

Ely.

14

Q

And you said you went right back to the

15

plant?

16

A

Yes .

17

Q

And your shift had just finished for the

A

Yes.

18
19

day?
I got there like at 6:20 in the

20

morning and I worked a night shift and they was, I

21

guess if I remember right, I can't remember what day

22

it was, they had had like that Friday and Saturday

23

and Sunday off.

24

was there.

25

out there so I waited a little bit, called my

I just went out there and nobody

The other shift just came on, nobody was
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foreman at home, he told me to call Bill Stewart.
Q

I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you.

A

Then he told me to call Bill Stewart.

Q

Did you talk to anyone at the plant while

you were there?
A

No.

Q

You phoned your foreman at home, and

that's Wayne-A

Darwayne.

Q

Excuse me, Darwayne.

A

I asked him if I was fired and h e -

Q

Why did you ask him if you were fired?

A

Because I spent three days in jail and I

What did you tell

him?

should have worked.

I worked Friday.

three days of work.

That's unexcused.

I missed
Plus I knew

I had one before and that's four, and I knew I coul
be terminated for that.
Q

You knew you could be terminated for

unexcused absences and you had enough to be
terminated?
A

Yeah.

Q

Did you say anything else to Darwayne

besides asking whether you were fired?
A

No, not that I can remember.
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something and I talked to him the next day.
Q

What did you tell Bill Stewart the next

A

I asked him what was going on.

day?
He said,

Well, I had to sign the paper saying you were fired,
discharged the 22nd.
Q

Okay.

Did he say why?

A

I can't remember.

Q

Okay.

A

That's when I asked him if there was-- he

I'm sure he did.

What did you tell him?

asked me if I wanted to take it a step higher.
said, Well, like what, talk to Vic?
-I have already done that.
And he said yes.
Yes.

I

He says, Well,

I said, You have, Bill?

I said, should I talk to Bill?

Then I go, That won't make any difference, and

he said, Yes, it does.

Like I said before, I have

respect for Bill Stewart and if he says, You're
fired, then you're fired.

So I just went along with

him .
Q

Okay.

Was anything else said?

A

No.

Q

Did you tell him anything about why you

had been arrested or why you were in jail?
A
up.

Not that I can remember.

Oh, they came

He asked me, he goes-- he asked me what time I

219

MR. CARR:

Especially if he's reported it.

THE WITNESS:
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Can you repeat it now?
Was there any question in

your mind that being absent from work because you're
in jail is an unexcused absence?
A

I have always believed before that it was.

Q

It was always believed that it was an

unexcused absence?
A

Yes .

Q

So by the time you got back to work on the

25th and your shift was finished you had four
unexcused absences; is that correct?
A

Correct.

Q

What happened next after you had this

telephone conversation with Bill Stewart on the 26th
of May, 1995?
A

What happened next?

I went to Blake's

house and-Q

What did you tell Blake?

A

I didn't know he was fired at the time.

Actually, I went next door to Blake's house because
I was seeing a girl that lived next door to Blake.
And then I see Blake's truck there and I go over
there because he should have been at work.
What are you doing?

And he goes, Like I'm

I said,
fired.
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1

Bulk Car Loading Chart, did you do anything else?

2

A

No.

3

Q

Regarding this car?

4

A

No.

5
6

Just the part I pointed about void

and that, that's all.
Q

You wrote in that part.

We're looking at

7

Exhibit 6.

Is any other portion of the handwritten

8

portion of Exhibit 6 in your handwriting?

9

A

No .

10

Q

Do you recognize the other handwriting on

11

Exhibit 6?

12

A

Blake Waddoups.

13 I

Q

Okay.

Did you ever tell anyone at

14

Amalgamated that you did not want to sign off on

15

shipments of adulterated sugar?

16

A

Well, those two cars, I don't think it was

17

that big of a deal if he would have or not.

18

supposed to be destroyed.

19

Q

It was

But did you ever tell anyone at

20

Amalgamated that you did not want to sign off on

21

shipments of adulterated sugar?

22

A

No.

23

Q

On these cars or any other cars

24
25

subsequently?
A

Well, like that one car where I thought I
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lost the plastic, or the cardboard in, but that was
taken care of, so just that.

And a couple of months

before that I was taking a hygrometer, I was taking
a reading towards the end of the car and I was
pulling it back up and I hit it along the side of
the hatch and two little small batteries came out of
it and one of them I found and the other one I never
did find so I suspected it landed in the car.

And I

didn't want my name to go to that if they were going
to send it to a customer, but those were the only
times, you know, I wouldn't want to sign my name to
paperwork if it wasn't going to be taken care of and
it was.
Q

So you never told anyone at Amalgamated

Sugar that you didn't want to sign off on shipments
of sugar because it had sugar contaminated from the
Mike Davis accident?
A

No.

Q

What is meant by the term "seal reports"

or is that a term that means anything to you?
A

It's just a like another precaution of

being sure when the locomotives-- you know, when
they take the cars to be shipped, that they are
secure.

They're supposed to look to be sure that

the cars are sealed and then on another piece of
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Q

Now, did you sign any reports or sign your

name to any documents under duress?
A

Well, maybe you just haven't been there to

feel the pressures and all this.

Yes, it felt under

duress.
Q

Did you ever object to signing some form?

A

No.

Q

And have someone tell you--

A

I didn't object, I just went and did it on

my own, I went and took my name off of these.
Q

You didn't care--

A

I didn't care what anybody was going to

•say, I wanted my name off of it.
Q

I just want to be sure with respect to

what you're saying.

With respect to the rail cars

that were loaded on the day of the Mike Davis
accident, you took your name off of the Bulk Car
Loading Chart; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Well, yes.

Order form, I still call

that the order form.
Q

That's fine with me.

I'm not familiar

with these forms the way you are.

Now, at any later

date did you refuse to sign some form?
A

No.

Q

Did you at any later date tell anyone at
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Amalgamated that you didn't want to sign some form?
A

No.

Q

So as you continued to work as a bulk

loader, for each rail car you would get a form like
Exhibit 6; is that correct?
A

Yes .

Q

And you would fill it out as this one is

filled out; is that correct?
A

Yes .

Q

And you would put your name down as the

bulk loader?
A

Yes .

Q

And would you sign the form where it says

Final Inspection and Sealed?
A

If I did.

Q

Yes, sir, of course.

A

If I started the car and left like an hour

later, my name would just be there on Preload.

If I

had just started loading it, Preload.
Q

If you were the bulk loader?

A

From start to finish, yes, I would sign

Q

Then you would sign on the form that is

it .

Exhibit 6 on the line that says Final Inspection and
Sealed; is that correct?
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A

Yes.

I would sign it and the foreman

would sign it.
Q

Is there any occasion when you refused to

sign it?
A

Refused, no.

Q

Was there any occasion in which you said

to anyone that you didn't want to sign it?
A

No.

Q

Was there any occasion in which someone

pressured you to sign it?
A

No.

If there was ever-- there was a

couple of times, it seems like a Car Loaded By Blake
Waddoups, sometimes it would have two people's names
on it or three maybe, where it has happened in the
past, but let's say head trims were not free of
crusty sugar and I didn't want to load it.

I would

put my name there and I would go talk, because we've
done it before, I would go, I don't like this.

He

would say, Load it and put my initials, and he would
initial it to show it was like it was inspected by
both of us.
Q

That's happened before.

But that doesn't have anything to do with

the Mike Davis accident, does it?
A

No.

But I would have never stuck my name

on it if he never would have initialed it, you know.
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A

No.

Q

In 1995 did you have problems or

difficulties with any employees, management
employees or nonmanagement employees at the company?
A

Management employees?

Q

Or nonmanagement.

I'm asking, you know, a

big question.
A

Just my co-worker.

Q

Is that Sam Garcia?

A

Uh-huh

Q

And you've explained that he wasn't a very

(affirmative).

good worker, in your view, and you were having
difficulty with him because he wasn't doing his job
well enough?
A

Correct.

Q

Aside from those difficulties, did you

have difficulty with anyone at Amalgamated?
A

No.

Q

Have you been in good health since you

left Amalgamated?
A

Yes.

I just had a physical done two weeks

Q

And what was the result of the physical?

A

She said I was very healthy.

Q

And have you been in good health since May

ago .
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'95 when you left Amalgamated?
A

No.

Q

Pardon?

A

Not-- physically, yes, but emotionally,

Q

Can you explain that?

A

Well, just being fired it really bummed me

no .

out.

It really made me feel like I was a nobody, a

nothing, like I wasn't a worth a fight for, to stay
on there at the sugar factory when I tried so hard
to do them a good job.

If they knew how many breaks

I missed and how many times I missed lunch to make
•them look good, and then they didn't try once for
me.

It just made me feel like I wasn't worth it and

it just kind of made you go, Wow, you know.
Q

Okay.

A

I couldn't believe it.

Q

Okay.

I still don't.

But aside from being bummed out, or

whatever term you want to use, from being fired,
have you been otherwise in good health?
A

Well, physically, yeah.

Q

Have you seen a doctor since you left

Amalgamated Sugar other than the doctor for the
physical you just mentioned?
A

Just when I have to go take drug testing
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1
2
3
4

to go to these different jobs.
Q

So different jobs require employee drug

testing and you go and have that done?
A

That's the only time I've had to see a

5

doctor.

6

nothing.

7

help ourselves.

8

helped ourselves through a lot more than any of

9

those people will ever know.

10

Q

I've never had to get counseling or
I thought about it, but me and Blake would
We would talk to each other.

We

So you haven't seen a psychologist or

11

psychiatrist or therapist since you left

12

Amalgamated; is that correct?

13 I

A

Correct.

14

Q

Have you been on any kind of medication

15

since you left Amalgamated?

16

A

No.

17

Q

When you left Amalgamated in May of 1995,

18

did you immediately begin looking for work?

19

A

I would take a month.

20

Q

So you didn't look for work for about a

21

month?

22

A

Correct.

23

Q

Were you able to work at that time?

Aside

24

from not looking for a job, were you able to work if

25

you had a j ob?
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1

reference?

2

A

Bill Stewart.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

Well, I went to Bill Stewart one day and I

What did you ask Bill Stewart?

5

asked him, What the hell is this-- well,, okay.

I'm

6

going to refer to when I applied at the beet dump

7

and they said no.

8

personnel she just said, No, we don't even want him

9

on the grounds.

When that lady talked to Clara in

After that I went and talked to

10

Bill and I said, Bill, what the hell are you guys

11

doing saying this?

12

them to call me and I'll give you a good one, and I

13

said thanks.

14
15

Q

He says, From now on just tell

And do you know whether anyone ever called

Bill Stewart?

16

A

As far as I know, I think one person has.

17

Q

Do you know who that would be?

18

A

I believe it would be Oreida Foods.

19

Q

And you worked at Oreida?

20

A

Just through the temporary service out in

21

their cellars, not in the factory itself.

22

did in the factory then I applied.

When I

23

Q

You applied for a job at Oreida?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And you think that someone at Oreida may
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have called Bill Stewart?
A

Yes.

Q

Why do you think that?

A

Well, they were going to-- they were going

to hire me.

They put me through their physical,

drug testing and everything and everything passed,
and I don't know if they talked to Bill Stewart or
if they talked to somebody else.

Then all of a

sudden they just said, We don't need you, and they
just let me go.
or nothing.

I didn't even have a chance to work

But first they set up extra

appointments and I went through their physicals and
everything.

I had to take two physicals, one that

they gave there at the factory and one at a doctor,
and it included drug testing, and everything came
back good and the next think I know, I can't say for
sure, it's like they called the sugar factory and
the sugar factory kind of told them what was going
on and they said, No, we won't hire you then.
Q

So you applied for a job at Oreida and you

went through the physical exams, etc., and you did
the drug test?
A

Yes .

Q

And then Oreida told you they weren't

hiring; is that correct?
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A

Yes .

Q

Did they say why they were not hiring you?

A

They said they had everybody they needed.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Did they say anything else?
She said I would be one of the first

people they would call.
Q

They never did.

Do you remember the name of the person you

spoke to at Oreida?
A

Linda, the first name is Linda.

Q

And she was the person who told you that--

A

She was the personnel office who called

Clara at the sugar factory.
Q

This woman named Linda at Oreida said to

you that they have everyone that they need right
now?
A

Yes .

Q

And that you would be among the first

called if they needed more people?
A

Yes, which she never did.

And I went

there and applied again just a few weeks ago because
they had it advertised in the paper and everything
they needed people and I have done that kind of work
before, and at least I've got experience, and why
they won't hire me, I have no idea.
Q

So you applied a second time at Oreida?
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1

A

Correct.

2

Q

So you don't know what went on at the

3

factory during the days of those four days; is that

4

correct?

5
6
7

A

Correct.

It should have been .cleanup,

though.
Q

Right.

Before we took this last break you

8

were talking about your application for employment

9

at a company called Oreida.

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Did anyone at Oreida tell that you Oreida

12
13 I
14
15

had contacted Amalgamated Sugar about you?
A

No.

They just said they would, but as far

as if they did or not, I have no idea.
Q

Do you know if anyone for Amalgamated

16

Sugar was in contact with any of your subsequent

17

employers or any of the companies you applied for

18

work at?

19

A

Just what I told you about the beet dump.

20

Q

Right.

21

A

That's the only time.

22

Q

Okay.

So you don't know of any

23

communications between anyone at Amalgamated Sugar

24

and any other employer regarding you; is that

25

correct?
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A

Correct.
MR. GAVRE:

I don't think I have any

further questions at this time.
MR. CARR:

No questions.

MR. GAVRE:

How do you want to. handle

signing, any suggestions?
instructions?

Send it to him with

Do you want to have it sent directly

to Mr. Sparrow?
MR. CARR:

Or you can send it to us and--

probably send it to us.
THE WITNESS:

It will be best to send it

to you because I'm moving real soon.
(Whereupon, the taking of the deposition
was concluded at 4:30 p.m.)
--00O00--
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Tab 3

INFORMATION SHEET FOR THE TWIN FALLS FACTORY
SAFETY
1.
2.

3*

Work as safely and carefully as possible. If you are not sure
if something is safe, ask your Foreman.
Report all injuries, no matter how small, to your Foreman and
the First Aid Station in the Factory Lab immediately. All
visits to the doctor or hospital for work related injuries
require prior approval of the Safety Director.
In each work area, there is a list of special safety equipment
needed in that area. You are responsible for checking out and
using this equipment. The safety equipment is located in the
Storeroom or Tool Crib.

ATTENDANCE
1.

You must come in, on time, every day your shift is scheduled
to work. If you will be late, or absent, you must call in to
the factory to report it. Phone numbers are 733-6888 or 7334104. Failure to do this is grounds for immediate dismissal.
It is your responsibility to get to work and be on time. All
reasons that you may choose to miss work for may not be
excused. For example if you do not have a ride to work and
you miss the full shift this absence will be unexcused. It is
your responsibility to clear all absences with your
supervisor. The maximum number of unexcused absences you can
receive before being terminated is three (3).

GENERAL INFORMATION
1.
2.

No pay advances will be given.
The time clock and most lockers are in the locker room.
Please keep all personal belongings in your locker that you do
not need at your station.
3. Lunch and break periods will be scheduled by your Foreman.
Where breaks are authorized away from the work station they
are limited to ten (10) minutes maximum and lunch is thirty
(30) minutes maximum„
4. Tou may park your car in an unmarked spot in the parking lot.
LOCK TOUR CAR. Employees are not allowed in the parking lot
during working hours.
5. Phone calls are permitted only during breaks and only from the
pay phone in the locker room.
6. With a few exceptions, everyone will be on a rotating shift.
Tour scheduled days off will be according to what shift letter
you are assigned to.
7. All new employees are on probation for forty-five (45) days.
8. The Storeroom is located in the center of the factory.
9. AAyone completing campaign will be offered a campaign job next
year before anyone new is hired.
10. At the end of campaign, there may be a few intercampaign
positions available.
They will be given to the campaign
workers who show an interest in year round employment, have a
skill we need, have established good work habits which
includes good attendance.
11. Radios, tape recorders, etc. are not permitted in the Factory.
*~~
*K<* hack of the time card are in effect and

Tab 4

AGREEMENT
between
The Amalgamated Sugar Company
and
The American Federation of Grain
Millers Local Unions
Nos. 282, 283, 284 & 290
Affiliated with the AFL-CIO

TERM AUGUST 1, 1993 TO JULY 3 1 , 1996

(a) quit, retires, or
(b) is discharged for just cause, or
(c) fails to report within the reasonable
time specified in the notice for
Campaign employment, which notice
will be sent to the last address he has
furnished to the Company.
13.3 SENIORITY LISTS: The Company will
provide two seniority lists at each factory on
February 1, April 1, June 1, and September 1
of any year, In addition, the Company will provide seniority lists at other reasonable periods providing notification is given the Factory
Accounting Manager on a timely basis before the end of a payroll period. One seniority
list would be for Regular Employees and one
would be for Non-Regular Employees. The
Regular Employee list will be based on the
number of hours of continuous service. The
Non-Regular seniority list will be based on the
number of months of Campaign worked.
These lists will be posted for thirty (30) days
for corrections and, if no objections are made,
will be accepted as authentic lists. The appropriate Union officer shall be furnished a copy
of both lists.

ARTICLE 14

DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
14.1 The Company has the right to discipline
or discharge employees for just cause. Discharge shall be evidenced in writing which
shall state the reason for the discharge and
shall be given to the employee at the time of
his discharge. An employee who believes his
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discipline or discharge is not justified shall have
recourse to the grievance procedure under the
Agreement.
14.2 Written warnings are not required nor
forbidden by this Article. A copy of ail written
warnings (Incident Report Form) and discharge notices will be given to the Union. The
Union will acknowledge receipt of such copy
by initialing the Company copy of the notices.
Employee's signature does not constitute personal admission of guilt, but acknowledges
receipt of document.

ARTICLE 15
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
15.1 STEWARDS: The Local Unions may
designate at least three (3) of their members
to act as Stewards. Such Stewards shall not
assume any of the duties or powers of a supervisor. They shall be empowered by the
Union to aid in adjusting grievances between
employees and the Company. All grievances
involving employees shall be adjusted whenever possible between the immediate supervisor or the foreman under them, and the
Employee Steward. In case they are unsuccessful In their efforts to adjust grievances with
these officials, the grievance shall be submitted to the Employee's Committee hereinafter
provided for.
15.2 EMPLOYEES'COMMITTEE:
The Local Unions agree to designate from their membership a workmen's committee of three (3)
employees whose name shall be posted on
the Bulletin Board.
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15.3 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE:
Step 1, An employee claiming a grievance
shall put his grievance in writing to his Steward within five (5) scheduled working days of
the Employee's knowledge of the occurrence
to be grieved. The Steward shall attempt to
settle the grievance through discussions with
the Grievant and his immediate supervisor.
Within two (2) scheduled work days after receipt of the grievance, the Steward shall notify the Employee's Committee that he has not
succeeded in a settlement of the grievance.
Step 2. If the Steward has failed to settle the
grievance with the immediate supervisor in
Step 1, the Employee's Committee within three
(3) scheduled working days after receiving the
grievance from the Steward, shall pass upon
the grievance. In the event the Employee's
Committee decides the grievance is entitled
to further consideration, they shall within two
(2) scheduled work days submit the written
grievance to the Local Management. The
grievance shall briefly state the nature of the
grievance, violation alleged and settlement
request. The Second Step hearing will be held
within five (5) scheduled work days of the receipt of the written grievance from the
Employee's Committee. The Company shall
give the Union a written decision within five
(5) scheduled work days of the Step 2 hearing. Discharge grievances will start in Step 2
and must be submitted directly to the
Employee's Committee within five (5/ scheduled wonk days from the time the employee
receives the written notice of discharge.

receipt of the second step answer, refer the
grievance to the International Representative
and/or the appropriate Company Official for
further handling. If a satisfactory agreement
cannot be reached between the International
Representative and appropriate Company
Official with thirty (30) days, it will then be referred to the local Union before proceeding into
the arbitration procedure. Time is of the essence and all grievances must be handled
within the prescribed time limits set forth
herein. Failure to do so shall constitute forfeitures of the written grievance by either party
failing to do so. Time limits may be extended
by mutual agreement between the parties.

Step 3. In the event the grievance is not settled
in Step 2, either party, if they so desire, may
within five (5) scheduled work days after the

15.4 ARBITRATION PROCEDURE:
If a
grievance is to be carried to arbitration, either
the Company or the Union shall notify the other
party of its intention by Certified Mail within
two (2) weeks after the parties have determined that a satisfactory settlement cannot be
reached.
If the Company and the Union are unable
promptly to agree upon an impartial arbitrator, the parties will request a list of arbitrators
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. The impartial arbitrator shall be designated in accordance with the procedures of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
The Arbitrator shall have authority to act only
with respect to grievances relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of
this Agreement and his decision shall be final
and binding on all parties involved.
Each party shall pay its own expenses incurred
in arbitration. The fees and expenses of the
Arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Company and the Union.
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15.5 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
A
Union representative may be present at meetings involving disciplinary action by the Company if requested by the Employee.
ARTICLE 16

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
16.1 It is mutually agreed that during the life
of this Agreement If both parties to same abide
by the terms of this Agreement there shall be
no cessation of work of the employees or action in any form taken or permitted by them
impairing Employer's operation or affecting the
distributions of his product, nor shall there by
any lockout by Employer.
ARTICLE 17

SEVERANCE PAY
17.1 SEVERANCE PAY GRANTED: In the
event the operation of the sugar producing
facilities of any of the plants covered by this
Agreement is to be permanently discontinued
by the Company, an Regular Employees, at
the affected factory, with three or more years
of continuous service shall be granted severance pay, unless the Company or Its successors offers the Employee employment either
at the same or other location at a similar or
reasonable rate of pay. The Employee will
have the option of accepting the transfer to
another factory or accepting severance pay.
17.2 BENEFTTS ALLOWED: An eligible employee who has completed three (3) full years
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of continuous service shall receive severance
pay of one (1) week's pay (40 hours) based
upon the regular straight time base wage rate
received by the Employee at the close of the
last Campaign prior to the discontinuance of
that factory operation. For each additional year
of continuous service, an eligible employee will
receive one (1) week's pay, on the same basis as indicated above, up to a maximum of
thirteen (13) weeks severance pay. It is understood that upon receipt of severance pay,
and employee relinquishes all recall, seniority, and employment rights with the Company.

ARTICLE 18

MISCELLANEOUS
18.1 BULLETIN BOARDS: The Company
shall furnish employees suitable places for the
posting of notices and bulletins pertaining to
employee and Company affairs. Notices
posted on the Union Bulletin Boards by the
Union must bear the signature of the President or Secretary of the Local Union.
18.2 UNION AFFAIRS: It is agreed that no
Union activities or Union business of any kind
be carried on by Stewards or other Union
members during the time they are gainfully
employed on shift by the Company. It Is further agreed that Stewards or other Union officers may, if they wish, solicit Union members,
collect membership dues, contact new employees, or otherwise carry on Union business in
the Company locker room prior to and after
the close of each shift, providing all parties
concerned are off shift. In case of emergency,..
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS
and JAMES EDWARD SPARROW,
JR. ,

Case No. 950900441
Judge Stanton Taylor

Plaintiffs,
vs .

DEPOSITION OF:

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, et al.,

BLAKE WILLIAM

WADDOUPS

Defendants.

The deposition of BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS,
a witness in the above-entitled cause, taken before
LANETTE SHINDURLING, Registered

Professional

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, at the law offices of PARSONS, BEHLE &
LATIMER, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the 13th day of September, 1996,
commencing at 8:30

a.m.

Associated Professional Reporters

the process of what we're doing here today?
A

No.

Q

Mr. Waddoups, would you state your full

name and address for the record?
A

Blake William Waddoups, HC66 Box 3-C,

Declo, Idaho, 83323.
Q

Is that the address you just gave, is tha

a mailbox or is that where you actually live?
A

That's a mailbox.

Q

Okay.

A

It's close to that.

Q

Okay.

And where is your residence?
It's in the country.

You live somewhere in the vicinity

of Declo, Idaho?
A

Yes.

Q

How long have you lived there?

A

For approximately-- right at about a year

Q

Okay.

A

Twin Falls, Idaho.

Q

And where in Twin Falls, Idaho?

A

I can't remember the address.

And where did you live before that

588 1/2

Adams, yes.
Q

Okay.

And how long did you live there?

A

For seven years.

Q

Mr. Waddoups, are you currently employed?

A

Yes, I am.

1

Q

And where do you work?

2

A

I work through Express Personnel Services

3

Q

What is Express Personnel Services?

4

A

A temporary personnel services.

5

Q

And where is that based or where does it

6

have an office that you use?

7

A

Burley, Idaho.

8

Q

Okay.

9

And are you working on a particula

job through this temporary service?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

For Darrell's Welding.

13

Q

Where is Darrell's Welding?

14

A

165 500 South, Burley, Idaho.

15

Where are you working now?

165 East,

guess it would be.

16

Q

17

place?

18

A

Approximately six months.

19

Q

And how much are you being paid on that

21

A

$8 . 50 an hour.

22

Q

Are you receiving any benefits on that

A

Through Express I've got very minimal

20

23
24
25

And how long have you worked at that

job?

job?

insurance that will cover my newborn child.

Q

So you have some medical insurance?

A

Yes .

Q

Does the medical insurance cover you as

A

Yes.

Q

And does it cover your wife?

A

I'm still not sure on that one.

well?

We're not

legally married.
Q

Excuse me?

A

We're not legally married at this time.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes .

Q

And your current medical insurance does

But you have a child?

cover your child?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you have more than one child?

A

No.

Q

Are you currently looking for any other

A

I can't answer that.

work?
I haven't thought

about it .
Q

Okay.

But I take it you're not right now

actively searching for another job?
A

At this exact moment, no, I'm down here.

Q

But you said you had been working for

1

about six months at a welding company.

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And do you anticipate that that job will

4

continue for a while?

5
6

A

Not necessarily.

I'm on through a

temporary agency.

7

Q

Okay.

So have you, while you've been

8

working at this welding company, have you been

9

looking for any other job besides the one you're on?

10

A

Yes.

Earlier in working for him I looked

11

for other welding, you know, positions.

12

last probably two months.

13

depositions, he's easy to work for.

Not in the

With the baby and these

14

Q

So I take it you have a new baby?-

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

When you were looking for other jobs while

17

you're at Darrell's Welding, do you recall what

18

other jobs you looked for?

19

A

Welding jobs.

20

Q

Do you recall what companies or employers

21

you applied to?

22

A

Idaho Sheet Metal.

Mostly just looked in

23

the papers for welding positions opening up.

I went

24

in and tried at Kodiak in Rupert and didn't get that

25

job.

i i

1

Q

Is that a welding job?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Have you been looking specifically for

4

welding jobs?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Is there some particular reason why you're

7

focusing on welding jobs?

8

A

I'm good at it.

9

Q

So you haven't been looking for other

10

types of jobs except for welding jobs?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Now, you said that you were good at

13

welding.

14

you have prior job experience as a welder or how is

15

it that you're good at welding?
A

16
17

It's just naturally something that you can

do or you can't do.
Okay.

18
19

Did you get some training in welding or do

When did you first do welding as a

job?

20

A

As a job?

21

Q

Yes .

22

A

That would have been November of last

23

year.

24

and was working for Integra Manufacturing in

25

Clearfield at the Freeport Center.

I came down to Ogden, lived with my parents

Q

What was the company again?

A

Integra.

Q

What kind of company is that or what kind

of business is that?
A

It's a manufacturing company.

A lot of

welding goes on.
Q

And so when did you start working at

Integra at Clearfield?
A

When?

Q

Yes.

A

In November of last year.

Q

November of '95?

A

Yes .

Q

And how long did you work there?

A

Approximately a month and-a-half.

Q

Okay.

What happened after a month

and-a-half?
A

They laid off swing and graveyard crews.

I was on graveyard.
Q

So you got laid off?

A

Yes .

Q

Okay.

In terms of employment, what did

you do after you got laid off by that company?
A

I went back to Declo and got a job through

Express within a matter of hours.

13

Q

Okay.

the time frame.

So I'm trying to figure out just
If you got that job in Integra in

November of '95, is that what you said?
A

Yes .

Q

So was it in December of '95 when you got

laid off?
A

Yes, approximately the 28th.

Right after

Christmas .
Q

Okay.

So you went back to Declo and you

got a job within, you said, a few hours?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall what company you worked for?

A

I went to work for John Smith, he owns an

implement company, welding for him.
Q

Okay.

And where is his company?

A

Burley, Idaho.

Q

And how long did you work for John Smith?

A

Off and on for probably two months.

Q

When you say off and on, you mean it

wasn't a regular job?
A

It was not a full-time position.

Q

Was it a part-time position where you

worked a few hours each day?
A

No.

It was a week here, a week there, a

few days there .

14

1

Q

Okay.

2

A

It's a temporary service that sent me out

3

on it.

4

Q

Right.

Did you have any other work during

5

the period you were doing the sort of on and off

6

work for John Smith?

7

A

Not that I can recall.

8

Q

And when did your work for John Smith come

9

to an end?

10

A

11

somewhere.

12

Q

Of 1996?

13

A

Yes, of this year.

14

Q

And then what did you do for work after

A

I then, around then got on with Darrell's

15

that?

16
17

Boy, it had to have been around March

Welding.

It was a few weeks later.

18

Q

So were you unemployed for a few weeks?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Did you collect any unemployment benefits

21

during that period?

22

A

Yes, I did.

23

Q

Do you recall how many weeks of

24 J unemployment benefits you have received?
25 I

A

Overall, probably six.

That spanned some

-i c

1
2

time into working for John Smith.
Q

Okay.

So when you say overall six weeks

3

of benefits, you don't mean they came in a six-week

4

block?

5

A

No.

6

Q

But it came on more than one occasion?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

But your recollection is it totaled about

9

six weeks?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

So then you went to work for

12

Darrell's Welding, and that's where you're working

13

today?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Okay.

Let's go back a little bit further

16

in time.

My understanding is you left Amalgamated

17

Sugar what, the end of May 1995?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And then you've described working in Utah

20

in late '95?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Tell me what jobs you had after leaving

23

Amalgamated Sugar up to the time you got that job in

24

Clearfield that you described.

25

A

It was a few months after I was laid off,

l6

fired, excuse me, a few months after I was fired I
took a temporary job through Intermountain Staffing
in Twin Falls.

That lasted a few weeks and then I

was unemployed again.
Q

What kind of job was that that you had

through Intermountain Staffing?
A

I worked at Plastic Slip Sheets USA.

Q

What kind of work did you do there?

A

I was mixing their plastic resins for

their process.
Q

Okay.

And why did that work come to an

A

I decided to leave Twin about that time.

Q

So you voluntarily quit that job?

A

Yes.

Q

And when you left Twin Falls where did you

A

To Declo.

Q

Okay.

A

Approximately 50 miles.

Q

So after you moved to Declo then did you

end?

go?

How far is Twin Falls from Declo?

have a job in Declo when you moved there?
A

Not when I moved, but shortly afterwards,

Q

And what job was that?

yes .

17

A

I went through Express Personnel and they

had a few little ones once in a while for a few
days, different-- just any job.
Q

You don't recall, though, right now?

A

I worked for Petersen Construction for

about a week and-a-half, two weeks.

I worked for

Rain for Rent for approximately three weeks.
Q

Why did these jobs come to an end?

A

They were a temporary job.

The work was

done .
Q

You earlier said that you moved from Twin

Falls to Declo.
A

Why did you leave Twin Falls?

Because of the way I had been treated and

the way I felt in Twin Falls.
Q

When you say by the way you were treated,

what are you referring to?
A

I'm referring to Michael Davis's death.

Q

Okay.

Now, you said you moved to Declo

and you got a few jobs?
A

Yes .

Q

And then did you get any additional jobs

while you lived in Declo?
A

What do you mean, additional?

Q

Well, you said you had a few jobs and you

described a couple of them and then at a later point

18

you moved down to Ogden and you said you lived with
your parents and got a job in Clearfield.

So have

you described all the jobs that you had while you
were at Declo?
A

I believe so.

I don't recall any others.

Q

So, then, when did you move down to Ogden?

A

In November.

Q

And why did you leave Declo for Ogden?

A

I was going to come down here and go to

welding school and get a job.
Q

Okay.

Where were you thinking of going to

welding school?
A

My parents had a few places picked out.

don't even know where they were.
Q

Did you actually apply to any welding

program?
A

No, I hadn't.

The job gave out before I

had a chance to get into it.
Q

Okay.

And that's the job in Clearfield

that you referred to?
A

Yes .

Q

But are you saying that when you were in

Declo and you decided to move to Ogden, at that
point were you already thinking of going to welding
school?

19

I

A

Yes .

Q

And was that why you moved to Ogden, to be

closer to some welding school?
A

It's where I could find a job.

Q

Okay.

So you actually moved to Ogden

first to find a job or to go to welding school?

I'm

just not clear, that's all.
A

To go to welding school, but to do that I

had to have a job.
a job.

I came down on a weekend, I got

I went back up, got my stuff and then stayed

with the parents for as long as that job lasted.
Q

What was it that made you pick Declo as a

place to move after you left Twin Falls?
A

My mother's brother lives there.

Q

So you have family there?

A

Yes .

Q

Were you living with your family members?

A

I was living with my uncle, yes.

Q

And are you living with your uncle now?

A

No.

Q

It's my understanding that after you were

fired by Amalgamated you applied for unemployment
benefits; is that correct?
A

Yes .
(Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)
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penalties for false statements made for the purpose
of obtaining benefits."

Do you see that?

A

Yes .

Q

Do you recall whether you read that

statement at the time you filled out this form?
A

I don't remember.

Q

Okay.

Did you, in fact, fill out this

form truthfully?
A

To the best of my knowledge, yes.
(Exhibit 2 marked for identification.)

Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Waddoups, let me show

you what's been marked as Exhibit 2, which consists
of three pages regarding your claim for unemployment
benefits.

Why don't you take a minute to look over

Exhibit 2.
A

(Reviewing document.)

Q

Mr. Waddoups, do you recognize Exhibit 2?

A

Yes .

Q

Looking just at the first page of Exhibit

2, is that filled out in your handwriting?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

And at the very bottom of the page, does

that appear to be your signature?

I know it's a bad

copy, but this is the best I could get.
A

There is no signature on this.
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Q

There's not?

part down here.

Okay.

I was looking at this

Does that-- this unfortunately is a

xerox of a fax so it's poor quality.
A

No, that doesn't appear to be my

signature.
Q

But you did fill out the first page of

Exhibit 2; is that correct?
MR. CARR:

May I see that?

THE WITNESS:
Q

I believe so.

(BY MR. GAVRE)

And did you fill out the

first page of Exhibit 2 truthfully?
A

I believe so.

Q

If you would look near the bottom of page

1 of Exhibit 2 there's a paragraph that's unnumbered
number 11 and it says, "Additional Claimant
Statement."

Could you read the handwritten

statement into the record?
A

It says, "Getting up in the morning after-

three months of trouble sleeping due to Mike Davis's
death that occurred on my shift from equipment that
I am empowered to operate on an every day basis.

It

was hard to do without"-- and it was supposed to say
sleep in there somewhere.
Q

So it ends with the words "hard to do

without," and you think--

o -*

correct, the word yes is written in.
A

Yes.

Q

You signed this statement?

A

Yes .

Q

So I'm asking you if this is correct, and

it is correct, right?
A

That's what it says, yes.

Q

Question 6 says, "If you were dismissed

because of absences, had you been warned your absent
rate was reaching unacceptable levels?

How many

warnings," and it has handwritten into it "2-3
times."

Is that a correct answer?

A

I guess so.

Q

Moving on to the next question, it said,

"What time were you scheduled to begin," and it's
written in "6:00 a.m."

Is that correct?

A

Yes .

Q

And it goes on, "What time did you call in

and let the employer," I believe it says "know you
wouldn't be in," and the handwritten statement says,
"I called in when I knew I was going to be late."
Is that correct?
A

Yes .

Q

Question 9 says, "What happened on the day

of discharge to cause dismissal," and the

11

about this particular conversation with Vic Jaro?
A
later.

I'm not sure.

Maybe I will have something

I can't remember anything right at this

moment.
Q

Okay.

You said something to the effect

that you asked Vic Jaro how he would like you to go
to the public with this issue?
A

That's not what I said.

Q

Okay.

A

I asked him how he would feel about the

Tell me what you said.

public knowing about the way they've contaminated
the silo and continued shipping as a food grade
product with blood in it.
Q

Okay.

A

That was about all I said.

Q

Had you--

A

Oh, I did mention the FDA, the news with

that as it being the public.
Q

Were you saying you were thinking of going

to the news or to the FDA?
A

I never said that.

Q

Okay.

So in what respect did you make

reference to the FDA or the newspaper or the news?
A

I asked him how he would like that

personally, where it would put his job.
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as he was absent.
Q

Do you know why he was absent?

A

I couldn't speculate on that.

Q

Okay.

A

Bobby Smith.

Q

Bobby Smith, excuse me.

You mentioned a Bobby Stone?

Who was Bobby

Smith?
A

He worked out in the mill on the same

shift I did before I transferred out to the sugar
warehouse.
Q

When did you transfer to the sugar

warehouse?
A

I can't remember the exact time.

It's

when I went to do bulk load there, it must have been
'94, I believe, '94-'95.

I can't remember.

Q

How long were you a bulk loader?

A

I bulk loaded off and on through juice

runs and summers off and on for probably eight
years, but I had other jobs at the same time in the
mill .
Q

I'm a little confused.

Bobby Smith worked

in the mill; is that what you said?
A

Yes .

Q

And you worked in the sugar warehouse as a

bulk loader?
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A

Towards the end, yes, but I had worked

with him out in the mill.
Q

And did the people in the mill work the

same kind of shifts that the people in the warehouse
worked?
A

Yes, they did.

Q

And so what are you saying about Bobby

Smith, that he too was late for work?
A

I know that he missed a lot of time.

Q

By missed a lot of time you mean what?

A

I mean a lot of time.

As far as I know,

he had been, I guess, let go or whatever and brought
back once before.
Q

Okay.

I'm just trying to get it clear.

When you say missed a lot of time, do you mean he
missed days or late coming to work or was absent?
A

Yes, that's what I mean.

Q

Which of those things?

A

All of those.

Q

And how would you know that Bobby Smith

was being late to work?
A

I answered that question.

I worked with

him in the mil1.
Q

Okay.

And are you saying you would see

him come in late?
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Yes, it is.
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Yes .
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Yes, I was.
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And so you started that day at 6:00
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a.m.

p.m.?

A

Yes.

Q

And then it's my understanding that

starting the next day, the day after Mike Davis's
accident, you had seven days off; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And you took those seven days off?

A

Yes .

Q

And then you returned to work after your

seven days off?
A

Yes.

Q

And it's also my understanding that Mike

Davis's accident occurred on a Thursday, February
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16, 1995?
A

Yes, it did.

It happened through my lunch

hour, which I had complained to supervisors about
having to keep our system running.
to keep an eye on it.

I was not there

I had to-- I was supposed to

keep that thing running through lunch while I went
to take my break and I complained about that before
and I was not happy with it and it really made me
not very happy when I find out somebody actually got
killed in it after I complained about it.
Q

Okay.

Can you tell me briefly what your

job involved as bulk loader?
A

I would go through the orders when I get

there, depending on whatever is running, but go
through the orders, figure out railroad cars we had
in stock that could be brought in for the next
loading.

And with the system the way it is you have

to have the right car in the right end at the right"
time with the other right car for whatever customers
you've got, which is a lot of decision making there
to do to make everything work out.
You have to keep them in grade the whole
time you're loading them.
before you load them.

You have to inspect them

You have to seal them, the

bottoms and the tops before they're shipped out.

135

And they like the bottoms to be sealed up
immediately as soon as you start the car.

You have

to run the whole system, which I think is around 52
pieces of machinery from one end to the other, you
start up the computer board.
You have to take subsequent samples,
depending on the quality-- the specifications of
that car for the customer, you have to take samples
anywhere from every 200 bags to just every 500 bags,
plus a composite, plus your start samples.

Plus all

at the same time you have to run through and set up
your own machinery, you have to make sure it's
running right, you have to set the sugar.

The mixed

sugar that you're setting to grade has to be sent to
the bagging machines, which comes directly out of
the system you're running.

You determine which

sugar they get because by law it's supposed to be
whatever it says on the bag, which company policy
says we do that, which they didn't.
A lot of times the sugar was way out of
grade and was shipped anyway.
would find.

Things like that you

When you would first come on shift you

would find out that they had loaded and sent out
truckloads of sugar that's out of grade, which means
it does not meet company specs that the company says

1

is for that-

2

coarse sugar in there, that's illegal.

3

do that all the time.

4

fix mistakes.

5

the whole time there.

6

If it says extra fine and they've got
They would

You would have to come on and

You would have to keep yours in line

The foreman of the shift, in my case it

7

would have been Bob Kinchelow, would have to come up

8

and find out what you were going to load on the bulk

9

loading so he could tell his baggers what to run.

10

But you had to get it all set up so that they had

11

the right sugar going to those bagging machines so

12

you didn't have that mistake in the type of sugar

13

going into the bags.

14

Q

Let me ask about that.

As a bulk loader

15

you are in charge of loading rail cars; is that

16

right?

17

A

Yes, bulk sugar.

18

Q

Okay.

19

And then there's also sugar that is

being loaded into bags?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And are you in charge of that or are you

22

directing that as well or just the loading of the

23

rail cars?

24
25

A
bag.

You are determining what sugar they get to
If you've got a certain-- certain cars you

T
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wake him up and he said she had a fight with him and
stayed over her parents.

I asked him if he went to

the doctor and he said no.

I asked him if he was

coming in and he didn't think so.

He said he needed

to get his check and pay some bills.

I informed him

that we needed to be informed of illness and that I
considered it unexcused.

He said okay."

Do you recall this incident that's
described in Exhibit 23?
A

Not the way he puts it.

Q

Okay.

On March 3rd, 1995, did you, in

fact, not come in to work that day?
A

I don't recall .

Q

Okay.

Do you recall having back spasms

and taking some pain pills or pills of some kind to
deal with your back spasms?
A

I don't recall.

I was asleep at the time.

Q

What does that mean, you were asleep at

the time?
A

I don't recall what happened.

know what he said.

I don't

I really don't care.

And if he

said I was unexcused I would say okay.
Q

Okay.

A

There's no use fighting it.

to say what they want.

They're going

They're going to consider
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two and-a-half day suspension?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And then did you come back to work?

A

Yes, I did.
(Exhibit 26 marked for identification.)

Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Waddoups, let me show

you what's been marked as Exhibit 26 and let me ask
you a question about this.

You'll see at the bottom

of Exhibit 26 there's an entry that says "5-28-95.
Blake Waddoups, 10:00 a.m., sick."

Did you call in

sick on May 28, 1995?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

And did you call in about 10:00 a.m.?

A

I don't know when it was.

the scheduled time to be there.

It was after

I had been up ever

since the suspension, and coming back to work for
two days before this day I was pressured a lot by
all bosses, made to feel like I wasn't worth
anything, and I was just plain sick from my nerves
of having to go in there and deal with these people
again.
Q

Okay.

When you said you felt pressured i:-y

the bosses, what do you mean?
A

I had been set up once and been warned

about it so they could fire me.
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about to go in and tell these people that did it to
me exactly what my problem was, but I ended up
telling them the last day when I ended up turning in
all my stuff-

I told Vic Jaro that I didn't like

the way things were handled and that they should
have actually done something and looked after me a
little bit.

If you go out and start a machinery and

you drag somebody into it, you may have a few
problems too.

Like you said, nobody knows when the

accident actually occurred.
starting that system.

It could have been me

And they didn't care.

actually added to every last bit of it.

They

And I hope

they go to hell for it.
(Exhibit 27 marked for identification.)
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Mr. Waddoups, let me show

you what's been marked as Exhibit 27.

Again, this

is something that I don't think you've seen before.
MR. CARR:

Standard objection, hearsay,

lack of foundation.
Q

(BY MR. GAVRE)

Let me just state for the

record that Exhibit 27 are notes prepared by Larry
Dayley.

I'll read them into the record.

Sunday, 5-28-95, 6:00 a.m.
show up.

It's dated

"Blake Waddoups didn't

He finally called in at 9:55 a.m. and said

he and his wife had a fight and that she had broke
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into his house and shut his alarm off causing him to
oversleep.

I checked with the lab and he told them

he was calling in sick and they said he would have
to talk to Bob Kinchelow who transferred the call to
me.

He did not say anything to either Bob or I

about being sick at that time.

Larry."

Do you recall on this date of the 5-28-95
speaking to Larry Dayley by phone?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Do you recall telling him that your wife

had turned off your alarm clock and caused you to
oversleep?
A

I told him that I had personal problems.

I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had
overslept.

I had called in sick because I wasn't

feeling well.

I don't know how he added the rest of

this up.
Q

Okay.

So you don't recall telling him

that-A

It may have sounded something to that

effect when he heard it.
thinking at that time.

I don't know what he was
I know I was sick to my

stomach, I was just not feeling good and I hadn't
felt good for quite a while.
Q

Had you and your wife had a fight?

OCT

Amalgamated Sugar have been in contact?
A

I wouldn't have any idea.

Q

Okay.

Did you ever ask Amalgamated

Sugar

for a reference or ask Amalgamated Sugar to talk to
any employer or prospective
A

No.

employer?

I wouldn't, not after I heard what

they said to James.
Q

Okay.

So as far as you know,

Amalgamated

Sugar has not been in contact with any of your
employers since-A

As far as I know.

Q

Do you know if Amalgamated Sugar has been

in contact with any of the companies you applied at?
A

I would not know that.
MR. GAVRE:

Okay.

I have no further

questions.
MR. CARR:
MR. GAVRE:

I have nothing.
Thank you, Mr. Waddoups.

(Whereupon, the taking of the deposition
was concluded at 6:23 p.m.)
--00O00--
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS
and JAMES EDWARD SPARROW,
JR. ,

Case No. 950900441
Judge Stanton Taylor

Plaintiffs,
vs .

DEPOSITION OF

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, et al. ,

BLAKE WILLIAM

WADDOUPS

Defendants.

The deposition of BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS.
a witness in the above-entitled cause, taken before
LANETTE SHINDURLING, Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, at the law offices of PARSONS, BEHLE &
LATIMER, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the 13th day of September, 1996,
commencing at 8:30

a.m.
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Tab 9

AGREEMENT
between

The Amalgamated Sugar Company
and
The American Federation of Grain
Millers Local Unions
Nos. 282, 283, 284 & 290
Affiliated with the AFL-CIO

TERM AUGUST 1, 1993 TO JULY 3 1 , 1996

(a) quit, retires, or
(b) is discharged for just cause, or
(c) fails to report within the reasonable
time specified in the notice for
Campaign employment, which notice
will be sent to the last address he has
furnished to the Company.
13.3 SENIORITY LISTS: The Company will
provide two seniority lists at each factory on
February 1, April 1, June 1, and September 1
of any year. In addition, the Company will provide seniority lists at other reasonable periods providing notification is given the Factory
Accounting Manager on a timely basis before the end of a payroll period. One seniority
list would be for Regular Employees and one
would be for Non-Regular Employees. The
Regular Employee list will be based on the
number of hours of continuous service. The
Non-Regular seniority list will be based on the
number of months of Campaign worked.
These lists will be posted for thirty (30) days
for corrections and, if no objections are made,
will be accepted as authentic lists. The appropriate Union officer shall be furnished a copy
of both lists.

ARTICLE 14
DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
14.1 The Company has the right to discipline
or discharge employees for just cause. Discharge shall be evidenced in writing which
shall state the reason for the discharge and
shall be given to the employee at the time of
his discharge. An employee who believes his
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discipline or discharge is not justified shaJJ have
recourse to the grievance procedure under the
Agreement.
14.2 Written warnings are not required nor
forbidden by this Article. A copy of ail written
warnings (Incident Report Form) and discharge notices will be given to the Union. The
Union will acknowledge receipt of such copy
by initialing the Company copy of the notices.
Employee's signature does not constitute personal admission of guilt, but acknowledges
receipt of document.

ARTICLE 15
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
15.1 STEWARDS: The Local Unions may
designate at least three (3) of their members
to act as Stewards. Such Stewards shall not
assume any of the duties or powers of a supervisor. They shall be empowered by the
Union to aid in adjusting grievances between
employees and the Company. All grievances
involving employees shall be adjusted whenever possible between the immediate supervisor or the foreman under them, and the
Employee Steward. In case they are unsuccessful in their efforts to adjust grievances with
these officials, the grievance shall be submitted to the Employee's Committee hereinafter
provided for.
15.2 EMPLOYEES'COMMITTEE:
The Local Unions agree to designate from their membership a workmen's committee of three (3)
employees whose name shall be posted on
the Bulletin Board.

46

15.3 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE:
Step 1. An employee claiming a grievance
shall put his grievance in writing to his Steward within five (5) scheduled working days of
the Employee's knowledge of the occurrence
to be grieved. The Steward shall attempt to
settle the grievance through discussions with
the Grievant and his immediate supervisor.
Within two (2) scheduled work days after receipt of the grievance, the Steward shall notify the Employee's Committee that he has not
succeeded in a settlement of the grievance.
Step 2. If the Steward has failed to settle the
grievance with the immediate supervisor in
Step 1, the Employee's Committee within three
(3) scheduled working days after receiving the
grievance from the Steward, shall pass upon
the grievance. In the event the Employee's
Committee decides the grievance is entitled
to further consideration, they shall within two
(2) scheduled work days submit the written
grievance to the Local Management. The
grievance shall briefly state the nature of the
grievance, violation alleged and settlement
request. The Second Step hearing will be held
within five (5) scheduled work days of the receipt of the written grievance from the
Employee's Committee. The Company shall
give the Union a written decision within five
(5) scheduled work days of the Step 2 hearing. Discharge grievances will start in Step 2
and must be submitted directly to the
Employee's Committee within five (5)' scheduled work days from the time the employee
receives the written notice of discharge.

receipt of the second step answer, refer the
grievance to the International Representative
and/or the appropriate Company Official for
further handling. If a satisfactory agreement
cannot be reached between the International
Representative and appropriate Company
Official with thirty (30) days, it will then be referred to the local Union before proceeding into
the arbitration procedure. Time is of the essence and all grievances must be handled
within the prescribed time limits set forth
herein. Failure to do so shall constitute forfeitures of the written grievance by either party
failing to do so. Time limits may be extended
by mutual agreement between the parties.

Step 3. In the event the grievance is not settled
in Step 2, either party, if they so desire, may
within five (5) scheduled work days after the

15.4 ARBITRATION PROCEDURE:
If a
grievance is to be carried to arbitration, either
the Company or the Union shall notify the other
party of its intention by Certified Mail within
two (2) weeks after the parties have determined that a satisfactory settlement cannot be
reached.
If the Company and the Union are unable
promptly to agree upon an impartial arbitrator, the parties will request a list of arbitrators
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. The impartial arbitrator shall be designated in accordance with the procedures of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
The Arbitrator shall have authority to act only
with respect to grievances relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of
this Agreement and his decision shall be final
and binding on ail parties involved.
Each party shall pay its own expenses incurred
in arbitration. The fees and expenses of the^
Arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Company and the Union.
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15.5 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
A
Union representative may be present at meetings involving disciplinary action by the Company if requested by the Employee.

ARTICLE 16

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
16.1 It is mutually agreed that during the life
of this Agreement if both parties to same abide
by the terms of this Agreement there shall be
no cessation of work of the employees or action in any form taken or permitted by them
impairing Employer's operation or affecting the
distributions of his product, nor shall there by
any lockout by Employer.

ARTICLE 17
SEVERANCE PAY
17.1 SEVERANCE PAY GRANTED: In the
event the operation of the sugar producing
facilities of any of the plants covered by this
Agreement is to be permanently discontinued
by the Company, all Regular Employees, at
the affected factory, with three or more years
of continuous service shall be granted severance pay, unless the Company or its successors offers the Employee employment either
at the same or other location at a similar or
reasonable rate of pay. The Employee will
have the option of accepting the transfer to
another factory or accepting severance pay.
17.2 BENEFITS ALLOWED: An eligible employee who has completed three (3) full years
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of continuous service shall receive severance
pay of one (1) week's pay (40 hours) based
upon the regular straight time base wage rate
received by the Employee at the close of the
last Campaign prior to the discontinuance of
that factory operation. For each additional year
of continuous service, an eligible employee will
receive one (1) week's pay, on the same basis as indicated above, up to a maximum of
thirteen (13) weeks severance pay. It is understood that upon receipt of severance pay,
and employee relinquishes all recall, seniority, and employment rights with the Company.

ARTICLE 18

MISCELLANEOUS
18.1 BULLETIN BOARDS: The Company
shall furnish employees suitable places for the
posting of notices and bulletins pertaining to
employee and Company affairs. Notices
posted on the Union Bulletin Boards by the
Union must bear the signature of the President or Secretary of the Local Union.
18.2 UNION AFFAIRS: It is agreed that no
Union activities or Union business of any kind
be carried on by Stewards or other Union
members during the time they are gainfully
employed on shift by the Company. It is further agreed that Stewards or other Union officers may, if they wish, solicit Union members,
collect membership dues, contact new employees, or otherwise carry on Union business in
the Company locker room prior to and after
the close of each shift, providing all parties
concerned are off shift. In case of emergency,
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Tab 10

c** Employee
Employee's F i l e
Industrial Relations
Supervisor
Uhlan

EMPLOYEE'S NAME

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY
INCIDENT REPORT

Bldke

W ddo

*

"PS

FACTORY
DATE OF INCIDENT

INCIDENT:

Twin Falls
1986

EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM
Amalgamated considers attendance very important-

When someone is absent

their workload has to be carried by someone else. This is not fair to
your fellow employees or to the Company.
excessive.

Blake your absenteeism has become

If you have developed a health problem it is important that you

get it taken care of so you can be a dependable employee.
Listed below is the days you have missed
January 8, 1986 (8) sick
January 9, 1986 (8) sick
January 12, 1986 (8) sick

September 28, 1986 (8) - called in
family emergency
October 6f 1986 (8) sick

January 15, 1986 (4) excused
January 29, 1986 (8) sick
February 3, 1986 (8) sick
DISPOSITION:
Before being granted an excused absence for sick leave a doctor's
verification is required.

If excessive absenteeism continues you

will be discharged.

RECEIPT OF THE FOREGOING IS
ACKM^CEDGE TILES /<r> rtf
DAY OF

^,:-

SUPERVISOl
^c.n

t*-,<>6

/o-i&*

JL&
pFeaietent, Local No.

-L<'-3_

I have been informed of the above
incident. Signature does not
constitute personal admission of
guilt but acknowledges receipt
of document.

Employee /"

Tab 12

Errplcyee
Employee's F i l e
Industrial Relations
Supervisor
Uhian

EMPLOYEE'S NAME

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY
INCIDENT REPORT
FACTORY

Blake Waddoups

Twin

^ l l s

DATE OF INCIDENT March 19, 1988

INCIDENT:

UNEXCUSED ABSENCE
On Saturday, March 19, 1988, you did not call i n .

You were called at

11:15 a.m. by the Breck G r i f f i t h , Assistant Superintendent.

I t is

your responsibility to call in i f you cannot come to work before s h i f t
change.

DISPOSITION: March 19, 1988, is an unexcused absence,
w i l l result in disciplinary action.

u n v n > r OFTOEFOREOOINCIIS
ACKNOWLEDGE THIS

Another unexcused absence

SUPERVISOR'

^PS

P r e s i d e n t , Local No. ^ P S ^ 3

I have been informed o f t h e above
incident. Signature does not
constitute personal admission of
g u i l t but acknowledge
of document
Biplqyee
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THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY
INTER-COMPANY CORRESPONDENCE
TWIN FALLS, IDAHO
December 28, 1993

ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:

Blake Waddoups

Attendance

In reviewing your sick leave for 1993, I find it necessary to
reinstate the requirement for doctor's verification of illness
according to the letter you received October 28, 1991. The
doctor 's verification is to be on the first day of illness and it
is your responsibility to make sure either your supervisor or
personnel receives the verification,

sick leave vill not be

granted without verification and an unexcused absences could
result.

Larry Dayley
'
Assistant Superintendent
cc:

personnel file
union
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CAR NUMBER L U D ' T - ' M

DATE^-'—j

In-Bound Seal tf's
(Top of Car)

FACTORY~U ^ / ^

"•-w

L

^

INITIAL INSPECTION

Yes No

l.ftfeT^. A r 1 / g ^ r

A. Amalgamated or customer-assigned car?

2.ftfe)> &^fr**

B. Inbound seais in place? If missing, how many? T o p _ B o t t o m _
C. Gates/hatches closed? If open, how many? T o p _ B o d o m _

7

D.

Gaie shields in place? If open or damaged, how r n a n y ^

E.

Air caps in place? If missing, how many?

D

6

*j. j

' ~ --

0..

7, ': - ^
A. Sanitary condition satisfactory?

!

B

-

A i M s

dCan

"

d

fiSnOlRAI^

f

D.

Body cracks absent?

E.

Water marks or roof leaks absent?

8

•i K- c^

9

-C<

0_

I

~ <"" « - « e d sugar and

Intenor free of .rash. soil, insects. pa.n, ch.ps. and abnormal odors?
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T3 O V ^ i 2

• o

» . •

,

' SV-,\ ? rr,

13 ,

13 a
D. D
j

')

~)

PnunHc

15

QD

H. Car is clean and ready for loading?
Signarure - Car Cleaner:

h 7 -Hi^Svi

~~
Zi

^ o

F. Airslide fabnc intact, no holes?
_ removed?
_
.._ much?
...
G. Sugar
How

(Bottom of Car)

•

C.

3_
* -

JS£S?-pSSSlJ2?mf^r

Yes No

r\
•
Date •

7

/rti/yo

4

D

Signature - Locomotive Operator:

Car Cleaned By:

2._

3

5.

__CAR CLEANING REPORT

m

2

Xo
Da

F. Mechanical condition satisfactory j o r use (brakes. ladder, couplers)?

8.,
9_

Out Bound Seal V s
(Top of Car)

(Bottom of Car)

T_. r .
2..

CAR LOADING REPORT
Car Loaded Bv: 7&**^J!^2>AJ&T

.3 _
D a t e ^ ^ ^ Z

A

Inner gate is in closed position?

B.

Hatch nms are clean and free of crusted sugar?

C.

Before closing hatches, checked for contamination on top of sugar?

0

Hatches and gates are protected with plastic?

Yes No

4._

0 D

s._

D

D

6 _

D

D

7_

D

D

8_

D

D

9._

D

D

I0._

D

D

11.

D

D

l

0

D

E. Three-way valves in closed position?
F. Top of car is clean. Loose sugar and tools removed?
G

Sample of sugar provided to Laboratory?

H. Car is ready for final inspection?
I. Was car dehumidified? Relative humidity level in car
Car temp after loading

%

Grains H ? 0/lb_

K

14._

Signature - Bulk Loader^

15.
FINAL INSPECTION AND APPROVAL FOR SHIPMENT
Date: J}~ps)'47<r Time: 4!06

M Customer:

•

Location:
Yes No
A. All seais in place, locked, verified
B. Gate shields and hatches protected with plastic?
C.

Top of car is clean?

D.

Three-way valves closed? Air caps in place?

E.

All canvases and bags accounted for?

• • • • • • •

QUALITY ASSURANCE
Sugar meets
specifications?

customer

O

D

D

D

Yes

O

D

D

No

Q

D

D

D

D

Chemist initials

CAR REJECTION RECORD
(Use this side ONLY if car is to be rejected)
Warehouse

Date

Car Number

Foreman

Reason car cannot be loaded:

Location of defect (Mark oo car type below, looking down from top.):
Brake End
I—

Brake End

AIRSLEDE CAR
FOR GENERAL OFFICE USE:

Np ~7|x
U-~~...
K
—A
"zy
\A:
K... . —A
U~ •\i
CENTERFLOW CAR

Dale Received

Next Loading Location

Date

INSTRUCTIONS
REIECTTNO mCATTON;
When a car is being rejected, complete this side of the report. Send a Xerox copy to Traffic
Department - General Office, Ogden.
TRAFFIC DF.PARTMF.NTWhen the car is released from the RR shop send a copy of this report to the location loading the
car Tor thefirsttime.
NEXT T o A r>mr> i nr

ATTON-

CAR M i . x x n P R u G ^
CA

dOL,On

DATE£-/r-*<T

F A C T O R Y J ^ J ffi

Yes No

INTTIAL INSPECTION

In-Bound Seal Ms
(Top of Car)

poster

4.

r j j " ) ^

C. Gates/hatches closed? If open, how many? Top

OQQl$S~

E. Air caps in place? If missing, how many?

OOQ191

Bottom

do i\

/

5.,

F. Mechanical condition satisfactory for use (brakes. ladder, couplers)?

0 ^

6,

Signature • Locomotive Operator:

7. O Q O f t ) ^

8.

Bottom

D. Gate shields in place? If open or damaged, how many 0

5. -?Q^)^Q?_
6.

Out Bound Seal tfs
(Top of Car)

A. Amalgamated or customer-assigned car?
B. Inbound seals in place? If missing, how many? Top

3

HZ!!?

7

Car Cleaned By:,
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sr

m

Yes No

CAR CLEANING REPORT

C*

8..

D»ie«gW5y?b

9..

A. Sanitary condition satisfactory?

0"O

II

B. Hatches, gates, sanitary shields clean and free of crusted sugar and
working properly?

0 " D ff»VYti. ( S l ^ Q i ^

12.

C. Interior free of trash, soil, insects, painc chips, and abnormal odors?

13

D. Body cracks absent?

14.

E. Water marks or roof leaks absent?

14.

15.

F. Atrsiide fabric intact, no holes?

IS.

w.Oc)0~>9f

(Bottom of Car)

eKo

G. Sugar removed? How much?

goo

Pounds

H. Car is clean and ready for loading?

no
efo

Signature - Car Cleaner:
CAR L O S I N G REPORT
4. ^ ^ C - 6 ' ^ '"

Date J2 ~/S-9S~

Car Loaded By:

Yes No

B. Hatch rims are clean and free of crusted sugar?
C

Before closing hatches, checked for contamination on top of sugar?

D

Hatches and gates are protected with plastic?

/&_

if
/ ^

4._

7._

zfu

8..
9._

F

10-.

I

Top of car is clean. Loose sugar and tools removed?

IL.

Car ts ready for final inspection?
Wis car dehumidified? Relative humidity level in car_
Car temp after loadinE

Signature - Bulk Loader

[* L*

12-.

Grfins H,0/lb

%3'~"<

FINAL INSPECTION AND APPROVAL FOR SHIPMENT
D a t e w ^ > ^ ^ Time: </• ^ **

15.
•

• • • • • • •

Customer:

Location:

<re

t

E. Three-way valves in closed position?

H

(Q^

(Bottom of Car)

sr'o

G. Sample of sugar provided to Laboratory?

WT

13

s._

A. Inner gate is in closed position?

; LMT

10.

QUALITY ASSURANCE
Yes No
Sugar
meets
specifications?

A. All seals in place, locked, verified

customer

B. Gate shields and hatches protected with plastic?

Yes

D

C. Top of car is clean?

No

O

D. Three-way valves closed? Air caps in place?

D D

E. All canvases and bags accounted for?

D D

Chemist initials

CAR REJECTION

RECORD

(Use this side_Qfc{LY if car is lo be rejected)
Date

Warehouse
Foreman

Car Number
Reason car cannot be loaded:

Location of defect (Mark OD car type below, looking down from top.):
Brake End
Brake End

AIRSLDDECAR
FOR GENERAL OFFICE USE:

CENTERELOWCAR
Date Received

Next Loading Location^

Date
INSTRUCTIONS

REJECTING mCATION;
When a car is being rejected, complete this side of the report. Send a Xerox copy to Traffic
Department - General Office, Ogden.
TRAFnCDKPARTMKrfr;
When the car is released from the RR shop send a copy of this report to the location loading the
car for the first time.
NFYT J QAT)TNP T nrATTHM.
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P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

H0V

1997

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW. JR.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 950900441
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

vs.

THE
AMALGAMATED
SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendant.
* * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are former union-represented employees of The Amalgamated Sugar Company

("Amalgamated Sugar" or "the Company") who worked in Twin Falls, Idaho. On May 22 and 28,
1995, plaintiffs were separately discharged by the Company for excessive absenteeism.
Specifically, they each had more than three unexcused absences, the maximum allowed by
Company policy. Plaintiffs did not contest their discharges as they were entitled to do under the
collective bargaining agreement between their union and the Company.
Now, plaintiffs claim that they were potential "whistleblowers," who were discharged for
threatening to publicize the Company's alleged criminal shipping of contaminated sugar. On this
basis, they claim that they were wrongfully discharged in violation of Utah public policy. Plaintiffs
also assert claims for tortious infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective
economic relations, and conspiracy. There is no factual basis or legal merit to any of plaintiffs'
claims.
Plaintiffs' claims are governed by Idaho law because all the events — plaintiffs'
employment, their discharges, and the alleged shipment of contaminated sugar — took place in
Twin Falls, Idaho. Nothing at issue in this case happened in Utah. Accordingly, plaintiffs'
"violation of Utah public policy" claim fails because Utah law has no application to the instant
case. The claim would also fail if it were governed by Utah law because plaintiffs did not report
the alleged shipment of contaminated sugar (which is a federal crime) to outside authorities. Under
Utah law, a "public policy wrongful discharge" claim based on whistleblowing of alleged criminal

o

conduct requires that the employee have reported the alleged conduct to outside authorities, which
plaintiffs did not do.
Plaintiffs' emotional distress claim should be dismissed because (a) it is barred by the
exclusive remedy provision of the Idaho workers' compensation statute, (b) it is preempted by
federal labor law, and (c) it lacks elements essential under Idaho law. Plaintiffs' interference with
prospective economic relations claim fails because there is no identified business relationship with
which Amalgamated Sugar could interfere. Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim fails because only one
person, Amalgamated Sugar, is accused of wrongdoing and it cannot conspire with itself.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs5 Employment
1.

Amalgamated Sugar hired Blake Waddoups ("Waddoups") in 1985 and

James Sparrow ("Sparrow") in 1989 to work at the Company's sugar manufacturing facility in
Twin Falls, Idaho. Complaintffl[8,10.
2.

"Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material hereto

worked and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho." Complaint % 7.
3.

Plaintiffs1 employment with Amalgamated Sugar was governed by a

collective bargaining agreement between The American Federation of Grain Millers Union ("the
Union") and the Company, and both plaintiffs were members of the Union. Deposition of
James E. Sparrow, Jr. at 28-29 (hereinafter "Sparrow Depo. at
Waddoups at 95-96 (hereinafter "Waddoups Depo. at
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").

"); Deposition of Blake William

4.

Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees may be discharged

only for "just cause," and a discharged employee may file a grievance if he believes that his
discharge was not justified. The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration. Ex. 4, at
pp. 4-5, to Sparrow Depo.; Ex. 9, at pp. 4-5, to Waddoups Depo.
5.

Plaintiffs' employment was subject to the rule that "The maximum number

of unexcused absences you can receive before being terminated is three (3)." Ex. 3 to Sparrow
Depo. Plaintiffs were familiar with this rule. Sparrow testified:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Do you recall being informed of the rule that you could
have no more than three unexcused absences?
Yes.
When do you recall being informed of that rule?
All the time.
***

A.

[P]eople were always talking about it, you know, foremen, supervisors.
(Sparrow Depo. at 27-28.)

Sparrow's Unexcused Absences
6.

Sparrow had unexcused absences on September 10, 1994 and March 24,

1995. Sparrow Depo. at 201-03 and Ex. 7, at pp. 1-2, thereto.
7.

On May 20, 1995, Sparrow did not report to work, but called in sick.

Sparrow explained:
A.

Q.
A.
T7R1R8 I

I just — it was just nerves in my stomach. I just felt really
queasy and I just didn't feel like going to work mostly. It
was just the place had gotten to me and I just didn't feel like
being there.
So you called in sick?
Yes. (Sparrow Depo. at 210.)
4

8.

On the afternoon of the same day, Sparrow drove to Nevada and was

caught speeding. Because he had an outstanding warrant for a prior unpaid speeding ticket.
Sparrow was arrested and not released from jail until May 25, 1995. Sparrow missed four days
of work, May 20, 21, 23, and 24, 1995. Sparrow Depo. at 211-16.
9.

Sparrow knew that his absences were unexcused and that he had exceeded

the maximum number permitted. When he returned to Twin Falls, Sparrow telephoned his
foreman and asked him if he was fired:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Why did you ask him if you were fired?
Because I spent three days in jail and I should have worked.
I work Friday. I missed three days of work. That's
unexcused. Plus I knew I had one before and that's four,
and I knew I could be terminated for that.
You knew you could be terminated for unexcused absences
and you had enough to be terminated?
Yeah.
***

Q.

A.

Was there any question in your mind that being absent from
work because you're in jail is an unexcused absence?
I have always believed before that it was.
[You] always believed that it was an unexcused absence?
Yes.
So by the time you got back to work on the 25th and your
shift was finished you had four unexcused absences; is that
correct?
Correct. (Sparrow Depo. at 217, 222.)

10.

Sparrow was discharged on May 22, 1995 by Assistant Superintendent

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Bill Stuart for having more than three unexcused absences. Sparrow Depo. at 219.

I78I88.1
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11.

Sparrow did not file a grievance with the Union as permitted under the

collective bargaining agreement. Sparrow Depo. at 31, 43-44.
Waddoups' Unexcused Absences
12.

On October 10, 1986, Waddoups received a written warning for excessive

absenteeism because of the large number of sick leave days he had taken. He was told that he
would need medical verification for any future sick leave absences. He was also warned:

w

'If

excessive absenteeism continues you will be discharged." Ex. 10 to Waddoups Depo.
13.

Waddoups had an unexcused absence on March 19, 1988.

Waddoups

Depo. at 113 and Ex. 12 thereto.
14.

On September 28, 1993, Waddoups was verbally warned about his poor

attendance. Waddoups Depo. at 118-19 and Ex. 15 thereto.
15.

On December 28, 1993, Waddoups received another written warning

about his attendance, and he was again required to have medical verification for sick leave
absences. Ex. 17 to Waddoups Depo.
16.

On June 29, 1994, Waddoups had an unexcused absence.

Waddoups

Depo. at 123 and Ex. 18 thereto.
17.

On March 3, 1995, Waddoups had an unexcused absence.

Waddoups

Depo. at 243 and Ex. 23 thereto.
18.

On May 28, 1995, Waddoups did not report to work. At 10:00 a.m., four

hours after his work shift had begun, Waddoups called in saying he was sick. Waddoups then

178188.1
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spoke to Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley, and gave him a different explanation: "I told
him that I had personal problems. I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had over
slept. I had called in sick because I wasn't feeling well." Waddoups Depo. at 258, 260-61 and
Ex. 26 thereto.
19.

Assistant Superintendent Larry Day ley terminated Waddoups for

excessive absenteeism. Waddoups Depo. at 22-23 and Ex. 2, at p.l, thereto.
20.

In his application for unemployment benefits, Waddoups admitted that he

had been warned "2-3 times" that his absence rate of reaching unacceptable levels. Waddoups
Depo. at 31 and Ex. 2, at p. 2, thereto.
21.

Waddoups did not file a grievance with the Union over his discharge.

Waddoups Depo. at 107.
Plaintiffs' Whistleblowing Allegation
22.

On February 16, 1995, there was a fatal accident at the Amalgamated

Sugar Twin Falls, Idaho facility. The facility was shut down and cleaned for three days after the
accident. Sugar that was being loaded on the day of the accident was subsequently shipped to an
animal feed manufacturer. Complaintffl[15, 22; Sparrow Depo. at 64, 126-27.
23.

Plaintiffs claim that sugar stored at the Twin Falls facility was

contaminated by the fatal accident, and was subsequently shipped to customers for human
consumption, a criminal violation of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act. Complaint f 44;
Sparrow Depo. at 46-7.
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24.

Plaintiffs claim that they "threatenjed] to expose the [Company's] illegal

activity" of shipping supposedly contaminated sugar.

Complaint % 40.

However, neither

plaintiff ever contacted the Food and Drug Administration, any public authority or the media
about the Company supposedly shipping contaminated sugar.

Sparrow Depo. at 173-74;

Waddoups Depo. at 65; Complaintffif23-44.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment
when the moving party makes a showing which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any
relief to the other party. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979).
If plaintiffs cannot prove an essential element of a claim, there can be no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and summary judgment is appropriate. For the reasons described below, defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs cannot make a sufficient showing on
essential elements of their claims.
ARGUMENT
III.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE CONTROLLED BY IDAHO LAW.
Because Utah is the forum state, Utah's choice of law rules determine which law

applies in the instant case1. Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864 (Utah App. 1994). Utah has adopted
the most "significant relationship" standard, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict

Because Idaho and Utah law differ on several issues in the instant case, including workers compensation
preemption and tortious infliction of emotional distress, it is necessary for the Court to resolve the choice of law
question.
178188 1
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of Laws § 145, for determining choice of law questions. Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218,
219-20 (Utah 1989); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d at 867; Doe v. Nevada Crossing. Inc., 920 F.
Supp. 164, 166 (D.Utah 1996).
To determine whether the law of Idaho or Utah applies, the following factors should be
considered: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (3) the dominie, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered. Forsman, 779 P.2d at 219 (citing to Restatement (Second) ot Conflict of Laws § 145).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs were hired in Idaho, worked in Idaho,
engaged in the conduct for which they were allegedly wrongfully treated in. Idaho, were
terminated in Idaho, suffered their injuries in Idaho, and resided in Idaho

The only connection

Utah has to the dispute is the fact that Amalgamated Sugar is a Utah corporation, headquartered
in Utah. Even this connection is weak because all of the Company's alleged acts took place in
Idaho, not in Utah. When, as here, an emploj ee lives, works and is terminated in one state and
brings claims against his employer because of his discharge, the place of the employer's
incorporation or headquarters is not significant. The governing law is the law of the state in
which the discharge occurs. See Pacheco v. Hercules. 61 FfcP Cases (BNA) 825, 826-27
(D.Utah 1993) (under Utah's choice of law rules, Georgia law governs wrongful discharge
claims (tort and contract) where plaintiff was discharged in Georgia, worked and lived in Georgia
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at time of his discharge, and employer had a place of business in Georgia, despite fact that
plaintiff was hired and worked in Utah for many years).2
In sum, the alleged injuries and wrongful acts occurred in Idaho, the plaintiffs worked
and lived in Idaho, the defendant does business in Idaho, and the relationship at issue
(employment) was centered in Idaho. Accordingly, under Utah's choice of law rules, Idaho lawshould govern plaintiffs' claims.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM THAT THEIR DISCHARGES VIOLATED UTAH
PUBLIC POLICY LAW FAILS BECAUSE IDAHO LAW GOVERNS THE
INSTANT CASE.
In their First Cause of Action, plaintiffs allege that their terminations violated the

common law of Utah, and specifically that they were wrongfully discharged "in violation of
vital, overarching fundamental, permanent, clear; and substantial public policies of the State of
Utah." Complaint f 39 (emphasis added). This claim, based on Utah law, is without legal basis
because Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims. For this reason, plaintiffs' First Cause of Action
should be dismissed.
V.

PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM WOULD FAIL EVEN IF IT
WERE GOVERNED BY UTAH LAW.
Under Utah, law only public policies that are "clear and substantial." can give rise to a

civil cause of action. Consequently, "not every employment termination that has the effect of

2

See also Caton v. Leach Corp. 896 F.2d 939, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1990) (under significant relationship analysis,
Texas law applies to claims arising out of employee's discharge when employee worked, lived, and was terminated
in Texas, despite the fact the employer was incorporated and headquartered elsewhere); A.M. Capen'sCo. v.
American Trad. & Prod. Corp.. 74 F.3d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1996) (Puerto Rico law governs tort and contract claims
arising out of termination of distributorship where termination occurred in Puerto Rico, despite fact that the
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violating some public policy is actionable." Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857,
860 (Utah 1997). Where criminal conduct is alleged, it is the "enforcement" of the "criminal
code" that "constitutes a clear and substantial public policy." Hence an employee may have "a
cause of action for wrongful termination based on termination of the employee for reporting
criminal activity to public authorities." Id. At 861. Consequently, even if an employee is
retaliatorily discharged, there is no actionable public polic} violation if the employee reports the
criminal conduct only to the employer:
However, if an employee reports a criminal violation to an
employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making
such reports, that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and
substantial public policy.
Id. (holding that no public policy wrongful discharge claim stated where employee complained
only to employer about alleged criminal activity).
Because plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in criminal conduct (shipping
contaminated sugar in violation of the Food Drag and Cosmetics Act) but did not report this
alleged crime to the FDA or any other public authority, plaintiffs fail to state a public policy
claim under Utah law.

company was incorporated and headquartered elsewhere and did not have any offices or facilities in Puerto Rico).
178188.1

11

VI.

PLAINTIFFS' EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM SHOULD BE
DISMISSED ON MULTIPLE GROUNDS.
A.

Plaintiffs' Claims For Negligent And Intentional Infliction Of Emotional
Distress Are Barred By Idaho's Workers' Compensation Statute.

Plaintiffs' cause of action for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
alleges that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in workplace conduct that caused plaintiffs emotional
and physical injury. Complaint at ffl[ 47-50. In Idaho (as in Utah), the workers compensation
statute provides the exclusive remedy to employees for injuries arising out of employment:
[T]he liability of the employer under this [Workmen's Compensation] law
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the
employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representations or assigns.
Idaho Code § 72-209(1). See also Keamev v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988) ("Our
worker's compensation law is a legislatively prescribed exclusive system of compensation for
employees who are injured on the job." Affirming summary dismissal of tort claims against
employer for events allegedly occurring at the workplace).
The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act contains an exception to its exclusive remedy
provision which applies "where the injury . . . is proximately caused by the willful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, servants or employees." Idaho Code § 72209(3).3

If any such "physical aggression" does occur in the workplace, it "shall not be

The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act necessarily bars a negligence claim for the obvious reason that
negligent conduct does not meet the requirements of "willful or unprovoked of physical aggression." Kearney, 760
P.2d at 1173. Plaintiffs' claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress fails for the additional reason that, under
Idaho law, "For a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress to arise, there must be physical injury to the
plaintiff." Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.. 923 P.2d 456, 464 (Idaho 1996). In the instant case, there is no
claim or evidence of any physical injury to plaintiffs. Complaint tH 47-48.
178188.1
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imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a
party thereto." Id.
In the instant case, Waddoups does not allege tnai he Has injured by any "physical
aggression." Complaint f47. Accordingly, Waddoups' emotional distress claim does not come
within the statutory "physical aggression" provision, and is therefore barred by the exclusive
remedy provision of the Idaho Workmen's i oinpcTisation \et.
Sparrow alleges that on one occasion a supervisor "slapped [him] up the side of the head
with [a] yellow notebook." Sparrow Depo. at 98. Sparrow does not claim that he was injured or
suffered emotional distress as a result of this incident. Rather it passed quickly with a few
words between him and the supervisor. Id. at 98-99. Sparrow also testified that he has been in
"good health" since leaving Amalgamated Sugar, except for being "bummed out" as a result of
being fired. Nor has Sparrow seen a doctor, psychologist, psychiatrist, or therapist. Id. at 26870.
In sum, even if a slap with a "yellow notebook" constitutes "physical aggressio

* r^

no evidence that Amalgamated Sugar provoked, authorized or was a party to the incident or that
Sparrow was injured, physically or emotionally, by the incident.

Accordingly, Sparrow's

emotional distress claim is also barred b> the Idaho Workmen's Compensation \ct
B.

Federal Labor Law Preempts Plaintiffs5 Emotional Distress Claims.

The federal Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") exclusively governs
collectively bargaining agreenieiiis and preempts all state-law claims that relate to collective
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bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The purpose of this "expansive" preemption of state
law is to ensure that uniform federal law governs the negotiation, interpretation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844
P.2d 949, 968 (Utah 1992) (citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions). The LMRA preempts tort as
well as contract claims in order to uphold the federally-created system of collective bargaining.
The justification for this expansive view of [federal labor law] preemption
is the ease with which an aggrieved employee otherwise could turn a suit
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or contract
claim, thereby obtaining a state law holding that might result in an
inconsistent interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. (Id. at
968-69.)
In the context of a unionized workplace, the LMRA preempts claims for tortious
infliction of emotional distress, except where the conduct at issue "is purely personal and does
not implicate the exercise of supervisors auHiority/' Id at "»71 \\ henever the conduct at issue is
not purely personal, but involves exercise of management authority, any tort claim regarding
such conduct is barred by federal law. This is true even if the conduct constitutes an abuse of
authority and is done "to toraient the plaintiff." Id This is so because such conduct, even if
abusive and improper, implicates the collective bargaining agreement and the authority it grants
to the employer. Id. at 971 -72.
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that the Company failed to provide Waddoups with
adequate medical and psychological counseling after the fatal accident, implied that he was
responsible for the accident, and threatened Sparrow with discharge Complaint Iffi 47-48 I hese
alleged acts were not purely personjl hut alleged abuses of company or supervisory authority.
17R1RS 1
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Id. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that the acts were within the scope and course of employment. Id.
f 3. Because the conduct alleged by plaintiffs is not "purely personal" and does "implicate the
exercise of supervisory authority," plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are barred by federal
labor law. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 971-72 (affirming summary dismissal of intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim based on alleged supervisory misconduct).
C.

Essential Elements of Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claims Are Without
Support,

The tort of intentional infliction of rmotional distress requires the defendant to have
engaged in "very extreme" and "outrageous" conduct that "no reasonable person could be
expected to endure." Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 954 (Idaho 1980);
Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Idaho \pp. 1984). The conduct alleged here — failing to
provide Waddoups with adequate medical and psychological counseling, implying that
Waddoups was responsible for the fatal accident since he was in charge of the machinery
involved, and threatening to discharge Sparrow — does not constitute actionable "outrageous"
conduct. Certainly, the only action that might even in theory escape the exclusive remedy
provision of the Idaho workers' compensation statute — the slap with a yellow notebook — was
not extreme and outrageous conduct.
It is also an essential element of the tort that plaintiffs have suffered "severe" and
"disabling" emotional distress. This requires more than ordinary distress, anyuish or depression:
[Ejvidence showing that the plaintiff was upset, embarrassed,
angered, bothered and depressed did not demonstrate a severely

178188.1

15

disabling emotional condition adequate for intentional infliction of
emotional distress damages.
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464-65 (Idaho 1996) (internal quotations
omitted).
In the instant case, neither plaintiff suffered a "severely disabling emotional condition" as
required by Idaho law. As pointed out above, Sparrow has been in good health, has ilot seen a
doctor oi therapist, and was merely "bummed out" by his firing. Sparrow Depo. at 98-99.
Waddoups likewise has worked since leaving Amalgamated Sugar, and has not been disabled.
Waddoups Depo. at 8-20.
In sum, there is no evidence to support two essential elements of plaintiffs' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INTERFERED
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE CLAIM IS
GROUNDLESS.
Plaintiffs claim that by firing them for cause and with "knowledge or intent that such
firing would severely hamper their opportunity for future employment," Amalgamated Sugar
tortiously interfered with their prospective economic relations. Complaint at ^ 52. Plaintiffs do
not identify any wrongful "interfering" conduct by Amalgamated Sugar, noi do they identify any
contractual or business relationship (in which they were involved), which was interfered with by
the Company. Id.ffl|52-54. Both are required by Idaho law. Idaho Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods. 824 P.2d 841, 860-61 (Idaho 1991) (defendant must tortiously interfere with "plaintiffs
contractual or I:jusiness relationships"). The only relationship to which plaintiffs refer is their
178188.1
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"employment relationship" with Amalgamated Sugar. Complaint % 54. An employer cannot
tortiously interfere with its relationship with its own employees. Orstrander v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993) ("a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract").
Accordingly, this claim is factually groundless and legally without merit
VIIL PLAINTIFFS' CONSPIRACY CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE AMALGAMATED SUGAR CANNOT CONSPIRE WITH
ITSEI ,F.
Plaintiffs' claim that Amalgamated Sugar conspired with unidentified Doe defendants 1
through 100. Complaint ^fl| 55-57. However, in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, plaintiffs allege
"that each of the defendants was the agent of each other in all of the actions and matter set forth;
and that at all of said times herein mentioned, each was acting as the agent of the other, was
acting in the course and scope of its agency with its principal, and that e\ ery act of each
defendant was within the scope of its authority was known to, authorized and ratified by the
others." The law is well settled that an agent cannot conspire with its principal. Ostrander v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 851 P.2d at 948 ("the actions of an agent are the actions of the
corporation"); Wiekhorst Bros. Excavating & Equip. Co. v. Ludewig. 529 N.W.2d 33, 40 (1995)
(corporation cannot conspire with agent acting it scope of her authority). Plaintiffs have failed to
identify anyone with whom Amalgam,itetl

SULMF

uinspired

.u s'nulJ

hnxc conspired.

Accordingly, this claim is baseless.
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IX.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' Complaint and all causes of action contained therein

should be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 5th day of November, 1997.

W. MARK GAVRE <
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of November, 1997, I caused to be handdelivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Taylor D. Carr - (Bar No. 582)
Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)
CARR & WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 363-0888
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS, and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW JR.,
Plaintiffs,

;)
;)
>
]>

vs.

]

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,

;
'
;

Defendants.

]

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
0£C o 3 BS7
Civil No. 950900441
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiffs present the
following points and authorities in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
As can be ascertained from Defendant's own memorandum of points and authorities, the
essential facts upon which each of the causes of action are based are readily understood by the
Defendant. These facts are more than sufficient to establish each of the five causes of action
alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint.

Plaintiffs instituted this litigation arising out of their wrongful terminations from their
employment with The Amalgamated Sugar Company ("Defendant"). After many years of loyal
service to Defendant, Plaintiffs were discharged from their employment without just cause and
for reasons involving violation of the laws and public policy of the State of Utah and of the
United States.
Defendant, using conclusory arguments and conclusory interpretations of Plaintiffs'
complaint and depositions, claims that the primary reason Plaintiffs were discharged was because
they broke Defendant's rule against acquiring three "unexcused" absences. Even assuming such
as true, whether Plaintiffs broke the rules raises a fundamental factual dispute which completely
precludes summary judgment.
This Court well knows, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the
moving party's burden to remove all questions of material fact before summary judgment can be
rendered. Defendant, rather than precluding any factual dispute as to whether Plaintiffs were
fired for whistleblowing, completely fails to address the question.
Plaintiffs' terminations were pretextual to the extent that they were arbitrary, and
prompted by Plaintiffs refusals to engage in or cooperate with illegal and improper activity.
Furthermore, It appears that Defendant has wilfully failed to comply with discovery,
which should be an independent basis for denying its motion for summary judgment. The Court
shall apply the strictest standard of review in reviewing this motion. The motion is premature
and should be summarily denied. Many facts are in dispute and Plaintiffs have had insufficient
2

time and insufficient cooperation from Defendant to ascertain the facts forming the basis of their
causes of action.
The facts presented by Defendant as undisputed are taken out of context and are
vigorously disputed. Defendant misrepresents the law and the applicable tests for each argument
it makes, and it does not meet its burden of proving all elements of the tests which are applicable
to the questions it presents.
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
1.

Undisputed.

2.

Undisputed.

3.

Undisputed.

4.

Undisputed that the collective bargaining agreement provides a "just cause" standard

under which Plaintiffs' firings will be reviewed in this Court. The "grievance process" has no
relevance to the facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims
5.

Disputed. Undisputed that "three unexcused absences" was a "rule" that was often

recited at the Twin Falls Factory and that the only wTitten memorialization of said rule reads as
follows:
You must come in, on time, every day your shift is scheduled to
work. If you will be late, or absent, you must call in to the factory
to report it. [ ] Failure to do this is grounds for immediate
dismissal. It is your responsibility to get to work and he on time
All reasons that you may choose to miss work for may not be
excused. For example if you do not have a ride to work and you
3

miss the full shift this absence will be unexcused. It is your
responsibility to clear all absences with you supervisor. The
maximum number of unexcused absences you can receive before
being terminated is three (3).
6.

Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow was assessed "unexcused absences" on

September 10, 1994 and March 25, 1995.
7. Undisputed. On May 20, 1995, Mr. Sparrow was sick, and he properly called the
factory in accordance with the rule quoted in ^ 5 above.
8.

Disputed.
Q.

[Mr. Gavre] So when you called in to the company in the morning [before
6:00 a.m.], were you already planning on going to Nevada that day?

A.

[Mr. Sparrow] No. I had no idea. When I called in sick I was at my
mother's house. I just had — I don't know, I had nerves in my stomach or
something an I was still in bed up until 3:30 [p.m.]. My ex-wife came and
asked me to go to Nevada with her, and I was still in bed at the time, and I
said, I guess, so I went with her.

Q.

So you weren't so sick that you couldn't drive to Nevada?

A.

I didn't drive. I rode.
*

*

*

Q.

So you could have gone to work that day?

A.

No. I couldn't have.

4

Sparrow Depo. at 209. Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow was cited for speeding in Nevada and was
arrested because of aprior unpaid citation. Mr. Sparrow rode as a passenger with his ex-wife to
Nevada and only drove after his ex-wife received a speeding ticket and refused to continue
driving. Sparrow Depo. at 211-213. Disputed that Mr. Sparrow missed four days of work. As
shown above, Mr. Sparrow was sick on May 20, 1995. Mr. Sparrow was fired on May 22, 1995.
9.

Disputed that Mr. Sparrow knew his absences were "unexcused" or that he had

exceeded the "maximum number permitted." Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow testified that he
thought the time in jail might have constituted "unexcused" absences. Disputed whether his time
in jail constituted "unexcused" absences under Defendant's "rule."
10.

Disputed that Mr. Sparrow was discharged for having more than three "unexcused"

absences. Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow was discharged on the pretextual basis that he had
received "three unexcused absences." Undisputed also that his firing occurred on May 22, 1995.
11.

Undisputed. Any grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement

has no relevance to the facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims.
12.

Undisputed. The October, 1986 warning has no relevance to the facts underlying

Plaintiffs' claims
13.

Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups was assessed an "unexcused" absence on

March 19, 1988.
14.

Disputed. Mr. Waddoups testified that Larry Dayley was emotional on September

28, 1993:
5

Q.

[Mr. Gavre] But Larry Dayley did talk to you about poor attendance?

A. . [Mr. Waddoups] I remember him coming up and saying something. It
was short, it couldn't have been more than five or six words and took off.
He was mad.
Waddoups Depo. at 119 (emphasis added).
15. Disputed. The written warning referenced by Defendant has no relevance to the
facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims except to show procedures that Defendant did not follow when
firing Plaintiffs.
16. Disputed. Undisputed that on June 29, 1994, Mr. Waddoups was assessed an
"unexcused" absence. Mr. Waddoups testified:
Q.

[Mr. Gavre] And then did you ask Bob Kinchelow if you could have a
portion of the day off?

A.

[Mr. Waddoups] I believe the remainder, yes.

Q.

And what did Bob Kinchelow tell you?

A.

He, I thought, said yes....
*

Q.

*

*

This Exhibit 18 says [objected to on grounds of hearsay] that Bob told you
that you needed to get Vince's approval and that you threw a fit?

A.

He lied.

Waddoups Depo. at 123.
6

17.

Disputed. Undisputed that on March 3, 1995, Mr. Waddoups was assessed an

"unexcused" absence. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups was sick on March 3, 1995 and properly
complied with Defendant's "rule" which is quoted in ^f 5, above. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups
testified in his deposition that there was no use fighting the arbitrary characterization (as either
"excused" or "unexcused") given to absences by Defendant. Waddoups Depo. at 243-44.
18.

Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups was sick on May 28, 1995 and Mr.

Waddoups was assessed an "unexcused" absence for being sick. "I had called in sick because I
wasn't feeling well. I don't know how he added the rest of this up." Waddoups Depo. at 261.
19.

Disputed. Undisputed that Larry Dayley asserted the pretextual reason of

"excessive absenteeism" when he fired Mr. Waddoups in violation of clear and substantial public
policy on May 28, 1995.
20.

Disputed. Undisputed that over the course of many years of employment, tardiness

and absenteeism had been discussed at different times in different forms. Undisputed also that
Defendant applied its "rules" arbitrarily and capriciously.
21.

Undisputed. Any grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement

has no relevance to the facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims.
22.

Disputed. Undisputed that on February 16, 1995, Michael Davis was fatally injured

when his arm and most of the blood in his body entered Defendant's sugar production system.
Undisputed that some cleaning of the system occurred. Disputed that sugar being loaded on the
day of the accident was shipped to an animal feed producer. Undisputed that Defendant claimed
7

and claims that the Quarantined Sugar was sent to an animal feed producer.
23. Undisputed that sugar stored in the Twin Falls factory was adulterated by human
blood and flesh and was shipped for human consumption in violation of food safety laws.
24. Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow took advantage of all
internal methods of resolving issues of contamination. Undisputed also that Defendant ignored
the danger that its adulterated sugar posed to the public, and Defendant violated food safety laws
Undisputed also that because of their attempt to resolve the contamination issues internally, Mr.
Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow were unlawfully terminated before they were able to alert public
authorities or the news media.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is not appropriate where "motive and intent play leading roles, the
proof is largely in the hands of the [Defendant], and hostile witnesses thicken the plot." Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Tnc.: 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). Defendant seeks the entry of a
summary judgment where discovery has not progressed because of Defendant's own dilatory
tactics. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman: 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987). In addition, many facts which Defendant presents as
undisputed are vigorously disputed and the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom will be
viewed by this Court in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Sandhergv Klein, 576 P.2d 1291
(Utah 1978) (holding that where the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but
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the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously disputed, the
matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only be resolved by a trial). Because
Defendant has not produced any explicit facts supported by affidavit or otherwise in support of
its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs may rely on their pleadings. S££ Gadd v. Olson,
685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984); Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah
1975).
In some very narrow situations, the Court may enter a summary judgment where no set of
facts can be established justifying the relief sought. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherhy Ins. Co..
594 P2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979) (Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment but
recognizing that when the facts are undisputed and no more than one reasonable conclusion can
be drawn, summary judgment might theoretically be permissible).

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS
PREMATURE

Plaintiffs have had insufficient opportunity to conduct discovery. Defendant has been
dilatory and uncooperative. On November 10, 1997, this Court conducted a Hearing on
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel (3), a Motion for Protective Order, and a Motion for discovery
sanctions in the form of a Default Judgment. This is not the record of a case in which discovery
has reached a stage where this Court may assume that the facts have been developed.
All of the causes of action herein are fact-sensitive. All of the facts which Plaintiffs need
9

to support their argument are in the exclusive control of Defendant. See Affidavit of Trent J.
Waddoups attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Continuance.

II.

PLAINTIFFS MAY AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO
CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE

Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if Plaintiffs have not alleged
sufficient facts, or if their causes of action do not allege proper bases upon which relief may be
had, Plaintiffs may amend their complaint as justice requires.

III.

DEFENDANT BEARS THE BURDEN OF SUPPORTING ITS
ASSERTION THAT IDAHO LAW APPLIES

This Court is presumed not to know the law of foreign states. If Defendant desires to
assert that Idaho law should apply to Plaintiffs' causes of action because of comity, it bears the
burden of presenting notice of its assertion, it must establish its assertions about the contents of
Idaho law, it must provide rules of decision upon which the Court may rely, and it must prepare
the Court for all foreseeable problems associated with applying foreign law (such as if the Court
attempts to apply foreign law, but is not able to discern the content of the foreign law).
Defendant has wholly failed in its responsibility. Thus, the Court may summarily deny
Defendant's choice of law assertion because the Court may apply the law of the forum in all
cases by inferring that the panies stipulate thereto or by inferring that no conflict exists. Sfi£ Doe
v. Nevada Crossing, Inc., 920 F.Supp 164, 167 (D.Utah 1996) (and cases cited therein). The
State of Utah "possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within
10

its territory." Pennoyer v. Neflfl 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

DEFENDANT'S POINT III.

IV.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF THE
FORUM — UTAH LAW

The Defendant is on a jurisdiction selecting expedition whereby it seeks to escape the
application of Utah law to its tortious misconduct. While application of Idaho law may advance
Idaho policies when Idaho is the forum, those policies would not be furthered by applying Idaho
law in a Utah forum. For this reason, this Court will look solely to Utah law.
In 1989, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "most significant relationship" test to a
question regarding intra-familial tort immunity. Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989)
("As to the applicability of the doctrine of interspousal immunity heretofore espoused by this
Court, by reason of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, it would appear that
Utah law should not be applied." Id. at 219 (emphasis added)). The application of the "most
significant relationship" test to an intra-familial tort did not necessarily extend the "adoption" of
that test to all torts because the particular factors to be considered in a choice of law question
vary greatly according to the cause of action which is brought.
Nevertheless, various federal courts have made "Erie Guesses," and the Utah Court of
Appeals has concluded that the Utah Supreme Court would probably apply the "most significant
relationship" test as articulated in Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
to all tort actions. $££ Record v. Bnggs. 887 P.2d 865 (Utah App. 1994); Doe v Nevada
11

Crossing, Inc.. 920 F.Supp 164 (D.Utah 1996). Plaintiffs do not dispute that this Court should
apply the factors listed in § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law and consider the
contacts listed in § 145. The approach the Court must take under the most significant contacts
analysis is not the application of a bright-line test; but rather, its task is to ask all of the right
questions.
The merit of this approach is that it gives to the state having the most interest in the
problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus
allowing the forum to apply the policies of the jurisdiction "most intimately concerned with the
outcome of [the] particular litigation." 3 Utah L.Rev., pp. 498-99. Moreover, by stressing the
significant contacts, it enables the Court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the two
jurisdictions involved, but also to give effect to pragmatic considerations of'Whether one rule or
the other produces the best practical result." Swift & Co. v. Rankers Trust Co.. 19 N.E.2d 992,
995 (N.Y. 1939).
While Defendant properly asserts that the "most significant relationship" test may be
applied to this matter, it improperly analyzes the facts by applying the discredited lex loci
delictus test. £fi£ Forsman, 779 P.2d at 219-20 (rejecting Defendant's "law of the situs"
analysis). Defendant simplistically avers that the parties were in Idaho, therefore, Idaho law
applies. Defendant does not attempt to apply the factors listed in § 145, and it does not even
fully quote § 145 to inform the Court that the contacts listed in § 145 are to be taken into account
in applying the principles listed in § 6 in order to determine the central question: Which state has
12
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the most significant interest in applying its law to the underlying facts? $££ Doe v. Nevada
Crossing. Inc.. 920 F.Supp 164, 167 (D.Utah 1996).
The proper application of all the factors listed below inescapably leads to the conclusion
that Utah's substantive law is the governing law. Section 145 provides as follows:
§ 145.

The General Principle
(1)
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2)
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6
to determine the law applicable to an issue include:1
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

the place where the injury occurred,
the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 145. The Court will take the above-listed
considerations into account when applying the principles listed below in § 6.
§ 6.

Choice-of-Law Principles
(1)
A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.

1

Note that the list of contacts is not exhaustive; but rather, the significant contacts
"include" a - d.
13

(2)
When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

the needs of the interstate and international systems.
the relevant policies of the forum,
the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
the protection of justified expectations,
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 6.
The value goals of § 6 and the contacts of § 145 should be "evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to" Plaintiffs' causes of action.2 The policies evaluated by the
court in the intrafamilial cause of action discussed in Forsman are not the policies underlying the
causes of action in this case.
In this case, the most important factors are: (A) The place where the injury occurred,
Restatement § 145(2)(a); (B) The relevant policies of the forum, Restatement § 6(2)(b); (C) The
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, Restatement § 6(2)(b); (D) The basic policies underlying
the particular field of law, Restatement § 6(2)(d); and (E) Ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied, Restatement § 6(2)(g).

2

Professor Weintraub of the University of Texas Law School proposes that: "If two or
more states having contacts with the parties or the transactions will have the policies underlying
their different tort rules advanced, apply the law that will favor the plaintiff...." Russell
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws at 360 (3d Ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
14

Defendant utterly failed to explain the relevant policies underlying Idaho law, to compare
the relative interests x)f Idaho and Utah in the determination of the particular issues in this matter,
or even to tell the Court what Idaho law is. Restatement § 6(2)(b).
A.

PURSUANT TO § 145(2)(a), THE INJURY OCCURRED IN UTAH,
AND THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY UTAH LAW.

The Defendant confuses the place where the injury occurred with the place where the
Plaintiffs suffered their money damages for which Defendant is liable. At first blush, this
rephrasing may appear cosmetic; however, it is fundamental to this choice of law issue under the
most significant contacts analysis.
The injury for which Plaintiffs seek redress under the law is Defendant's violation of
Utah's clear and substantial public policies regarding food safety and the termination of
employees who advance those public policies. The "injury" is not the amount of money damages
that this Defendant will ultimately be required to pay to Plaintiffs as a result of its tortious
misconduct. The "injury" is the contravention of Utah's vital state interests. The "injury"
includes the damage to public health perpetrated by a Utah corporation, the damage to
employment relationships where a Utah corporation punishes employees who refuse to commit
an unlawful act, the damage to an unsuspecting public which is not protected by citizen
crimefighters promoting clear and substantial Utah public policies, etc. The "injury" was caused
by Defendant's reckless conduct which originated in Utah and was inflicted upon Plaintiffs in
Idaho. Restatement §§ 145(2)(a), (b). The cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of
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\ Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation
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Public Policy, Therefore, the Place of the Injury Is I Jtak,.
Defendant's violation of public policy rendered an otherwise private matter repugnant to
the public good. The public policy exception to the employment ai
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cause of action which sounds in tort because the injury caused by such an action is perpetrated
against the public, as opposed to the parties \ >n I \
[T]he vindication of public policy worked by the tort cause of
action cannot be accomplished by a contractual provision that
prohibits discharges for any but just cause. Even when a contract
prohibits conduct that also would violate public policy, the
remedies for breach of that contract would satisfy only the private
interests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., by restoring a
wrongfully discharged employee to his or her position and making
him or her whole. There is no reason to expect that these remedies
would be as draconian as those that might be available under the
tort cause of action, remedies that are designed not only to
remedy the breach and make the employee whole but to deter
and punish violations of vital state interest. While any employer
violating a contractual just-cause standard of dismissal should be
liable for breaking its promise to its employee, Peterson dictates
that an employer who violates clear and substantial public policies
should be liable for the more expansive penalties of tort, a
potentially harsher liability commensurate with the greater wrong
against society. When an employer's act violates both the
contractual just-cause standard and a clear and substantial public
policy, we see no reason to dilute the force of the double sanction.
In such an instance, the employer is liable for two breaches, one in
contract and one in tort. It therefore must bear the consequences of
both.
Rcthcrford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 955 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added) (citing
Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)).
1 1: le toi t :)f w rongfi il discharge in violation of public policy affects the conduct of Utah's
employers by imposing punitive damages,,,4 "[Potential punitive damages will exert, a valuable

rhe Court should advance the forum's governmental interests by applying the "better
rule of law"
Utah lav • i; IJCI: Leflar, McDougal & Felix, American Conflicts 'Law.... 279 (4th ed.
1986).
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deterrent effect on employers who might otherwise subject their employees to a choice between
violating the law or losing their job.,
df!

T

?MII

h a m i i H SJ2 P 2\\ it 1 f,S , innpli.iMs added) The State

hii • mi extremely strong state interest in providing "an incentive ror employers to refrain

from using their unique economic position to coerce employee
ana suDsiaiiii.il inmblik

IHUR US

COHJL

.

. ~v

\r

Moreover, n will encourage employees to engage in lawful .

conduct and report violations of the law." Id. (citing with approval, Boyle v, Vista Eyewear.
Inc.," , : - . . . ,

.»

•*

J un violation of

federal Food and Drug Administration regulations)). Furthermore, Utah protects employees
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food and its interest in protecting those w h o are fired for promoting this clear and substantial

Defendant bears the burden of showing that Idaho has any interest in this matter. In the
absence of such a showing, the Court will conclude that Idaho has n o interest. "If the Court finds
that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in the circumstances of the case and
the other has none, it should apply the law of the interested state." Brainerd Currie, Notes on
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of I,aws : Duke L , l 171, 178 (1959).
See also Restatement § 6(2)(c).
Iy

public policy.6
If Idaho law would also dictate liul f KJencIanni v\u\ iiml r\\ n ,md substantial public
p. .h.:iri then the conflict between Idaho law and Utah law is a "false conflict" because both
State's laws are the same. Where the Court encounters a :-:: •. , '

'

-^

- familial' and adept. Restatement at § o\2)ig'. :: :he r-rccess.
the Court will advance predictability and uniformity of result and protect justified expeeiations.
Restatement a: ,
In sum, the injury relating to the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
occurred in Utah. Food vvhxh is contaminated in Idaho does no! skn in Idaho I"r muT*-*? in
. i i*:^ a..v/n •' -hr-- food Drought into Utah by protecting employees who further that interest
and seek protection in Utah courts gives Utah amore significant interest in protecting Plainulls
than Idaho ' tia aiise Utah imposes se\ cut; penalties on responsible employers like Defendant,
Utah has demonstrated its more significant interest, and Utah law applies,

(

In terms of the age-old example of shooting a bullet across state lines: The gun was
located in Idaho, the tngger was pulled from Utah by a Utah corporation, the bullet wounded one
Idaho domiciliary' and one Utah domiciliary in Idaho, then the bullet ricocheted off the two
victims and severely wounded the State of Utah through injury to Utah's public policy.
7

"If the Court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interest of the two states is
unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum "' h::\ nerd Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of I aws. Duke L J. * "*! " * * v^> *

B.

PURSUANT lu:;\ 45(2)fb), THE CONDUCT CAUSING THE INJURY
TO UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY ORIGINATED WITH DEFENDANT'S
MANAGEMFV^ ^vry
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The state of Utah has a strong interest in regulating the unlawful actions of its civrcr.s
(Defendant) and in protecting its citizens from unla. :

:-. :.:..::*:

Mr--'

Banian Coast mt rorpnrate niratcs. If a Utah corporation does business in other states where it
wreaks havoc (especially when that havoc returns to Utah in the form of adulterated
has a strong interest in appi»\\\v \\> i.i1*' in in '"ii'iaic and niotect its citizens.8
Defendant is incorporated in Utah and manages its factories from its headquarters in
Ogden, Utah. Defendant represents tfiai On.: is a '
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Common sense, standard business practices, and Plaintiffs' uncontested allegations dictate
otherwise. The corporation's management located at its headquarters lonnulates and nitorces
ihc busmen iHaiiaavj, mlti,, ,tml reinilatiini . that lie at the fore of Plaintiffs' causes of action in
this case. Defendant's employees' and managers' attitudes and conduct regarding issues such as:
"'adulterated K»ml " J L|uaiili! ui pnuim inri• i\ iwt* ilrvrlnprd ^ nil afnnice to the attitudes and
conduct of Defendant's management at its headquarters. These attitudes and conduct fostered
The United Mates supreme Court held in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. that the United
States is not barred by international law from governing the conduct of its citizens on the high
seas or in foreign countries. 344 U.S. 280 (1952),
For example, United States securities laws apply to fraud involving securities
representing ownership interests in domestic corporations which are sold in foreign countries.
This is true even where the only victims of the fraud are foreigners. The United States has a
strong interest in punishing the misconduct of its own citizens for the disregard of its law and the
misuse of United States' law which gives the appearance that the United States approves of such
misconduct.

the corporation's culture which requires conduct in conformity with developed corporate
customs. Such developed customs are espu ...

'

' --on which, according

ii i us 'AUKWfT^ 10 Plaintiffs' discover}' requests, has no written policies on very important matters.
Those weaned on Defendant's culture approved of illegal!) scriuiny adulterated sugar ir he t\i\cn
r»< diilMtetn aiiJ ilisajuMoved ofinnd fired) those who stood athwrart its bandwagon culture
screaming "stop!"9
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ihem came directh from Ogden, Utah.

Plaintiffs plan to develop this belief through additional discover}'.
PURSUANT TO § 145(2)(c), THE DOMICIL OF PLAINTIFF BLAKE
WADDOUPS IS UTAH AND THE DOMICIL OF DEFENDANT IS
UTAH, THEREFORE UTAH LAW APPI IES.
Plaintiff Blake Waddoups is a domiciliary of Utah. Ltah is Mi \\ addnai
org.

*

du.ii „ ik n(

f choice (he intends to return here). Defendant

correctly argues that both Plaintiffs resided in Idaho at the time when Defendant tortious)} fired
them. ... >.
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acile is determined

large'11-- h\ the subjective intent of the parties.10
v j ^ s 1S a m o . t l o n j 0 1 sunnuji. i"iilb'Mi^|i| ^ii-i I),M Court; will view all facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs.
" Plaintiffs would present affidavits supporting their assertion that Mr. Waddoups is a
Utah domiciliary; however, Plaintiffs do not bear that burden on this motion for summary
judgment because Defendant merely made yet another conclusory statement. L tan K (V. P.
56(e); See Gadd V.Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984) (holding that the reuuirem-* i
Rule 56(b) is inapplicable if the moving party does not support its motion witn affidavit - ZLLDLParrish v. Layton CityjQix|L, 542 P.2d 1086'i(>S7 (I Jtah 1975).

Two-thirds of the parties (Defendant and one-half of the Plaintiffs) are domiciled m the
state of Utah. Utah has a predominant continuing interest in applying its laws to this case
involving its citizens.
D.

PURSUANT TO § 145(2)(d), THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS CENTERED IN UTAH, THEREFORE, UTAH LAW
APPLIES.

Even if two-thirds of the parties were not domiciled in Utah, Utah still has a predominant
interest in applying its laws to "those who seek relief in its courts." Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie
Co.. 550 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Ark. 1977). The only place where a relationship exists between the
parties is this Court. See Restatement § 145(2)(d) ("(d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.") (emphasis added).
1.

The Contract Is Not Relevant to Defendant's Tortious Conduct,
Therefore, The Situs in Which The Contract Was Entered Is
Irrelevant.

"Because the public policy exception is imposed by law, the . . . agreement is involved
only because it forms the basis of the relationship; the agreement is tangential to the" tortious
misconduct. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992). The collective bargaining
agreement entered into between Plaintiffs and Defendant formed the basis of the relationship
between the parties; however, the breach of the just-cause term of the contract was merely
tangential to Defendant's breach of its duty to the people of Utah which is imposed by Utah's
clear and substantial public policy relating to food safety. Moreover, the detriment imposed
upon Plaintiffs by Defendant "inure[s] to the [detriment] of the public." IdL

DEFENDANT'S POINT IV.

V.

DEFENDANT VIOLATED CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC
POLICY

Defendant concludes that Plaintiffs have no cause of action for wrongful termination
based upon its circular argument/conclusion set forth in its memorandum at Point IV, p. 10.
Defendant's argument concludes, in essence: Idaho law applies because it is the law of the situs,
thus Utah law does not apply, and hence Defendant should argue Idaho law regarding wrongful
discharge; however, Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs only alleged that
Defendant violated Utah's public policy in their complaint. fk£ Defendant's memo, at p. 10
(emphasis in original). BiiLsee, Records v, Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 869 (Utah App. 1994) ("In
characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the pleading
labels chosen.") Defendant cites no Idaho law indicating no cause of action in Idaho, no caselaw
supporting the hypertechnical reading of complaints in notice-pleading jurisdictions, no statutes,
no commentators, etc.

DEFENDANT'S POINT V.

VI.

PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO REPORT DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL
CONDUCT TO GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES DOES NOT BAR
THEIR CLAIM

Defendant grossly misstates the public policy exception to at-will employment and
grossly misinterprets Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). The Utah
Supreme Court stated in Heslop:
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We do not agree that plaintiff cannot meet a public policy requirement
simply because he did not report the violation to the Attorney General or
to the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all internal methods for resolving
the problem; he need not have gone outside the Bank to try to correct the
policy violation.
Hednpv Bankoflltah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992). In Fox v, MCI, the Supreme Court
held:
[T]he termination of a private sector employee in retaliation for the good
faith reporting to company management of alleged violations by coworkers of Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-403, 76-6-405, 76-6-703, or 76-6-705
(1995), does not implicate a clear and substantial public policy of the state
ofUtah.
Fox v. MCT Communications Corp.. 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). Did the court overrule its
holding in Heslop? No.
In Heslop, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fired him because of his insistence that
the defendant bank comply with the Utah Financial Institutions Act found at Utah Code Ann. §
7-1-318. The court concluded that the act "serves a substantial public policy because it protects
the public as well as regulates the institutions themselves." Heslop 839 P.2d at 837 (emphasis
added).
In Fox v. MCI, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fired her after she reported
violations of criminal laws relating to "computer fraud." The computer fraud related to
"churning" accounts to meet internal quotas and to earn higher commissions. In other words, the
victim of the alleged crime was the defendant itself and not the public. "The churning and
creation of 'new' accounts, while clearly intended to produce higher pay for the employees, was

a practice defendant knew about and, by tolerating it, acquiesced in. For that reason, the
corporation was not defrauded." Id. at 860. There was no fraud because the only effect of the
conduct would be felt by the defendant (and not the public), therefore, the only "clear and
substantial public policy" that plaintiff could state would be the public policy which encourages
reporting criminal activity to public authorities which Ms. Fox did not do.
Generally, whistleblowers who complain internally, but who have not contacted an
appropriate enforcement authority are protected by state laws. "[T]he rationale . . . is that loyal
employees, who do not go outside their organizations, should not have less protection than
employees who could be considered more disruptive by complaining outside their
organizations." Westman, Daniel P., Whistleblowing. The Law of Retaliatory Discharge at 114
(1991). An employee working under Defendant's purported "rule of law" would be faced with
the peril of reprisal without legal remedy in exchange for performing public obligations.
Defendant's theory does not promote public policy. An employee's reporting unsanitary
conditions within the workplace is action in furtherance of Utah's firmly held public policy
favoring safe and clean food. Concomitantly, retaliation against the reporting employee as a
punitive measure and a deterrent to other observers of unsanitary conditions directly affronts that
policy. "[I]t would seem that a business ought to welcome an employee's disclosure of
significant" product-quality problems unless, of course, it would unduly damage productquantity goals. Fox v. MCI, 931 P.2d at 859.
After Fox v, MCI, Plaintiffs could not have based their claims on the public policy which
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encourages reporting criminal activity to public authorities. Fortunately, Plaintiffs never alleged
the violation of that public policy. Defendant pulled a chair out from under nobody. It did not
unseat Plaintiffs' claims.
In sum, Plaintiffs alleged that they threatened to reveal the unsanitary conditions of
Defendant's inventory shortly before being fired.11 During the two months which passed
between the contamination and Plaintiffs' firings, Plaintiffs made clear their refusals to engage in
illegal activity and actively sought to determine whether merely holding adulterated food
constitutes a criminal violation (it does). Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant conduct a thorough
investigation (it pretended to investigate to placate Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs diligently demanded
that Defendant follow its own rules on conducting investigations regarding contamination after
they found out that Defendant performed a sham investigation (it never did). The foregoing
states a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because Plaintiffs furthered
public policy and refused to engage in illegal activities.

11

&£ ££., Clifford v, Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry„ 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding, in the Title VII context, that there is no legal distinction between filing a complaint and
threatening to file a complaint).
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DEFENDANT'S POINT VI.

VII.

PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS
NOT BARRED BY ANY STATUTORY SCHEME
A.

IDAHO COURTS RECOGNIZE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS CONCURRENT WITH CLAIMS
FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION.

There is no need for this Court to address Defendant's purported interpretation of the
Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act because the Idaho courts have recognized claims for
emotional distress concurrent with claims for wrongful termination. Sfi£ £ ^ , Holmes v. Union
Oil Co of California. 760 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Idaho App. 1988). The rationale of these cases is
that the actions were not part of the normal employment relationship. Rather, the misconduct
constituted a pattern of pre-termination harassment in retaliation for internal complaints.
Moreover, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not a mechanism geared
toward reimbursing a person for injury; but rather, it is an intentional tort which sanctions
antisocial behavior.
Under Idaho's Worker's Compensation statute, Defendant's arguments ring hollow. How
does an intentional act come within the definition of an accident?
"Accident" means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for
mishap, or untoward event connected with the industry in which it
occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time and place
where it occurred causing an injury.
I.C. § 72-102(14)(b). An intentional act which forms the basis of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress can never fit the definition of accident and is not pre-empted.
28

If the Court were to consider Defendant's argument, it would dismiss it because:
Plaintiffs have not conducted enough discovery; Plaintiffs have not begun assessing the damages
they sustained yet (including the amount or degree of their mental damages); The question of
whether the physical abuse in question was authorized is a question of fact (even if the physical
abuse was not authorized at the time, it may have been subsequently ratified by Defendant);
Defendant's physical abuse constitutes the independent tort of battery-; etc.
B.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LMRA UNDER THE
RFTHFRFORD ANALYSIS.

Defendant owed Plaintiffs the duty not to outrageously harass, humiliate, ridicule, and
embarrass them.12 This duty did not arise from the collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA");
but rather. Defendant owes every member of society the same duty. Because Plaintiffs' cause of
action exists separate and apart from the CBA (i.e., it is not a contract cause of action), the claim
is not pre-empted by the LMRA. fke Farmery, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S.
290, 305, 06 (1977) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against union
and officials was not pre-empted).13
12

See £ ^ , Knafel v, Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 899 F.2d 1473 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that
plaintiffs claim that she was singled out to, inter aha, do jobs that the employer knew would
exacerbate back condition was not pre-empted); Malone v. Safeway Stores, Inc.. 698 F.Supp.
207 (D.Oregon 1977) (holding that claims which included threatening to "get rid o f plaintiff
was outrageous conduct not covered by the CBA).
13

The test of LMRA preemption was also explained by the United States Supreme Court
in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (ruling that a state action asserting a right
related to a CBA is not pre-empted unless it is "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA); and
Linglc v, Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (holding that a retaliatory
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Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the Retherford court did not dismiss all of Ms.
Retherford's emotional distress claims. The court carefully considered Ms. Retherford's specific
allegations and concluded that some of the allegations were pre-empted and some were not.
Retherford. 844 P.2d at 971. The Retherford court explained the test as follows: "To Determine
whether this tort claim is preempted, we must determine whether . . . there is any basis for
concluding that defendant's conduct alleged to provide a basis for the tort claim might
reasonably implicate any of the terms of the [CBA]." Retherford v. AT&T Communications.
844 P.2d 949, 971 (Utah 1992) (citing Tingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc.. 486 U.S. 399
(1988).
The Retherford court adopted the distinction between "purely personal misconduct, as
opposed to misconduct under color of possible contractual authority. . . . " Retherford. 844 P.2d
at 972. Therefore, Defendant bears the burden of presenting this Court with specific provisions
of the CBA which set forth contractual authority of its managers and which it claims will be in
need of interpretation by this Court. Defendant has utterly failed to bear it burden and inform
this Court.
The mere conclusory assertion by Defendant that its actions were "supervisory" is not
sufficient. Defendant concludes that its misconduct was supervisory: "Indeed, plaintiffs allege
that the acts were within the scope and course of employment." Defendant's Memo, at p. 15.
The Retherford court explained that (under a theory of negligent employment) there is "no need
discharge action was not pre-empted).
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to consult the [CBA] to determine whether [abusive employees] were acting within the scope o{
their employment." Retherford. 844 P.2d at 973.
Retherford explained the method of categorizing Defendant's misconduct as either purely
personal or the exercise of supervisory authority. The court concluded that certain conduct
alleged by Ms. Retherford was "supervisory" and thus contractual: AT&T ordered Retherford to
transfer to Boise, it told her to stop complaining, it told her where to sit, it assigned her certain
tasks. Retherford. 844 P.2d at 972. The court concluded that certain other conduct alleged by
Ms. Retherford was purely personal: following her around the office, making threatening faces,
attempting to frighten her as she walked across the street. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972.
1.

Defendant's Conduct Toward Plaintiffs Was Purely Personal,

Defendant's misconduct was purely personal despite Defendant's conclusion that
Plaintiffs allege "supervisory" abuse. Defendant concludes that three of Plaintiffs allegations are
allegations of supervisory abuse, it ignores Plaintiffs' other allegations, and it has prevented
discovery which could uncover additional violations.
First, Defendant failed to provide Mr. Waddoups with psychological counseling and
gamma globulin shots which were provided to all other employees. Complaint at ^ 47. It is true
that the decision to offer psychological counseling is a supervisory function which would be preempted; however, it is not a supervisory function to single-out one person to whom counseling
and medical help would not be offered. At the very least, this is a material disputed fact.
Second, Defendant implied that Mr. Waddoups was responsible for the death of his co31
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worker, that he was responsible for the contamination of all of the sugar in the factory, and he
would be the scapegoat if criminal charges were brought. Complaint at 1147(a). It cannot be
argued that the CBA somehow governs the great American pastime of "covering your ass."
CYA is purely personal misconduct which is separate and distinct from the CBA. Defendant's
"purely personal" desire to engage in purely personal attacks on co-workers does not implicate
the CBA. If these managers had made a thorough investigation and had "exercised their
contractual authority" by naming Mr. Waddoups as the culpable party, then their misconduct
would be pre-empted. Defendant's managers practiced the art of career advancement through the
well-placed shiv. Spreading unfounded rumors and making obnoxious innuendo is purely
personal.
Third, Mr. Sparrow's supervisor slapped him and asked him frequently: "Is today the day
I get to fire you?" In Retherford, the court examined physical abuse (which is clearly personal)
and threats of firing for complaining about a co-worker's homosexual advances. The court held
that Ms. Retherford's supervisor exercised her supervisory authority when she told Ms.
Retherford to stop complaining or she might be fired. It is true that the use of supervisory
authority to quell dissension among employees is "supervisory" even if it is done improperly
with an improper motive (for LMRA pre-emption purposes). In Douglas, the Seventh Circuit
Court held that "supervisory" functions relate to "allegedly arbitrary denials of her requests for
days off, an 'unjustified' final warning, and 'unwarranted and excessive' scrutiny of her work."
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972. If Plaintiffs simply alleged threats to fire, such an allegation would
32

be pre-empted. However, Plaintiffs allege threats to fire that are not based upon performance or
made under the color of any contractual authority; but rather, are coupled with unwarranted
physical abuse which (one assumes) is not the subject of any provision of the CBA. The threats
to fire were made not to reprove Mr. Sparrow's conduct; but rather, Defendant made the threats
in a sinister manner as if to say: "I would personally like to fire you today, but my supervisory
authority does not allow it."
Fourth, Defendant fails to mention Plaintiffs' allegation that one of Defendant's managers
stood behind Mr. Waddoups during exercises and simulated a homosexual act. Complaint at
1147(b). The reference of the obscene act was Mike Davis (the fatally injured co-worker who was
gay) and the blame that the manager personally intended to place upon Mr. Waddoups for the
death of his co-worker. Again, one assumes that simulated, homosexual sex-acts are not within
the description of authority and responsibility as set forth in the CBA; however, because
Defendant fails to point to any provision of the CBA which might be applicable, the Court is left
to speculate.
Whether a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted by the
LMRA depends on the degree of outrageousness of the conduct and the manner in which the
conduct was performed. $££ Fanner v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 305, 06
(1977) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against union and officials
was not preempted by the LMRA under the "abusive manner" exception). The test is whether
the state law cause of action is "inextricably intertwined" with the state law cause of action. In
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this case, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires that the Coin t look at the
conduct of the employer with.
C.

... >•..:

- .

WHETHER PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE "INEXTRICABLY INTER I \\ I NED"
WITH THE CBA IS A QUESTION OF FACT.

The tort of ; xnuonal lnllutinii nt (..'motional distress requires that Plaintiffs prove that:
"[Defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiffs], (a) with the purpose
of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) wf

. .1

ave known that such

\\ i 11 Id result and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable
in that they offend against the generally accepted standards ol decaia aiul inou'Li,

Robertson

v. Utah. F1..1-! 1 ,. SSU P M I *V 1 'RR (Utah \pp. 1995Mciting Samms v. Fccles. 358 P.2d "44
347 (Utah 1961)).
Defendant conclude:, uiiln ml c plaiutinn w inal'iSis tlul the conduct described above is
not "outrageous." Defendant's Memo, at i 5 Accusing someone of negligent homicide is not
outrageous, and as a matter of law a reasonable jur
'-:--'*

.ng someone with criminal sanctions unless he chooses to be a tfcteam

player" and help ship $9 million dollars worth of adulterated sugar to the

PUDIIL L

tun

iniiraL'cous, ajjn as -« m,mer m ! nv 1 reasonable jury could not find that such conduct was
outrageous? Performing simulated, homosexual sex-acts on co-workers during companymandated exercises v> 11m uuihinnnr ,irui .1 \ nmP'*i m 1 iw j reasonable jury could not find that
such conduct was outrageous? Slapping someone with a notebook and threatening him with

being fired for pure entertainment value is not outrageous, and as a matter ol law a reasonable
jury could not find thai such conduct was ouuageou'"" rvimdimt s conclusion that its conduct
was acceptable is outrageous.
Plaintiffs suffered disabling emotional distress.

noi emotionalh bnn<j

iiinisclt 10 took r'ni work for an entire month after his unlawful firing.
Q.

| Mr Gavre] And have you been in good health siru,^ .\ia>

- -A ;.-.. .. a

let I Amalgam a in I!"'
A.

| Mi. Sparrow] No.

A.

:>o; - physically, yes, but emotionally, no

^

Can you explain that9
1

" ill i si brim.1 fired it really bummed me out. It really made me feel like

I was a nobody, a nothing, like I wasn't worth a fight for, to stay on there
good job. li they
knew how man> rr-jjK- ! missed an,: hcu\ mam times ! missed lunch to
make them look goo*. .::

.-

NI made

me feel like I wasn't worth 1: dr\a :; jus: kind of made you go. Wow, you.
know.
Span '\\ F >ep* ,n "ViS-ry^ Mr Sparrow was disabled by his emotional distress.
Q.

[Mr. Gavre] When you left Amalgamated in May of 1995, did you
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immediately begin looking for work?
A.

| Mi ^pdiios* | I winihl f.ikr -iboiit a month.

Q

s0

A.

Correct,

Q

ivvere y 0 U a bi e to work at that time? Aside from not looking for a
1

A.

you

didn't look for work for about a month?

vere you able to work i( you had a job?

•- -. :all> , > es, probably. Emotionally, probably not, no.
\nd that's because, as you said, you were bummed out from being
fired?

A.

Well, yeah, from the results from being fired.

Sparrow Depo. at 270-71. Mr. Waddoups testified that his wik i miiil urn \icep in ilu- *anic bed
w if h him because "I w, 'iild \v,ik: up screaming in the middle of the night in a cold sweat and
actually hurt her just flopping around It all goes back to this Mike Davis crap

Waddoups

Depo. cii 262
Plaintiffs have not received professional psychological counseling. Mr. Sparrow testified
that he had thought about procuring aumsHiiii1 hut In* ami Mi V,
talking to each other and "helped themselves through a lot
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•JII<IOU|V,

ItHpnl llirnisHve*; by

' Sparrow Depo J: _" ( =

DEFENDANT'S POINT VII.

\ Ill

DEFENDANT INTENTIONALIA INTERFERED WITH PLAINTIFFS*
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.

After Plaintiffs' firings, Mr. Sparrow applied to work with a contractor who did work for
Defendants. -

^ "l

*

* * Defendant as his ex-employer,

the contractor called Defendant. Defendant refused allow the contractor to bring Mr. Sparrow
onto its premises, therefore, Mr. Sparrow was not lined. Spanuv\ I k;pi» ;n ,1 n\ \ A I M >
Sp.irnm would have been hired at Oreida; however, after Oreida called Defendant, Oreida
revokes :is offer

Sn arrow Dene at 2^0-^4.
•-—

'

* t

i ••** a reasons satisfies the elements of this tort. Any

reasonable person tcnow s in*.*: v. ,-. person is fired forbad conduct, the person's work-history is
stained and the bad smell in igei s ii ldefiniteh

Defendant's pretexti lal firings interfered with

Plaintiffs' ability to gain decent employment. In fact, both Plaintiffs continue to s t r j ^ : ; ^ un
miserable jobs making miserable wages because of; defendant's miserable iniscoiid
f hi cause of action is valid and properly alleged. Plaintiffs' allegations stand
uncontro verted.
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DEFENDANT'S POINT VII.

IX.

DEFENDANT CONSPIRED WITH UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS OR
ENTITIES TO TERMINATE PLAINTIFFS

Defendant correctly states that it cannot conspire with itselt Mow evei, I )etendan: makes
another attempt to dismiss a cause oi urtmn b.i *n\ upun a stilted reading of Plaintiffs' complaint.
Record;'; v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 869 (Utah App. 19^4} ("In characterizing a cause of action,
Utah courts ioor tr the nature oi the action ami noi die pie idine len:K ilinscn. ")
• .: ;.irrel with the legal standard quoted by Defendant, More discover}' is
needed to find evidence regarding those with whom. Defendant conspired Plaintiffs h:<\" m^i
identified co-amspirauis because Defendant has not cooperated with discovery.

CONCLUSION
Based "jpnp 'In loiTerim- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in
its entirety.
RfcSPF' TFU1X ) M 'BMI M N»Ihr

-3

da\ >>f December, 1997.

CARR&WADDOUPS

Attomevs for Plaintiffs

MATTING CF.RTTFTCATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY Ihal I caused a true unmornviuip' m'Pl ATNTIFF'S
\l hMORANP! ]M IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this

day oi Decemb;.:

Mr. W. Mark Gavre
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake Tin-. T"
. . « - •

TREl^Pl WADDOUPS
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W. MARK GAVRE (4577)
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN (7951)
PARSONS BEHLE& LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801)532-1234
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *
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Case No. 950900441

Plaintiffs.
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vs.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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I.

INTRODUCTION

More than two years have passed since plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, and there is still no
evidence supporting any of their claims. In their opposition memorandum1, plaintiffs continue to
make wild allegations about Amalgamated Sugar supposedly shipping contaminated sugar.
These allegations are as groundless as they were more than two years ago. Opposing counsel's
inflammatory and offensive assertions are defamatory and would be actionable if they were made
outside the legal process. Plaintiffs posture themselves as would-be whistleblowers. Yet it is
undisputed that plaintiffs never reported any supposed contaminated sugar to the FDA, the media
or anyone else (as they claim they were going to do), either while they were employed by
Amalgamated Sugar or after their terminations. In sum, plaintiffs' lawsuit is groundless and
borders on bad faith.
In its opening memorandum. Amalgamated Sugar explained that plaintiffs' public policy
wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because it is asserted solely under Utah law, while
Idaho law is controlling. (The claim would also be groundless under Utah law.)

Plaintiffs'

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is barred by the Idaho Workmen's
Compensation Act, is preempted by federal labor law. and lacks essential elements of the cause
of action.

Plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage is also factually

groundless.

1

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereinafter referred to as
"PI. Opposition Memo, at
." Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
184512.1

In their opposition memorandum, plaintiffs fail to create a genuine dispute of material
fact, but instead raise specious arguments, misstate the law, and mischaracterize the record. As
explained below, there is no basis for plaintiffs' opposition to Amalgamated Sugar's motion for
summary judgment.

II.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SHOW ANY GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL
FACT.
Plaintiffs purport to dispute certain facts, but fail to show any genuine issue of material

fact. Rule 56(e) requires plaintiffs to go beyond "mere allegations or denials," and to set forth
"specific facts" supported by affidavits or other admissible evidence in the record. For each fact
that plaintiffs claim is in dispute, they must "specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which [they] rel[y]." Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(2)(b). Plaintiffs do
not comply with the requirements of the foregoing rules. Plaintiffs merely assert that certain
facts are "disputed," but provide no citation to the record.

PL Opposition Memo, at 3-8.

Accordingly, the material facts relied on by Amalgamated Sugar "shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment." Rule 4-501(2)(b).2
Equally important, plaintiffs do not show any genuine dispute as to facts that are material

hereinafter referred to as "Def. Opening Memo, at

."

2

Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) ("The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment
motion."); Treloggan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (where non-movant's opposition is supported by
"no evidentiary facts" and expresses "unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions," summary judgment properly
granted); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979) (when summary judgment motion is based on
plaintiffs deposition testimony and no affidavit was filed by plaintiff in response, summary judgment appropriate).
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to Amalgamated Sugar's motion. Much of what plaintiffs dispute (without basis in the record)
are not material facts, but merely background information. The material facts are only those that
pertain to Amalgamated Sugar's specific arguments for summary judgment with respect to
plaintiffs' causes of action. As explained below, the facts actually relied on by Amalgamated
Sugar are not genuinely disputed.
III.

IDAHO LAW GOVERNS PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS, AND PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO
SHOW THAT UTAH LAW HAS ANY APPLICATION.
In its opening memorandum. Amalgamated Sugar explained that Utah applies the "most

significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine the
governing law in a given case. Although plaintiffs attempt to muddy the issue, Utah courts have
been clear on this point:
We apply the "most significant relationship" approach, as
described in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in
determining which state's law should apply in actions involving
torts, contracts, property interests, and the like. See, e.g., Forsman
v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1989) (applying "most
significant relationship" analysis to torts case).
Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864. 867 (Utah App. 1994). See also Pacheco v. Hercules, Inc., 61
FEP Cases (BNA) 825, 826 (D. Utah 1993) (same); Doe v. Nevada Crossing, Inc., 920 F.Supp.
164, 166 (D. Utah 1996) (same).
Plaintiffs in substance admit that Utah applies the "most significant relationship" test in
deciding choice of law questions. PI. Opposition Memo, at 11-12. The application of the "most
significant relationship" test to the instant case makes clear that Idaho law governs plaintiffs'
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claims because the parties, the events at issue, and the alleged injuries were all located in Idaho.
Def. Opening Memo, at 8-9. Plaintiffs, however, attempt to avoid this obvious conclusion by
misconstruing and misapplying the "most significant relationship" test.

Despite plaintiffs'

efforts, it is clear that all the relevant factors support the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs'
lawsuit (which consists of three tort claims).3
Under the "most significant relationship" test, the following factors determine which
state's law to apply in tort cases:
(1)

The place where the injury occurred;

(2)

The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(3)

The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties; and

(4)

The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145.
The proper application of the above four factors is illustrated by Judge Greene's decision
in Pacheco v. Hercules, Inc. In that case, Hercules hired the plaintiff in Utah in 1968 where he
worked for 19 years, until he was transferred (temporarily) to a company facility in Georgia in
1987. In Georgia, the plaintiff allegedly was subjected to tortious misconduct by a coworker and

3

Plaintiffs contest the application of Idaho law only with respect to their public policy wrongful discharge claim.
Plaintiffs admit that Idaho law governs their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and are silent as to
what law governs their interference with prospective economic advantage claim. PL Opposition Memo, at 28, 37.
184512!
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a supervisor, suffered severe emotional injury, and eventually lost his job. The plaintiff sued his
supervisor and Hercules based on tort and contract theories. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 825.
Applying the four factors of the "most significant relationship" test. Judge Greene
concluded that Georgia law governed the plaintiffs claims:
All four factors point to Georgia. The injury occurred in Georgia.
The alleged conduct which caused the injury occurred in Georgia.
At the time of the injury, plaintiff and defendant [supervisor] were
domiciled in Georgia, and defendant Hercules, a Delaware
corporation, had a place of business in Georgia. Finally, at the
time of the injury, plaintiffs employment relationship was
centered in Georgia. For these reasons, the court determines that
Georgia lawr governs plaintiffs tort claim.
Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 826. Judge Greene also determined that the plaintiffs contract claims
were governed by Georgia law. Id. at 827.
Application of the four factors to the instant case demonstrates that Idaho law governs
plaintiffs' claims. The first factor is where the injury occurred. Plaintiffs allege that they were
"wrongfully discharged" from their jobs at the Twin Falls, Idaho factory of Amalgamated Sugar
in violation of public policy. Complaint fflj 6-7, 35, 37. For this alleged injury, plaintiffs seek,
inter alia, damages for "loss of earnings" and "loss of future earnings." Complaint at p. 17.
Plaintiffs' "wrongful discharge" injury occurred in Idaho where they were discharged.
Plaintiffs also claim that they suffered emotional distress as a result of Amalgamated
Sugar's treatment of them on the job at the Twin Falls factory. Complaintffi[47-50. This alleged
injury also occurred in Idaho.

Finally, plaintiffs claim that Amalgamated Sugar tortiously

interfered with their prospective economic advantage by terminating them "purportedly for
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cause" and thereby "hampering] their opportunity for future employment." Complaint * 52.
Plaintiffs' subsequent unsuccessful attempts at employment took place in Idaho.

Waddoups

Depo. at 8-9; 11-20; Sparrow Depo. at 9-13; 16-17. This alleged injury (whether based on the
Company's alleged conduct or its supposed consequences) also took place in Idaho.
In response, plaintiffs argue that their "wrongful discharge" injury is not their discharges,
but "the contravention of Utah's vital state interests."

PI. Opposition Memo, at 15.

This

argument is nonsensical for numerous reasons. First, it begs the question of how Utah can have
any "vital state interests" in plaintiffs' discharges in Twin Falls, Idaho. Plaintiffs invoke an
alleged "injury suffered by Utah's public" (jd. at 19), but make no attempt to show how the Utah
public was affected by plaintiffs' discharges.

Second, plaintiffs are not "private attorneys

general" suing on behalf of the Utah public, but individuals suing for themselves over their
alleged wrongful discharges in Idaho. They are seeking damages for their "[lost] earnings,
emotional injuries and mental injuries." Complaint at p. 17. Third, courts have uniformly held
that when an employee claims he was wrongfully discharged, the injury is the discharge
(regardless of the legal theory on which the alleged wrongfulness of the act is based) and occurs
at the location where the employee is discharged. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at S26-27.4 In sum,
plaintiffs' alleged injury is their discharges which took place in Idaho.5

4

See also Ashmore v Northeast Pipeline, 843 F.Supp. 759, 774 (D.Me. 1994) (using the most significant
relationship test to determine tht appropriate law for a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim, the
court held that despite the fact that plaintiff lived in another state during the term of his employment, the law of the
state where the termination occurred should apply because it was the place where both the conduct causing the
injury and the injury occurred as well as the place where the employment relationship was negotiated and
184512.1
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The second factor under the "most significant relationship" test is where the conduct
causing the injury occurred. Plaintiffs' alleged wrongful discharge injuries were caused by
Amalgamated Sugar's discharging them, which occurred in Twin Falls, Idaho. It is undisputed
that Mr. Sparrow was discharged by Assistant Superintendent Bill Stuart and that Mr. Waddoups
was discharged by Assistant Superintendent Larry Day ley in Twin Falls, Idaho. Def. Opening
Memo, at 5 fl[ 10) and 7 fl[ 19); PL Opposition Memo, at 5 (t 10) and 7 fij 19). Despite
plaintiffs' admissions that they were discharged in Idaho by their respective Assistant
Superintendents, opposing counsel argues that the actions took place in Ogden, Utah. PL
Opposition Memo, at 21-22. Opposing counsel provides no support for this contention which
contradicts plaintiffs' own testimony. Counsel's unsupported contention does not comply with
the requirement of Rule 56(e) that an opposition to summary judgment must go beyond "mere
allegations or denials" and must set forth "specific facts" supported by affidavits or other
admissible evidence in the record. In sum, the alleged injurious conduct occurred in Idaho.

commenced and where the plaintiffs supervisors were located).
5

Plaintiffs cite Doe v. Nevada Crossing in support of their argument for the application of Utah law (PI. Opposition
Memo, at 16), but Doe actually demonstrates that Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims. In Doe, the plaintiffs
asserted a claim for "breach of the spousal relationship." 920 F. Supp. at 166. The court determined that Utah law
governed this claim because the plaintiffs were "Utah residents who are husband and wife living in Utah," "the
center of [the plaintiffs' spousal] relationship ... is in Utah" and therefore "Utah is where the damage to the
relationship of [the] plaintiffs was experienced." In contrast, the plaintiffs were in "Wendover, Nevada a few miles
from the Utah border" for "less than 24 hours." Because "Utah is the most significant place of [the plaintiffs']
interpersonal relationship," the court concluded that Utah law governed their claim for breach of their spousal
relationship. Doe, 920 F.Supp. at 165. 167. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact Utah law does not
recognize the cause of action at issue. The court then dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. 920 F. Supp. at 169.
Given that plaintiffs in the instant case lived, worked and were discharged in Idaho (and continue to live
and work in Idaho) and that Amalgamated Sugar's factory which employed plaintiffs is located in Idaho, the
reasoning of Doe supports the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' lawsuit.
184512.2
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The third factor is the domicile, residence, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties. Plaintiffs' residence and domicile during the time of their employment and discharge
by Amalgamated Sugar was Idaho. Plaintiffs' Complaint states:
Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material
hereto, worked and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of
Idaho.
Complaint U 7.6 While Amalgamated Sugar is incorporated in Utah, its relevant place of business
(where plaintiffs were employed) is Twin Falls, Idaho. Complaint ]j 6. Thus, the third factor
supports the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' claims.
The fourth factor is where the relationship between the parties is centered.

Because

plaintiffs were employed by Amalgamated Sugar in Twin Falls, Idaho and because the only
relationship between the parties was the employment relationship, their relationship was centered
in Idaho. In response, plaintiffs argue that their relationship with Amalgamated Sugar is centered
in Utah because they filed their lawsuit in Utah. PL Opposition Memo, at 23. This is an absurd
argument because (1) the relationship at issue is that between the parties at the time of the events
giving rise to the lawsuit, and (2) if plaintiffs' argument were valid they could create and
"center" a relationship with anyone anywhere in the country merely by choosing where to file
suit.

Opposing counsel alleges that Mr. Waddoups' domicile is Utah because he intends to move to Utah. PI.
Opposition Memo, at 22. This argument is without merit because (1) the assertion about Mr. Waddoups1 alleged
intent is without foundation in the record, and (2) the relevant time period for Mr. Waddoups' domicile or residence
is when the events at issue occurred, i.e., when he worked and was discharged in Idaho. See, e.g., Pacheco, 61 FEP
Cases at 826 ("At the time of the injury, plaintiff [was] domiciled in Georgia."). Moreover, in his deposition, Mr.

184512J
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All four factors support the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' claims. There is no
basis for plaintiffs' attempt to have Utah law extended beyond its borders so as to intrude upon
the affairs of Idaho. As Judge Greene observed (citing an earlier decision), the law of the state in
which the employment relationship existed and the dispute arose must be applied because
otherwise the state would be deprived of the ability to govern the conduct of persons, particularly
foreign corporations, within its own territory.
[T]he important interest [Idaho] has in wrongful termination cases
which are based upon conduct arising inside the state [must be
recognized]: The Court bases its determination on the fact that
[Idaho] law governed [the company's] conduct within the state.
That authority necessarily resulted in application of [Idaho] law to
all other aspects of [the company's] relations with its employees.
Failure to apply [Idaho] law concerning wrongful termination in
this case, therefore, would produce an unprincipled exception to
[Idaho's] ability to govern the affairs of foreign corporations
operating within the state.
Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 827 n. 6 (citation omitted).
In sum, Idaho has the most significant relationship to plaintiffs' claims and therefore
provides the governing law applicable to those claims.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM FAILS
BECAUSE IT IS ASSERTED UNDER UTAH LAW, NOT IDAHO LAW.
Plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because it is

asserted under Utah law, while Idaho law governs plaintiffs' lawsuit. Plaintiffs do not dispute,
indeed insist, that their public policy wrongful discharge claim is based on Utah law. PI.

Waddoups testified that after leaving Amaigamaied Sugar, he worked m Idaho, lived in Utah for a brief period and
then returned to Idaho where he now lives Waddoups Depo. at 8-9; ! 1-20.
184512. i
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Opposition Memo, at 11-24. Because plaintiffs rely on inapplicable law (and deliberately ignore
the governing law), their public policy wrongful discharge claim must be dismissed as legally
groundless.
Plaintiffs apparently believe that if Utah law is not applied, they cannot assert a public
policy claim. Such is not the case. Idaho recognizes a cause of action for public policy wrongful
discharge7, and therefore plaintiffs can file a motion to amend their complaint to assert a public
policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law. However, so long as plaintiffs insist that their
claim is based on Utah law and ignore governing Idaho law, their claim for public policy
wrongful discharge should be dismissed.
V.

PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM WOULD FAIL EVEN IF IT WERE
GOVERNED BY UTAH LAW.
While plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim is legally groundless because

they refuse to assert it under Idaho law, it is also the case that the claim would be meritless if it
were governed by Utah law (which it is not). This is so because in 1997 the Utah Supreme Court
clarified

Utah law governing

public policy wrongful

discharge

claims brought

by

"whistleblowing" employees. In Fox v. MCI Communications, the Supreme Court held that
where an employee complains or "blows the whistle" on alleged criminal conduct and is fired as
a consequence, the employee fails to state a public policy claim unless he reported the alleged

7

See. ££i> Jackson v. Minidoka irrigation District, 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981
(Idaho 1996). The Idaho public policy wrongful discharge cause of action sounds in contract while the Utah cause
of action sounds in tort. Hummer. 923 P.2d at 987; Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Utah 1992).
184512 1

10

541

criminal conduct to the public authorities. If the employee complains only to the company itself,
he has not engaged in activity that is sufficiently public in character to be protected by Utah law.
In Fox, the plaintiff alleged that she was fired because she reported to company
management that employees were engaged in criminal conduct. The Supreme Court held that
such facts, even if true, are not sufficient to state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
Utah public policy:
[I]f an employee reports a criminal violation to an employer, rather
than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports, that
does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public
policy.
Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997).8
Plaintiffs assert that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in criminal conduct, specifically
shipping adulterated sugar in violation of the federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act. Complaint
% 25 ("unlawful shipments" and "fraudulent sales" of sugar), t 40 ("illegal activity") ^ 44
(shipping "adulterated" sugar "unlawful under the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 331 et seg.M). Plaintiffs
claim that they were fired because they "threaten[ed] to expose [Amalgamated Sugar's] illegal
activity" by threatening to report it to "food safety agencies of the State of Idaho and the United
States or in the alternative to advise the media." Id. ^ 33, 40. Because plaintiffs posture

8

Other jurisdictions also require employees to report suspected criminal conduct to law enforcement authorities for
there to be a viable public policy wrongful discharge claim. See, e.g., Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing, 13 IER
Cases (BNA) 226, 232 (Mo. App. 1997) (affirming dismissal of public policy wrongful discharge claim where the
plaintiff reported the alleged criminal conduct to management, but not the public authorities, and hence no "clear
mandate of public policy is effectuated").
184512.1
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themselves as whistleblowers of criminal conduct, their claim is directly governed by the rule of
law stated in Fox v. MCI Communications.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the holding of Fox by citing to an earlier case and ignoring the
fact that Fox states the law in Utah governing "whistleblowing" claims. They also try to obscure
the holding in Fox by citing to comments made in dicta, and ignore the actual rule of lavsannounced by the Supreme Court in Fox (quoted above). PI. Opposition Memo, at 25-26.
Plaintiffs also attempt to escape the application of Fox by claiming that they were
discharged not only for their threatened whistleblowing but also because they "refused to engage
in illegal activities." PI. Opposition Memo, at 27. Plaintiffs provide no evidentiary support
whatsoever for this assertion. They do not identify any "illegal activities" they were supposedly
requested to perform or any refusal on their part to engage in such activity. Id.
The reason for the groundlessness of plaintiffs' assertion is obvious: There was no illegal
activity that plaintiffs were required to or even could have performed.

Plaintiffs were "bulk

loaders," responsible for loading sugar in rail cars. They had no responsibility to determine the
purity of sugar, and did not certify or in any way validate the condition of sugar. They did not
determine where the sugar was shipped or whether it was intended for human or animal
consumption or any other use. They merely loaded rail cars with sugar and filled out bulk
loading forms indicating that the cars were loaded and that the car openings were closed and
sealed. Waddoups Depo. at 87-88; 135-137 and Ex. 21 thereto; Sparrow Depo. at 177-179;
183-184; 186-191 and Ex. 5-6 thereto.

184512.1
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In their depositions, plaintiffs did not testify that they were requested to engage in illegal
activities, nor did they claim to have refused to perform illegal activities. Rather, they loaded rail
cars and filled out the standard forms as normal bulk loaders. Sparrow testified:
Q.

[A]t any time after the Mike Davis accident did you bring
up any concern you had about possible contaminated
sugar?

A.

No.

Q.

You never brought it up to anyone?

A.

No.
***

Q.

[D]id you ever tell anyone at Amalgamated that you did not
want to sign off on shipments of adulterated sugar?

A.

No.
***

Q.

So you never told anyone at Amalgamated Sugar that you
didn't want to sign off on shipments of sugar because it had
sugar contaminated from the Mike Davis accident?

A.

No.
***

Q.

Did you ever object to signing some form?

A.

No.
***
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Q.

Did you at any later date tell anyone at Amalgamated that
you didn't want to sign some form?

A.

No.

Q.

So as you continued to work as a bulk loader, for each rail
car you would get a [bulk loading] form like Exhibit 6, is
that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you would fill it out as this one is filled out, is that
correct?

A.

Yes.
***

Q.

And then you would sign on the form that is Exhibit 6 on
the line that says Final Inspection and Sealed, is that
correct?

A.

Yes. I would sign it and the foreman would sign it.

Q.

Is there any occasion when you refused to sign it?

A.

Refused, no.

Q.

Was there any occasion in which you said to anyone you
didn't want to sign it?

A.

No.

Sparrow Depo. at 172, 249, 250, 256-58.
In sum, plaintiffs' "refusal to engage in illegal activity" argument is without any factual
basis and, indeed, is contradicted by the record. Plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge
claim rests solely on their contention that they threatened to "blow the whistle" on supposed
184512 1
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illegal activity. Therefore, if plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim were governed by
Utah law (which it is not), it would fail to state a claim because plaintiffs did not report the
alleged criminal activity to the public authorities.
VI.

PLAINTIFFS1 INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
CLAIM IS GROUNDLESS.
A.

DISTRESS

Plaintiffs' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim is Barred bv the
Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.

Plaintiffs assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress based on how they
were supposedly treated on the job after the Mike Davis fatality. Complaint ^ 47-50. In its
opening memorandum. Amalgamated Sugar explained that plaintiffs' emotional distress claim is
barred by the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.9 Def. Opening Memo, at 12-13.
In response, plaintiffs cite just one case, Holmes v. Union Oil Co. of California, 760 P.2d
1189 (Idaho App. 1988), which does not have anything to do with the Idaho Workmen's
Compensation Act or the application of its exclusive remedy provision. Holmes merely ruled
that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim asserted by a former employee based
upon his discharge was "without merif and properly dismissed at summary judgment because

9

Plaintiffs' infliction of emotional distress claims would also be barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.u.. Brvan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 893-94 (Utah 1975) (injured
employee's tort claims against employer barred by Workers' Compensation Act, even though injuries were
allegedly caused by supervisors intentional harassing conduct); Lantz v. Nafl Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937,
939-40 (Utah App. 1989) (affirming summary dismissal of ton claims against employer based upon injuries
allegedly resulting from supervisor's conduct); Mounteer v Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058-59
(Utah 1991) (affirming summary dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as barred by the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act).
184512.1
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the discharge was not "extreme and outrageous conduct" as required by the tort. 760 P.2d at
1197.
Plaintiffs next argue that because their emotional distress claim is based on alleged
intentional harassment (not an unintentional accident), their claim can never be barred by the
Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.

PL Opposition Memo, at 28. There is no merit to

plaintiffs' argument. The statute expressly states that workers compensation is the exclusive
remedy for job-related injuries except where an injury is "caused by the willful or unprovoked
physical aggression." Idaho Code § 72-209(3) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Coun has
made clear that the statute means what it says:
[Tjhe Idaho worker's compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. . . . If the employee is
unable to prove that the injury was caused the willful or unprovoked physical
aggression of the employer, the employee will not be entitled to damages.
Kearnev v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988). Plaintiffs do not allege any severe
emotional distress as a result of willful or unprovoked physical aggression, and therefore their
claim is barred. Def Opening Memo, at 13.
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly rejected plaintiffs' argument that an
intentional tort claim should not be barred because alleged intentional misconduct is not an
accident. The Court has repeatedly affirmed summary dismissal of intentional tort claims as
barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act, as long as the claimed injuries do not result from
"willful or unprovoked physical aggression." See, e£., Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc.. 659
P.2d 87, 88-90 (Idaho 1982) (affirming summary dismissal of intentional tort claims as barred by
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the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
"intentionally and recklessly subjected the Plaintiff to severe emotional distress, pain and
suffering," and rejecting dissent's suggestion that an intentional act may not come within the
statutory definition of "accident"); Henderson v. State, 715 P.2d 978, 979 (Idaho 1986)
(affirming summary dismissal of intentional tort claims asserted by discharged employee who
alleged that he had been "harassed" and mistreated on the job, which treatment caused him
mental and physical injuries. Despite the plaintiffs allegations of intentional misconduct, his
tort claims were barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act because his injuries did not result
from physical aggression); DeMoss v. Citv of Coeur D'Alene, 795 P.2d 875, 877 (Idaho 1990)
(affirming summary dismissal of tort and "assault and battery" claims based on injuries allegedly
resulting from supervisor's intentional conduct because there was no evidence of "unprovoked
physical aggression").
In sum, plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision
of the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.
B.

Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claims Are Preempted bv Federal Labor Law.

In its Opening Memorandum, Amalgamated Sugar explained that the federal Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA") preempts plaintiffs' emotional distress claims because
plaintiffs'

allegations about supposed supervisory harassment implicates the collective

bargaining agreement (governing plaintiffs' employment and supervisory authority), which is
exclusively governed by federal law. Def. Opening Memo, at 13-15. Courts have routinely
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dismissed, on the basis of LMRA preemption, emotional distress claims based on alleged
supervisory misconduct in unionized workplaces. See, e ^ , Johnson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 921
F.2d 1015, 1017-18, 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary dismissal of infliction of
emotional distress claim as preempted by LMRA where the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor
harassed him, publicly ridiculed him, verbally abused him, and improperly disciplined him).
Federal labor law preempts tort claims whenever the claims "implicate the exercise of
supervisory authority," that is, whenever the misconduct alleged is "misconduct under color of
possible contractual authority." Only if the alleged misconduct is "purely personal" and "does
not implicate the exercise of supervisory authority" can the claim escape being preempted by the
LMRA.

Retherfordv.

AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 971-72 (Utah

(summarizing federal labor law preemption under LMRA).

1992)

Infliction of emotional distress

claims, in particular, are preempted for the additional reason that the issue of the outrageousness
of the alleged conduct cannot be resolved without reference to the labor agreement:
[A]ll aspects of [the plaintiffs] employment, including the terms of
the Collective] Bfargaining] Agreement], must be considered
when evaluating whether [the employer's] conduct was outrageous.
Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1020 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs attempt to escape federal labor law preemption by recharacterizing their
emotional distress claim as involving only "personal" matters. PI. Opposition Memo, at 31-33.
In doing so, plaintiffs misstate the law and mischaracterize the facts on which they rely. For
conduct to be "personal" so as to escape federal labor law preemption, it must be based on

184512.1

18

£49

conduct that is unrelated to employment and is personal to the particular individuals involved.
For example, a tort.claim based on a supervisor's "comments about the sexual activities of [the
plaintiffs] wife" which "escalated into a fist fight" was held not preempted. Retherford, 844
P.2d at 972. Plaintiffs do not allege such personal conflicts.
Moreover, if the conduct at issue were truly personal so as to avoid federal labor law
preemption, it would merely allow plaintiffs to assert claims against other persons in their
individual capacity, not claims against the Company. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972 (emotional
distress claims against three co-workers not preempted because based on their personal behavior
towards the plaintiff).

In other words, if plaintiffs were to succeed in their "it was only a

personal matter" argument, they would have no basis for their tort claim against Amalgamated
Sugar.
The asserted factual basis for plaintiffs' emotional distress claim demonstrates that the
claim is not personal in character. Plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar "offered counseling
and gamma globulin shots after the [Mike Davis] accident to any employee who desired them,
[but] failed to offer this help to Mr. Waddoups" (who was on a regularly scheduled 7-day break
after the accident).

Complaint ^j 47; Waddoups Depo. at 134.

The allegation is factually

incorrect because Mr. Waddoups testified that the Company made two psychiatrists available at
the factory on the day of the accident, and that he met with one of them. Waddoups Depo. at
217-18. In any case, the allegation does not concern any alleged "purely personal" dispute
between Mr. Waddoups and any other individual, but describes how the company supposedly
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responded to the accident. Plaintiffs also allege that Amalgamated Sugar "implied" that "Mr.
Waddoups was responsible for the fatal accident" due to "Mr. Waddoups* control over the
movement of the bulk-loading system." Complaint U 47(a). Again, there is nothing in this
allegation of a "purely personal" nature. It merely asserts a supposed management judgment
about Mr. Waddoups' responsibility in light of the fact that he was in charge of the machinery
that caused the accident.10
With respect to Mr. Sparrow, plaintiffs allege that a supervisor slapped him with a yellow
notebook and threatened to terminate him for "messing up." Complaint ^ 48(a); Sparrow Depo.
at 98. This allegation clearly implicates the exercise of supervisory authority and therefore is
preempted by federal labor law. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972 (emotional distress claim based on
supervisors' alleged "reprimanding]" the plaintiff and threatening that she would "lose her job"
preempted by federal labor law because claim "raises questions about [the supervisors'] authority
under the collective bargaining agreement"); Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1017-18 (emotional distress
claim based on supervisor's alleged harassment, ridicule, and improper disciplining of the
plaintiff preempted by federal labor law); Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877
F.2d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (infliction of emotional distress claim based on employer's
alleged "arbitrary," "unjustified," and "excessive" disciplinary actions towards the plaintiff
preempted by federal labor law).

10

Plaintiffs allege that an unidentified John Doe "defendant" simulated a homosexual act with Mr. Waddoups.
Complaint f 47(b). Because this allegation involves an unidentified and unknown person (and not a manager, as
opposing counsel asserts), it cannot be the basis of a valid claim against the Company.
184512.1
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In sum, plaintiffs' infliction of emotional distress claims are preempted by federal labor
law.
C.

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Essential Elements of Their Emotional Distress
Claim.

Plaintiffs fail to show that the alleged conduct was extreme, uncivilized and outrageous as
required for their claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Def. Opening Memo, at
15. Plaintiffs cite no case law in support of their position, but merely ask rhetorical questions.
PI. Opposition Memo, at 34-35.
Equally important, plaintiffs cannot establish another required element of their claim that they suffered severe, disabling emotional distress. Proof of i%a severely disabling emotional
condition'" is an essential element of the cause of action, and not merely an aspect of damages:
[E]vidence showing that the plaintiff was upset, embarrassed,
angered, bothered and depressed did not demonstrate a severely
disabling emotional condition adequate for intentional infliction of
emotional distress damages.
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464-65 (Idaho 1996). Plaintiffs merely
allege that Mr. Sparrow felt 4*bummed out" about being discharged,11 and did not work for 4wabout

n

Plaintiffs' discharges are not pan of their emotional distress claim (Complaint ^47-50), and therefore it is
irrelevant that Mr. Sparrow was "bummed out" b\ his discharge Moreover, a discharge is not extreme and
outrageous conduct actionable under the ton of intentional infliction of emotional distress See, e.g., Holmes v.
Union Oil Co of California. 760 P.2d 1189. 1 197 (Idaho App 1988) (affirming summar> dismissal of intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim based on the plaintiffs discharge because discharge is not "extreme and
outrageous conduct"): Sperber v Gahgher Ash Co 747 P.2d 1025. 1028-29 (Utah 1987) (discharge from
employment, even when the employee is given a taisc reason for the action, "does not constitute outrageous or
intolerable conduct bv an employer." While "ever> employee who believes he has a legitimate grievance
concerning his discharge from employment experiences some emotional anguish," such does not give rise to "a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress")
184512 1
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a month." PL Opposition Memo, at 35-36. Both plaintiffs have worked regularly since leaving
Amalgamated Sugar. Waddoups Depo. at 8-9; 11-20; Sparrow Depo. at 9-16. In short, plaintiffs
have not suffered any "severely disabling" condition, and therefore their intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim is groundless, and should be dismissed.

VII.

PLAINTIFFS'
INTERFERENCE
WITH
ADVANTAGE CLAIM IS GROUNDLESS.

PROSPECTIVE

ECONOMIC

In its opening memorandum, Amalgamated Sugar pointed out that plaintiffs* interference
with prospective economic advantage claim is groundless because they do not identify, let alone
substantiate, any conduct by Amalgamated Sugar that interfered with any actual or potential
economic relationship between either plaintiff and any third party. Def. Opening Memo, at 16.
Proof of such interfering conduct that disrupts an actual or potential economic relationship
between a plaintiff and a specific third party is a required element of the cause of action. Idaho
Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Vallev Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 860-61 (Idaho 1991).
In response, opposing counsel misstates the record in order to claim that Mr. Sparrow was
turned down for two jobs because of Amalgamated Sugar.

PI. Opposition Memo, at 37.

Counsel's claim is contradicted by Mr. Sparrow's deposition testimony. The first job in question
was at Amalgamated Sugar itself, specifically at its "beet dump" where sugar beets are stored for
later use in the Company's factories. Sparrow Depo. at 17, 270. This alleged incident does not
support plaintiffs' claim because a party to a contract (actual or potential) cannot tortiously
interfere with it. Orstrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 846, 850 (Idaho 1993).
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The second job referred to was at Oreida Foods, about which Mr. Sparrow testified he
does not know of any contact between Oreida Foods and Amalgamated Sugar regarding himself.
Sparrow Depo. at 272-73. Moreover, Mr. Sparrow testified that Oreida Foods informed him that
he was not being hired because "they weren't hiring" and "they had everybody they needed." 14
at 273-74. In sum, there is no support for opposing counsel's claims about Mr. Sparrow. With
respect to Mr. Waddoups, counsel does not even claim that Amalgamated Sugar interfered with
any potential employment or other opportunity. PL Opposition Memo, at 37.
Moreover, plaintiffs testified affirmatively that they are unaware of any contacts between
Amalgamated Sugar and any of their subsequent actual or potential employers. Mr. Sparrow
testified:
Q.

So you don't know of any communications between anyone
at Amalgamated Sugar and any other employer regarding
you, is that correct?

A.

Correct. (Sparrow Depo. at 276-77.)

Mr. Waddoups testified:
Q.

So as far as you know. Amalgamated Sugar has not been in
contact with any of your employers since —

A.

As far as I know.

Q.

Do you know if Amalgamated Sugar has been in contact
with any of the companies you applied at?

A.

I would not know that. (Waddoups Depo. at 310.)

In sum, there is no basis for plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage
claim.

VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and stated in Amalgamated Sugar's opening memorandum.
plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims stated therein should be dismissed with prejudice.
•2,
DATED t J H ^ y day of December. 1997.

W. MARK GAVRE
MARGARET NIVETMCGANN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cenify that on this 2 ^ - day of December, 1997. I caused to be handdelivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to:
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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W. MARK GAVRE (4577)
MARGARET NTVER MCGANN (7951)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR.,

Case No. 950900441
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendant.
* * * * * * *

This matter came on for hearing before the Court on Monday, March 23, 1998. Pending
before the Court were defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiffs Motion for a
Continuance.
Defendant The Amalgamated Sugar Company was represented by W. Mark Gavre of
Parsons Behle & Latimer. Plaintiffs Blake William Waddoups and James Edward Sparrow, Jr.
were represented by Trent J. Waddoups of Can* & Waddoups.

9;s

Having considered the memoranda, affidavit, and exhibits filed by the parties and having
heard oral argument from counsel, the Court hereby makes the following decision, based upon
undisputed facts, and enters the following Order:
1.

Plaintiffs' claims are governed by Idaho law, not Utah law. As the forum state,

Utah applies the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws to determine the governing law in a given case. In the instant case, plaintiffs resided and
worked in Idaho during all material times. Plaintiffs were discharged by Amalgamated Sugar in
Idaho, and the alleged wrongful and injurious acts took place in Idaho. While Amalgamated
Sugar's headquarters is in Utah, there is no evidence in the record of any conduct by
Amalgamated Sugar in Utah related to plaintiffs.

Accordingly, applying the "most significant

relationship" test, the Court finds that Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims.
2.

Plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Utah public policy is

dismissed with prejudice because, being based on Utah law, it fails to state a claim under Idaho
law. Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to file an amended complaint asserting a claim under
Idaho law for wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho public policy.
3.

Plaintiffs' claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress is

dismissed with prejudice on the ground that it is preempted and therefore barred by the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Plaintiffs were union members working for
defendant at its Twin Falls, Idaho plant under a collective bargaining agreement between
defendant and plaintiffs' union, The American Federation of Grain Millers Union. The collective
bargaining agreement provided a grievance and arbitration process for handling disputes between
200893.1
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defendant and union-represented employees. Plaintiffs' allegations under this claim all concern
supervisory conduct related to the operation or management of defendant's plant and hence
concern the exercise of supervisory authority under the collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiffs' claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress is also dismissed on
the ground that there is no evidence that either plaintiff suffered a severe or disabling emotional
condition as a result of alleged conduct by defendant, as required by Idaho law.
4.

Plaintiffs' claim for interference with prospective economic advantage is dismissed

with prejudice because there is no evidence of conduct by defendant interfering with any actual or
potential contract, employment relationship, or other economic relationship between either
plaintiff and any other person.
5.

Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy is dismissed with prejudice because there is no

evidence of defendant conspiring or interacting with any other person regarding plaintiffs.
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, p^^tiffn^^frnp^m^and
all causes oHxxkmzm&z^^

therein, is herebyrdismissed-with prgud^f and plaintiffs

are granted leave to file an amended complaint asserting a claim under Idaho law for wrongful
discharge in violation of Idaho public policy.

200893.1
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DATED this /

day of N&feh, 1998
BY THE COURT:

STANTON M/JA
Second District Co

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

<*£.

Trettfl Waddoups
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of March, 1998, I caused to be hand-

delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
^ # * *

WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH \°^

AUG

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS,and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW JR.,

RULING

Plaintiffs,
vs

Case No. 950900441

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs move the court for a new trial or to alter or amend
its judgment under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
reviewing the motion and the relevant issues plaintiff raises, the
court finds nothing raised that changes its decision.

The motion

is accordingly denied.
In addition, the court finds that its order granting summary
judgment complies with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure with the exception of the motion for a continuance.

The

motion was impliedly denied by granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment, however, no brief written statement of the ground
for its decision was given.
motion

for

a

continuance.

The court now explicitly denies the
Because

the

plaintiffs

did

not

demonstrate how additional time would enable them to rebut the
motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's motion for a continuance
was denied. Plaintiffs have also had sufficient time, opportunity,
and cooperation in conducting their discovery.

Ruling
Case No. 950900441
Page 2
Dated this
fy

day of August, 1998

Stantofi M
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Ruling
Case No. 950900441
Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the JO "" day of August, 1998, I s
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to counsel
follows:
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
W. Mark Gavre
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898

^KOJ,'.

Deputy Court/Cleric
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W. MARK GAVRE (4577)
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN (7951)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South Main Street. Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR.,

Case No. 950900441

Plaintiffs,

Judge Stanton M. Taylor

vs.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendant.
* * * * * * *
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I.

INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 1998 the Court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of The

Amalgamated Sugar Company ("Amalgamated Sugar" or the "Company"). The Court dismissed
with prejudice plaintiffs' claims for (a) wrongful discharge in violation of Utah public policy, (b)
intentional and/or negligent inflection of emotional distress, (c) interference with prospective
economic advantage, and (d) civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended
complaint asserting a claim under Idaho law for wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho public
policy. See Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3.
Plaintiffs have now filed their Amended Complaint, which reasserts all the claims that the
Court already dismissed with prejudice, and also asserts a claim for wrongful discharge in violation
of Idaho public policy. The dismissed claims will not be addressed in this memorandum because
plaintiffs cannot reassert these claims, especially in light of the fact that the Court has already
denied plaintiffs' motion to revive the claims.1
Plaintiffs' one remaining claim — wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho public policy —
should be dismissed with prejudice because (a) it fails to state a claim under Idaho law, and (b) the
claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

On April 17, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Motion for a New Tnal or to Alter or Amend Judgment in which they
attempted to persuade the Court to reverse its order granting summary judgment. On August 12, 1998, the Court
issued its Ruling denying plaintiffs' motion.
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Plaintiffs are former union-represented employees of Amalgamated Sugar who worked in
Twin Falls, Idaho. Plaintiffs' employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement
between their union and Amalgamated Sugar. The collective bargaining agreement contained a
"just cause" standard for termination, and also provided a grievance and arbitration process for
resolving work-related disputes, including discharges. On May 22 and 28, 1995, plaintiffs were
separately discharged by the Company for excessive absenteeism. Specifically, they each had more
than three unexcused absences, the maximum allowed by Company policy. Although plaintiffs
claim that they were discharged Without just cause," they did not contest their discharges or
attempt to use the grievance and arbitration process that was available to them.
Now plaintiffs claim that they were potential "whistleblowers," who were- supposedly
discharged for threatening to publicize the Company's alleged criminal shipping of contaminated
sugar. On this basis, they claim that they were wrongfully discharged in violation of Idaho public
policy. There is no legal merit or factual basis to plaintiffs' claim.
Idaho law recognizes a "public policy wrongful discharge" claim as a breach of implied-inlaw contract claim in the context of at-will employment. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Idaho
law because (a) Idaho law does not recognize a public policy wrongful discharge claim where
employees are employed under a collective bargaining agreement with a "just cause" standard for
termination, and (b) as supposed "whistleblowers," plaintiffs never "blew the whistle," i.e., they
never reported the alleged wrongdoing at .Amalgamated Sugar to any public authority. Idaho law
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does not recognize a public policy '^histleblower" claim except where the employee-plaintiff
reports the alleged wrongdoing to an appropriate governmental entity.
Additionally, plaintiffs' "public policy" claim is barred under the Labor Management
Relations Act.

Plaintiffs' employment contract with Amalgamated Sugar was the collective

bargaining agreement that governed their employment.

Collective bargaining agreements

(including all related claims whether pled in tort or contract) are governed exclusively by federal
labor law. Consequently, plaintiffs' claim, an implied contract claim, is barred because it is based
on plaintiffs' actual employment contract, the collective bargaining agreement, and plaintiffs failed
to timely exercise their rights under the collective bargaining agreement.

Alternatively, if

plaintiffs' claim is construed as asserting separate implied right distinct from the collective
bargaining agreement, it is barred because such claims are not permitted by federal labor law.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs' Employment
1.

Amalgamated Sugar hired Blake Waddoups ("Waddoups") in 1985 and James

Sparrow ("Sparrow") in 1989 to work at the Company's sugar manufacturing facility in Twin
Falls, Idaho. Amended Complaint ^ 8, 10.
2.

"Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material hereto worked

and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho." Amended Complaint ^j 7.
3.

Plaintiffs' employment with Amalgamated Sugar was governed by a collective

bargaining agreement between The American Federation of Grain Millers Union ("the Union")
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and the Company, and both plaintiffs were members of the Union. Plaintiffs received copies of
the collective bargaining agreement. Deposition of James E. Sparrow, Jr. at 28-29 (hereinafter
"Sparrow Depo. at _ " ) ; Deposition of Blake William Waddoups at 95-96 (hereinafter
"Waddoups Depo. at _ " ) .
4.

Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees may be discharged only for

"just cause," and a discharged employee may file a grievance if he believes that his discharge
was not justified.

The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration.

The collective

bargaining agreement states:
The Company has the right to discipline or discharge employees
for just cause. . . . An employee who believes his discipline or
discharge is not justified shall have recourse to the grievance
procedure under the Agreement. . . . An employee claiming a
grievance shall put his grievance in writing to his Steward within
five (5) scheduled working days of the Employee's knowledge of
the occurrence to be grieved . . . Time is of the essence and all
grievances must be handled within the prescribed time limits set
forth herein. Failure to do so shall constitute forfeitures of the
written grievance by either party failing to do so. . . . If a grievance
is to be carried to arbitration, . . . [the arbitrator's] decision shall be
final and binding on all parties involved.
Ex. 4, at pp. 4-5, to Sparrow Depo.; Ex. 9, at pp. 4-5, to Waddoups Depo.
5.

Plaintiffs' employment was subject to the rule that "The maximum number of

unexcused absences you can receive before being terminated is three (3)." Ex. 3 to Sparrow
Depo. Plaintiffs were familiar with this rule. Sparrow testified:
Q.
Do you recall being informed of the rule that you could
have no more than three unexcused absences?

247063.2
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A.

Yes.

Q.

When do you recall being informed of that rule?

A.

All the time.
***

A.
[Pjeople were always talking about it, you know, foremen,
supervisors.
Sparrow Depo. at 27-28.
Sparrow's Unexcused Absences
6.

Sparrow had unexcused absences on September 10, 1994 and March 24, 1995.

Sparrow Depo. at 201-03 and Ex. 7, at pp. 1-2, thereto.
7.

On May 20, 1995, Sparrow did not report to work, but called in sick. Sparrow

explained:
A.
I just - it was just nerves in my stomach. I just felt really
queasy and I just didn't feel like going to work mostly. It was just
the place had gotten to me and I just didn't feel like being there.
Q.

So you called in sick?

A.

Yes.

Sparrow Depo. at 210 (emphasis added).
8.

On the afternoon of the same day, Sparrow drove to Nevada and was caught

speeding. Because he had an outstanding warrant for a prior unpaid speeding ticket, Sparrow
was arrested and not released from jail until May 25, 1995. Sparrow missed four days of work,
May 20, 21, 23, and 24, 1995. Sparrow Depo. at 211-16.
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9.

Sparrow knew that his absences were unexcused and that he had exceeded the

maximum number permitted. When he returned to Twin Falls, Sparrow telephoned his foreman
and asked him if he was fired:
Q.

Why did you ask him if you were fired?

A.
Because I spent three days in jail and I should have worked.
I work Friday. I missed three days of work. That's unexcused.
Plus I knew I had one before and that's four, and I knew I could be
terminated for that.
Q.
You knew you could be terminated for unexcused absences
and you had enough to be terminated?
A.

Yeah.
***

Q.
Was there any question in your mind that being absent from
work because you're in jail is an unexcused absence?
A.

I have always believed before that it was.

Q.

[You] always believed that it was an unexcused absence?

A.

Yes.

Q.
So by the time you got back to work on the 25th and your
shift was finished you had four unexcused absences; is that
correct?
A.

Correct.

Sparrow Depo. at 217, 222.
10.

Sparrow was discharged on May 22, 1995 by Assistant Superintendent Bill Stuart

for having more than three unexcused absences. Sparrow Depo. at 219.
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11.

Sparrow alleges that he was discharged "without just cause" and without being

given an "opportunity to respond or be heard on the purported basis [of his discharge] that he had
abused his sick leave." Amended Complaintffif39, 37.
12.

Sparrow did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement

regarding his discharge. Sparrow testified:
Q.
Did you know that an employee who is discharged who
does not think it's fair or justified can have a grievance filed?
A.

Yes.

Q.
You knew you could file a grievance upon being
discharged?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you know that there was a grievance procedure?

A.

Yes.
***

Q.
And did you know that. . . there was at the end of the
process an arbitration procedure?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And did you know these things in May 1995 when you
were discharged?
A.

Yes.
***

247063 2
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When you got fired did you file a grievance with the union?

A.

No.
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Sparrow Depo. at 43-44, 175.
Waddoups' Unexcused Absences
13.

On October 10, 1986, Waddoups received a written warning for excessive

absenteeism because of the large number of sick leave days he had taken. He was told that he
would need medical verification for any future sick leave absences. He was also warned: "If
excessive absenteeism continues you will be discharged." Ex. 10 to Waddoups Depo.
14.

Waddoups had an unexcused absence on March 19, 1988. Waddoups Depo. at

113 and Ex. 12 thereto.
15.

On September 28, 1993, Waddoups was verbally warned about his poor

attendance. Waddoups Depo. at 118-19 and Ex. 15 thereto.
16.

On December 28, 1993, Waddoups received another written warning about his

attendance, and he was again required to have medical verification for sick leave absences. Ex.
17 to Waddoups Depo.
17.

On June 29, 1994, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. Waddoups Depo. at 123

and Ex. 18 thereto.
18.

On March 3, 1995, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. WTaddoups Depo. at

243 and Ex. 23 thereto.
19.

On May 28, 1995, Waddoups did not report to work. At 10:00 a.m., four hours

after his work shift had begun, Waddoups called in saying he was sick. Waddoups then spoke to
Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley, and gave him a different explanation: "I told him that I
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had personal problems. I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had over slept. I had
called in sick because I wasn't feeling well." Waddoups Depo. at 258, 260-61 and Ex. 26
thereto.
20.

Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley terminated Waddoups for excessive

absenteeism. Waddoups Depo. at 22-23 and Ex. 2, at p.l, thereto.
21.

In his application for unemployment benefits, Waddoups admitted that he had

been warned "2-3 times" that his absence rate was reaching unacceptable levels. Waddoups
Depo. at 31 and Ex. 2, at p. 2, thereto.
22.

Waddoups alleges that he was discharged "without just cause" and without being

given an "opportunity to respond or be heard on the purported basis [of his discharge] that he had
been tardy too often." Amended Complaintffl[39, 35.
23.

Waddoups did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement

regarding his discharge although he was aware of the grievance process. Waddoups Depo. at 98,
107.
Plaintiffs' Whistleblowing Allegation
24.

On February 16, 1995, there was an accident at Amalgamated Sugar's Twin Falls

facility in which employee Mike Davis was killed. The facility was shut down and cleaned for
three days after the accident.

Sugar that was being loaded on the day of the accident was

subsequently shipped to an animal feed producer. Complaint %% 15, 22; Sparrow Depo. at 64,
126-27.
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25.

Plaintiffs claim that sugar stored at the Twin Falls facility was contaminated by

the fatal accident, and was subsequently shipped to customers for human consumption, a
criminal violation of the federal Food. Drug and Cosmetics Act. Complaint % 44; Sparrow Depo.
at 46-7.
26.

Plaintiffs claim that they "threatened] to expose the [Company's] illegal activity"

of shipping supposedly contaminated sugar. Complaint ^ 40. However, neither plaintiff ever
contacted the Food and Drug Administration, any federal authority, any state authority, or the
media about the Company's supposed shipping of contaminated sugar. Sparrow Depo. at 17374; Waddoups Depo. at 65; Complaintffl[23-44.
27.

Sparrow testified that he never raised with anyone the issue of supposedly

contaminated sugar being shipped:
Q.
[A]t any time after the Mike Davis accident, did you bring
up any concern you had about possibly contaminated sugar?
A.

No.

Q.

You never brought it up to anyone?

A.

No.
***

Q.
So with respect to Mike Davis's death, did you raise any
issue of contamination with anyone?
A.

No.

Sparrow Depo. at 172, 173-74.

247063.2
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28.

On May 31, 1995, after they had been discharged, plaintiffs returned to

Amalgamated Sugar's Twin Falls facility to pick up their personal belongings. Waddoups got
into an argument with plant manager Vic Jaro about supposed sugar contamination. Sparrow
Depo. at 145-47. Waddoups testified:
Q.
Were you saying you were thinking of going to the news or
to the FDA?
A.

I never said that.

Waddoups Depo. at 65.
ARGUMENT
III.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE UNDER IDAHO LAW
A.

Idaho Law on Public Policy Wrongful Discharge.

Idaho law recognizes a public policy wrongful discharge claim only as (a) contract claim
(b) based on an implied-in-law restriction that limits an employer's otherwise unfettered right to
discharge an individual employed under an at-will employment contract.
[T]his Court [declares its] intent to classify a cause of action for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a breach of
contract rather than a tort. All employment contracts terminable at
will are subject to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A
breach of the covenant is a breach of the employment contract, and
is not a tort. The potential recovery results in contract damages,
not tort damages. Similarly, a cause of action for wrongful
termination of a contract of employment at will based on a
violation of public policy is a contract cause of action which results
in contract damages.
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Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (Idaho 1996) (citations and internal quotations marks
omitted; emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly followed the New Hampshire Supreme Court in
recognizing a public policy wrongful discharge claim as a contract claim that applies to at-will
employment contracts.
We hold that a termination by an employer of a contract of
employment at will which [violates public policy] constitutes a
breach of the employment contract.
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977) (quoting Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). See also Hummer, 923 P.2d at 987 (citing Monge on
same point).
It is because an at-will employment contract gives the employer complete freedom to
discharge an employee for any reason that the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized an implied
contractual restriction on the employer's freedom of action where a termination would violate
public policy. See Hummer, 923 P.2d at 986-87 (employer may terminate at-will employment
contract for any reason without incurring liability unless termination violates public policy);
Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 946, 949 (Idaho 1993) (Idaho law
recognizes "an exception to employment-at-will contracts where a discharge is for a reason
contravening public policy."); Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals. Inc.. 715 P.2d
1019, 1021-22 (Idaho App. 1986) ("either the employer or the employee may terminate [an at-
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will] employment agreement at any time without liability, except that the employer may not
discharge the employee for a reason contravening public policy").
Where the employer does not have unfettered freedom to discharge an employee and
hence the freedom to violate public policy, the need for an implied-in-law contractual restriction
(to protect public policy) is absent. The Idaho Supreme Court has not ruled on a claim of public
policy wrongful discharge in the context of a collective bargaining agreement containing a "just
cause" standard for termination. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme
Court would not recognize a public policy claim where a "just cause" contract term already
prohibits the employer from terminating an employee in contravention of public policy. See,
e.g.. Laramee v. French & Bean Co., 830 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Vt. 1993) (at-will employees
protected from terminations that violate public policy. "That protection however is not provided
to employees whose discharge is contractually protected by a just cause provision of a collective
bargaining agreement.")
In sum, a public policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law is a contract claim
based on a contractual restriction that by operation of law is implied into the underlying at-will
employment contract. Idaho has not recognized a public policy wrongful discharge claim outside
the context of at-will employment.

247063.2
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B.

Plaintiffs Fail to State a Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Claim Because Their
Employment Contract Protected Them From Discharge Except for "Just Cause."

The collective bargaining agreement that governed plaintiffs * employment with
Amalgamated Sugar prohibited the Company from terminating employees except where there
was "just cause" for termination:
The Company has the right to discipline or discharge employees
for just cause.
Facts K 4. If an employee did not believe that there was "just cause" for his discipline or
discharge, the employee could file a grievance and, with the support of the Union, take the matter
to binding arbitration. Id. While, plaintiffs claim that they were discharged "without just cause,"
they did not attempt to use the grievance and arbitration process. Id. ^ 11, 12, 22, 23.
On the facts of this case, plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Idaho law for public policy
wrongful discharge. As explained above, Idaho has recognized the cause of action only in the
context of at-will employment, where the employee has no contractual protection from being
wrongfully discharged. Plaintiffs in the instant case were fully protected from being wrongfully
discharged. Not only did their employment contract contain a substantive "just cause" standard
for discharge, it also provided a grievance and arbitration procedure for resolving the merits of
disputed discharges.

Facts % 4.

In light of these contractual provisions, the rationale for

implying an additional contractual restriction into the employment contract has no application.
Moreover, if plaintiffs were to be allowed to assert a public policy wrongful discharge claim it
would mean that they could ignore their actual employment contract and the remedies it
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provides, and yet assert in court a contract claim based on a dispute (termination of employment)
expressly covered by plaintiffs' own employment contract. There is no support in Idaho law for
what plaintiffs are attempting to do, and their claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
C.

Plaintiffs Fail to State a Public Policy "Whistleblower" Claim Because Thev
Never Reported the Alleged Wrongdoing to Public Authorities.

Plaintiffs assert their public policy wrongful discharge claim on the ground that they were
potential "whistleblowers."

Facts If 26.

However, plaintiffs never reported to any public

authority, state or federal, the criminal conduct (supposed shipment of contaminated sugar) they
now allege.

Id.

Indeed, Sparrow never raised the issue with anyone at the Company or

elsewhere (id. % 27), and Waddoups mentioned the issue at the Company only obliquely. Id.
128.
Idaho has recognized a "whistleblower" public policy wrongful discharge claim only
where the plaintiff-employee actually reported the alleged wrongdoing to the appropriate public
agency. See Rav v. Nampa School District No. 131. 814 P.2d 17, 21 (Idaho 1991) (public policy
wrongful discharge claim stated by at-will employee where his "employment was terminated
because he had reported certain safety code violations to the state electrical engineer"). Idaho
has not recognized a "whistleblower" claim where the employee failed to report the alleged
wrongdoing to a governmental agency or raised the issue only internally within the company.
Courts generally have refused to recognize "whistleblower" claims where the employee
did not report the alleged wrongdoing to a public authority. This is especially true where, as
here, criminal conduct by the employer is alleged. Only where the alleged wrongful conduct is

reported to a public authority is there the requisite "public'' dimension to the employee's conduct
necessary to sustain a "public policy" claim. An employee who reports wrongful or criminal
conduct to his employer is engaged only in private conduct.

See, e.g.. Fox v. MCI

Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) ("[I]f an employee reports a criminal
violation to an employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports,
that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public policy." summary dismissal
of public policy claim affirmed); Schlang v. Kev Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (D.
Nev. 1992) ("[A] complaint registered with the employer is a private or proprietary action that is
not entitled to public policy protection."); Wiltsie v. Babv Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev.
1989) ("Because appellant chose to report the [alleged illegal] activity to his supervisor rather
than the appropriate authorities, he was merely acting in a private or proprietary manner."
summary dismissal of public policy wrongful discharge claim upheld); Zaniecki v. P. A. Bergner
& Co., 493 N.E. 2d 419, 421-22 (111. App. 1986) (Reporting illegal activity to a supervisor is a
purely private action because "the critical element of public authority involvement is lacking.").
In sum, because plaintiffs did not report the alleged criminal conduct to any public
authority, plaintiffs fail to state a "whistleblower" public policy wrongful discharge claim.
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IV.

PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM IS BARRED UNDER FEDERAL
LABOR LAW
A.

Federal Law Governing Collective Bargaining Agreements.

Claims relating to a collective bargaining agreement are governed exclusively by federal
labor law under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).: Such
claims "must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law." AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985).

See also Textile Workers Union of

American v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (§ 301 vests exclusive power in
"federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining
agreements."); Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1987) (summarizing
federal labor law).
There are two prerequisites that must be satisfied before a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement claim (or related claim) can be brought. First, the plaintiff-employee must
exhaust or attempt to exhaust his grievance and arbitration remedies under the collective
bargaining agreement. See Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 163 (1983) ("an employee is required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration
remedies provided in the collective-bargaining agreement."); Sperber. 747 P.2d at 1027 ("Under
federal law, an employee is required to exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies provided

~ Section 301 states in relevant pan: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
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in the collective bargaining agreement between his union and his employer."); Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
Second, the plaintiff-employee must allege and prove that his union, as his agent and
representative, breached its duty of fair representation to him by its conduct under the collective
bargaining agreement.

Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 165 ("To prevail against... the

Company . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the
contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.") (internal
quotation marks omitted; bracketed words in original). The reason for this "breach of duty of
fair representation" prerequisite is that the collective bargaining agreement already provides
union employees with a remedy and a procedure for obtaining the remedy, and. therefore an
employee may not go beyond the grievance and arbitration procedure (by suing in court) unless
he can demonstrate that his union made a sham of his contractual remedies.
Unless an employee proves that he has not been fairly represented
by his union under the collective bargaining agreement, the
grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement are the employee's exclusive remedy.
Sperber. 747 P.2d at 1027. See also Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 165 (breach of union's duty of fair
representation must be proven because lawsuit constitutes "a direct challenge to the private

(Continued from Previous Page)
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1947).
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settlement of disputes under the collective-bargaining agreement") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only exclusively governs claims
for breach of collective bargaining agreements, it also preempts and therefore bars state-law
claims that relate to collective bargaining agreements. The justification for § 301 preemption is
the ease with which an aggrieved employee otherwise could turn a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement into a state tort or contract claim, thereby possibly obtaining a state law
remedy inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S.
at 209-11 (tkthe preemptive effect of §301 must extend beyond suits alleging [collective
bargaining agreement] violations" to encompass state-law claims thatfckwouldfrustrate the federal
labor-contract scheme established in § 301").
Under Section 301, a broad range of state-law claims are regularly dismissed as
preempted by federal labor law. See, e.g.. Steel workers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 370-72 (1990)
(wrongful death claim under Idaho law against union, based on union's alleged negligence in
conducting safety inspections, preempted by § 301 despite fact that Idaho Supreme Court ruled that
union's duty to reasonably conduct safety inspections had an independent basis in state law
unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement); Park Citv Education Ass^n v. Board of
Education, 879 P.2d 267, 273 (Utah App. 1994) (dismissal of contract claims upheld as barred by
federal labor law); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir,
1996) (discharged employee's breach of contract and breach of implied covenant claims
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preempted by § 301); Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1992) (emotional
distress claim preempted by §301); Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638.
644-45 (9th Cir. 1989) (implied covenant claim preempted by collective bargaining agreement
containing terms governing grounds for discharge); Herman v. Carpenters Local Q"7!,
60F.3d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary dismissal of implied covenant claim
where collective bargaining agreement prohibited terminations without just cause). Because of
the expansive scope of § 301 preemption, barred state-law claims are either dismissed or may be
reconsidered as if they were pled under § 301. In the latter case, the claim would have to satisfyall requirements for a § 310 claim. Sperber, 747 P.2d at 1027-28 (preempted state-law contract
claim reconsidered as if it were a § 301 claim, and then dismissed under § 301).
B.

Because Plaintiffs' Claim Is Based on Their Collective Bargaining Agreement,
the Claim Is Barred Under Federal Labor Law

As explained above, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim is an implied
contract claim (analogous to an implied covenant claim) based upon plaintiffs' underlying
employment contract.

See Section IIIA above.

As also explained above, Idaho has not

recognized a public policy wrongful discharge claim except on the basis of an at-will
employment contract. Id. Nonetheless, if it is assumed for purposes of discussion that Idaho
might recognize plaintiffs' claim in the context of their collective bargaining agreement, the
claim would be barred under federal labor law. This is so because plaintiffs7 claim asserts a
contractual restriction that is implied in plaintiffs' underlying contract, the collective bargaining
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agreement. Plaintiffs' claim is thus a claim concerning the collective bargaining agreement.'
Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim must comply with the requirements of § 301.
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of the prerequisites to a valid claim under § 301. First,
plaintiffs did not file a grievance or attempt to use their contractual remedies under the collective
bargaining agreement. Facts ffi[ 12, 23. Second, plaintiffs do not allege, let alone attempt to
prove, that their union breached its duty of fair representation to them. Accordingly, plaintiffs'
claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
C.

If Plaintiffs' Claim Were Characterized as Separate from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, It Would Still Be Barred bv Federal Labor Law.

As an implied contract claim, plaintiffs' state-law claim is clearly dependent on their
collective bargaining agreement. However, if plaintiffs were to try to characterize their claim as
separate from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim would still be barred by § 301. This
is so because the Labor Management Relations Act does not permit a separate contract (express

3

A collective bargaining agreement is not limited to the four corners of the written contract, but encompasses
additional matters by implication United Steelworkers \ Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960) (terms of collective bargaining agreement "not confined to the express provisions of the contract"); Eitmann
v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1984) (company conduct "not explicitly covered
by the collective bargaining agreement is properly within the scope of the contractual grievance procedure").
Consequently, an implied contract claim, like an implied covenant claim, is based on the collective bargaining
agreement itself because it is based on a provision that is implied into the labor agreement. Rissetto, 94 F.2d at 599
("claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also clearly preempted because such covenant is an
implied term of [the plaintiffs] CBA").
The dependence of plaintiffs' claim on their collective bargaining agreement is confirmed by the fact that
they allege that they were discharged "without just cause" and without an "opportunity to respond or be heard" on
the reasons for their discharges. Facts «|c 11, 22 Both the "just cause" standard for discharge and the "opportunity
to respond or be heard" on the reason for a discharge are provided by the collective bargaining agreement and its
grievance and arbitration process
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or implied) to coexist with a collective bargaining agreement where the purported contract would
be inconsistent with or more advantageous than the collective bargaining agreement. See, ej^,
Chmiel v. Beverlv Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Section 301
preempts any individual labor contract inconsistent with a collective bargaining agreement").
An implied contract claim is inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement if it
does not require the employee to use and exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies or if it
can be brought after a claim could be asserted under the collective bargaining agreement.
Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1984) (implied
contract claim preempted as inconsistent with collective bargaining agreement where it would
"supersede" the "contractual grievance procedure" in the collective bargaining agreement and
allow employee to assert claim without exhausting contractual remedies).
Federal labor law does not permit inconsistent claims, such as asserted by plaintiffs,
because to do so would undermine the role of labor unions as representatives of unionized
employees and would also undermine the collective bargaining process. The Utah Supreme
Court has explained this point in detail:
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union
representatives can bargain for the terms and conditions of
employment for those within the bargaining unit. . . . [Any]
separate contract must be consistent with the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the union. Thus, inconsistent separate
agreements are not enforceable
Nothing could undermine the
authority of the collective bargaining unit more thoroughly than
allowing individuals or cohorts of employees to enforce separate
contracts that were more advantageous to those employees than
was the collective bargaining agreement itself.... Accordingly,
247063.2
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we decline to [allow] individual agreements to undercut the union
as the bargaining agent. In the instant case, providing anv remedy
under an implied contract when no remedy is available under the
collective bargaining agreement — because the time for arbitration
has passed — obviously would put fthe plaintiff! in a more
advantageous position than [union] employees bound bv the
collective bargaining agreement, thereby undermining the
collective bargaining unit. Consequently, [the plaintiffs] alleged
implied contract is unenforceable.
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 970 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted;
emphasis added).
In the instant case, plaintiffs' purported implied contract claim (if treated as separate from
the collective bargaining agreement) would be inconsistent with the collective bargaining
agreement governing plaintiffs' employment. Specifically, plaintiffs' claim would,permit them
to ignore the grievance and arbitration process and would also permit them to bring a lawsuit
well beyond the time in which a claim could be asserted under the collective bargaining
agreement.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' state-law claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act.
V,

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim based on

Idaho law should be dismissed with prejudice.
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DATED this 4th day of January, 1999.
/•

W. MARK GAVRE
MARGARET NIYER MCGANN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company
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v . ^ i U N TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT, to:
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Taylor D. Car --"BarW r"~
Trent J Wadu:i_ps - (Bar V- o: ')
CARR&ttAliDOr"'-"
Attorneys for Plamtir
8 East Broadway, Sune lUi
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 363-0888
:•.: IHSTRICI I'Ol'Ki (IF 'Mr SECOND n Pli IM DISTRICT, STATE Or UTAH
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS, and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR.,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
v

s

•

-

)

)

•'

\.\V.-"

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,
~ r ,
Defendants.

'
)

Judge Stanton M. Tavlor

)

I'ursiwihi hi R1111 • -1 - >
' ( H (1 )(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiffs present
the following points and authorities m opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Amalgamated argues, in effect, that Idaho allows a business to violate its
public policy so long as the business employs its workers under a union contract. This
assertion is supposedh hast J mi mr Lid tfi.it h 1 ti 1111 'mn \iirs i nnfarl i1;im;u'f<. is th( icrncriv

available under the cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation oi public pohc\ In
other words. Amalgamated asserts thai pastm^ wim h;n v pm nr remedies arr nioi entitled to
-\clusivitv argument, however, is not supported by law or
logical reasoning. It is supported only by non-decision of the Idaho supreme court which this
Defendant attempts to elevate to the level of controlling precedent.
. \ c.

..:

:

-

*v "* •"•*•- A~- ^-eempted by federal

defendant r ^ i e s that Planning pmaie rights under the:: collective bargaining
agreement supplanted the state right of action provided for the purpose of protecting public
nghts

Ii.c I. mice Males ^apreniL . :..:. .-. ^dirssal this aryumein and siMirnik p ' r ^ n i
'

[ure

lucrative for this Defendant (its real

argument; is immaterial. Because the cause of action of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy and the acts, rules, and regulations 01 v ongress can be easily reconciled, tl ici e
is no pi eu 11 if n HI mi in llns case.

n

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must commit- ihr complaint in the
liyln rni^t tin ornble to the p1:unHff[s] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [their] favor."
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 19011 The Court may
grant a motion to dismiss "only where it appears that the
to relief undi.

. .

:....•

»T«* * *" * :'-;• - eouid pi o\c to support their

" " Robe-son '• Gem im Co., S2S P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Prows v.
State, 822 ?.2d "f>4. ^66 (Utah 1991)).

\j». kjL M L X - r

I.

rlL A\ AIL ABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS
NEGOTIATED FOR AND INCLUDED IN THE CBA IS N O T
F \ ANT TO THIS STATE-LAW ACTION

Deieituun; •\:;;aigamjiea argu;.

luiii.'ltjl disch.inM > .uisf of

action '»' ,I<.M ,ii -'nr'l'n'ces precludes the existence of a wrongful discharge cause of action
for employees who have negotiated any type of restraint on an employer's discharge rights.
Defendant cites no authority supporting its conclusion except .host: », HM-> .nAmm |( di HIL- l.hx
caust. ot uciKiii 11»i ,II " ili '-»nplo\t-t."
Although this Defendant consistently refuses to acknowledge the public policy behind
the public policy exception, it is the public policy that is relevant — and not the discharge.

3

: ;ie discharge itself (and the "just cause" requirement under the CBA) only gives rise to
private interests between the employee and the ernpl*» i i I In |»11b11L \m\u:\ I'wcptiun
requires < i put »lic aspect ti ) tl ic: ' firing which makes the firing unlawful. See Peterson \
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (quoting Foley v Interactive Data Corp.. 4
Cal. 3d 654,"65 P 2d 3^3. ?"7Q. 2*4 Ca> ki/. - .

^

"^ >

not the underpinning of the cause of action.l The public policy exception (through an award
of damages pursuant to state law) regulates as effectively as forms of preventive relief See
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 3:>^ I1 ^. 2.UJ M " i r'^M

1 iiu - inn umrh

hd\ t: pro\ ided J wionujul elisrhan?e remedy to protect the public interests, whereas the
unions created a just cause remedy to protect the private interests of union members.

1

" I o make out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, an employee mus* >/n ^
that his employer terminated him; (ii) that a clear and substantial public policy existed, \II:J
that the employee's conduct brought the policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the
conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected. Cf. Heslop, 839 P.2d at 837);
Wilmot v Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp,, 118 Wash. 2d 46, 82^ P 2d 18, 28-29 (Wash. 1991);
Henry H. Pemtt, Jr., "The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self
Interest Lie?," 58 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 397, 398-99 (1989). As to subpart (iv), the employee
initially need only show that the conduct bringing the public policy into playfclwasa cause of
the firing." See Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 29. If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the
employer must then articulate a legitimate reason for the discharge. See id. When faced with
evidence of a legitimate reason for termination, the employee must prove that engaging in the
protected conduct was a "suostantial factor" in the employer's motivation to discharge the
employee. See id. ai "*<• " Rvan v Dan's Food Stores. _ P.2d _ _ ; 350 I Jtah Adv
Rep. 3(Utar 'QQC
4

Defendant Amalgamated asserts that this Court should speculate that the Idaho
supreme court would not provide a cause of actioi : tc union * orkers pi otected t : ] * a "ji ist
— •• -- - v

; jeiendant's memo, at p 13. The Idaho supreme court, on the

other hand, stated:
In Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., inc.* 11, lu^m —, "20 P.2d
632 (1986), this Court upheld a jury instruction which instructed that a
termination based on legal union activities would be contrary to public
policy established by the Legislature.
Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 986 (Idaho 1996): see also Rosencrans v. Intermountain
Soap Co., 605 P.2d 963 (Idaho 1980) (imposing a gooc ;aiin rcuuiremeni on .::; .;_ri employee puiMi.mt lu <i contrail nt a iiefiniU" *"

ac^rc, MeicJ: \ ;:::errrk ur.iLir uas- Co..

77S P.2d 744 at n. 1 (Idaho 1989) (reversing summary judgment oeeause a rnabie issue o:
fact existed with respect to the existence of a contract and approvingly allowing the breach of
contract claim to be tried together

s

lolation oi puoi.

du knowledged md dors acknow ledee the right of union workers to maintain a cause of action
based upon state law.

5
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—HRTING AMALGAMATED^ CRIMINAL CONDLCI 10
PL BLIC AUTHORITIES IS NOT NECESSARY TO STATE A
CLAIM BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DO NOT BASE THEIR CLAIMS
ON THE PARTICULAR PUBLIC POLICY WHICH ADDRESSES
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL STATUTES.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the enforcement of criminal statutes is the public policy
upon which their claims rest. Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege that their conduct
advanced this jyrtiuiLi! puhlu. polk

II Ins, is nur ilrsruir; AnmliNimnmrs earnest desire to

show that such an allegation, if made, would fail.
The public policy upon which Plaintiffs rely is the policy favoring untainted,
unpoisoned, uncontaminatec I^JJ
;.

•••

-.' • ?es (

.•„.: .. ;\>:;c\
'

... .:;. ... ,\ ...^:

' 'Urn

" /omc-:':o r ^ beiendant's conclusion that the

gja. 01 clean food cannot be obtained without government involvement is a non sequitur, at
best, "a nonsensical distinction," at worst.
s ..j chooses to approach his employer should not be
j.c:.:t;w - . J::.C J> simply because a direct report to law enforcement
agencies might effectuate the exposure of crime more quickly. This
would be a nonsensical distinction.
Parr v. triplet! I orv.. 1 i . iupp 1 [Cjj\ 1 U)(>-,,M ! M ) 111 M'Siuj ] he allegations regarding

1

"The purpose of [food safety statutes] is clearh the protection of the public health
and safety. The accomplishment of that purpose is of prime importance and must ve
vigorously championed, The high degree of danger and serious consequences latent in the
distribution of food to the public require the imposition of the duty amounting to the creation
of the strictest liability'." Niemann v. Grand Central Market, Inc.. 337 P 2d 424 (I Jtah 1959).
6

I (I

Amalgamated's violation of public policy interest "are not dependent on reporting them, to an
outside agency; they stand on then ow i i ' " v ei duz^» * general Dynamics.,

"?9,

562 (S D C": .1 1990); accord K lover v. Allen Freight Lines, Inc.. 885 P.2d 391, 395 (Kan.
App. 1994) ("[A]n employee may report a serious infraction of a rule, regulation, or law to
either company management or law enforcement officials.")
Ddcn.i.iiii iuuiliMiii.ili.lt1 lies MuM (he rn n« ' Ml" .\'i ,r -t< <r n<

\fi "r uipports its

conclusion. Defendant Amalgamated errs as Plaintiffs explained previously in opposition to
this Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Fox did not nver-J: r : r
Restoration, 909

p

" J "~ : """•-

* ..
?

:.y ^:.

..

.VJI- V a:;^ v. Pro-Tech

^ w ; i: exnressmg unwillingness to read case to

overrule another sub silentio because "the two situations are so different"),, The Utah
Supreme Court specifically stated in Heslop:
^ e-

* ^ ' ^ ; .1'. ":* *a mo. m ^ . « puLi.v po;;^- i^uirement

MI:;D*_ -. . aubc tic uiu nui icpor the vioianon to the Attorney General
or tG the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all internal methods for
resolving the problem: he need not have gone outside the Bank to try to

correct the policy violation.
Heslop \ Bai lk of Utah. 839 P 2d 828, 838 ( I Ital i 1992; ;i i< MM ,g li :iat ti ic aci coi isiden ;d
served a substantial public policy because it protects the public as well as regulating financial
institutions themselves),. The analysis in Fox relied upon by this Defenaan: c::h addresses
the public policy of criminal law enforcement — not the policy achie* c,; r , :IK iaw

By
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their nature, cnminal laws cannot be enforced unless reported. On the other hand, loud can
be kept clean and the public can be kepi IieaUlii w iillitniiil repoii1- in puhlu .inthnniin

in ihh

situation:
[A] fundamental public interest is implicated whether or not the
plaintiff reports any alleged wrongdoing to an outside agency, and
whether or not a statute has been violated.
V erduzcu. n J "'' I "Mj(i(i <tt 'i(>l, accord Moskal \ Fist' I ennessee Bank *1 c S.W.2d 509
(Term. App. 1991) (acknowledging cause of action asserted by employee who refused to
participate, continue to participate, or remain silent about illegal activities).

8

>AHO'S VERSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEP 1 IU\ IS
EXTREMELY BROAD
Idaho has described tin i

n '. i uv|iln>ii and' \\\\ \\w\\ uftiood faith and fair •

dealing as "principles under which freedom of contract of private dealing is resmcied by law
for the good of the community." Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Pis:.. 56? P Z^ :-~, ^
(Idahc 1 °'77^ (quoting Petermann v. Inte*
lJolic\ ,it

•^-*j_iiL,

-_ :?:uiiicnmu<j » i^iiiat^a
" j. maiiu b puDiic pohc\ exception is based

upon the constructive duties of good faith and *ai: dealing which "are implied obligation.^ of
every contract/' Luzar v Western Surety Co., 692 F _~ J3T\ 340 (Idaho 1984): see also
Metcair \. lrucrmuu: —.. »jq> v •».

:

•- .

*

'io 1989) (recognizing that Idaho

joined "the minority view in this country. . . .").
The duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on employment contracts is

J Xhe Idaho Legislature has expressed its public policy:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the
health, morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary
unemployment is therefore a subject of national and state interest and
concern which requires appropriate action to prevent its spread and to
lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the
unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security
requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic :\ix:
This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable
employment
Idaho ( ode .-Mil,

'

I iili).
9

extremely broad in Idaho. Idaho's supreme court stated:
[W]e conclude that any action by either party which violates, nullifies
or significantly impairs any benefit of the employment contract is a
violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which we adopt today.
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co.. 778 P.2d 744, 750 (Idaho 1989). A dissenting justice
described this standard as "far too liberal and loose a standard." Id Nevertheless, the
foregoing is Idaho law.
In addition, the Idaho supreme court has explained that the breach of the duty of good
faith is a violation "separate and apart from the a breach of contract per se and . . . damages
may be recovered for the [violation] and for the contract breach." White v. Unigard Mut. Ins.
Co.. 730 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Idaho 1986) (discussing the tort of bad faith breach of an
insurance contract) (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Wis.
1978)). In other words, Plaintiffs' claims are based on Amalgamated's breach of its duties
which arose because of its contract with Plaintiffs, but the claims are not claims "on the
contract." Id. at 1020. Plaintiffs' claims are separate and distinct arising under legal
obligations imposed by state law.4

4

Another example of this type of cause of action arising because of a contract but not
being a suit on the contract is the doctrine of respondeat superior. See also Interwest
Construction v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996) (explaining that the duty to perform
contractual duties in such a manner as to not injure persons or property arises from law, not
contract); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965).
10
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Under Idaho law, public policy is implicated by any firing "motivated by bad faith or
malice or based on retaliation [because such conduct] is not the best interest of the economic
system or the public good." Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho
1977) see also Burdick v. American Express Co., 677 F.Supp 228 (S.D. N. Y. 1988) (noting
that a distinction between "preventive" and "retaliatory" dismissals would serve no useful
purpose). The sine qua non of Plaintiffs' claims against Amalgamated is Amalgamated's
misconduct with respect to clean food and Plaintiffs' staunch opposition thereto. Amended
Complaint atffi[19-30; 32-34; 40-44. Plaintiffs' claims do not depend upon any contractual
term negotiated for and included in the CBA.
Amalgamated fired Plaintiffs on pretextual bases because Messrs. Waddoups and
Sparrow refused to shut up and be "team players" with respect to the Adulterated Sugar. It is
this opposition to Amalgamated's misconduct which furthered the public policy of clean,
unadulterated food and which gives nse to Plaintiffs' claims. It is Amalgamated's evil
motive (a prototypical question of fact) in firing Plaintiffs for their advancement and defense
of public policy that is the basis of Plaintiffs' claims. The motivation for Plaintiffs' firings
was to hide Amalgamated's public policy malfeasance (as opposed to contractual
nonfeasance); therefore, Plaintiffs clearly and unequivocally state a claim:
[A]n employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the
motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.

11

1n

Jackson, 563 P.2d at 57. Despite Amalgamated's desperate efforts to mischaractenze their
claims,5 Plaintiffs clearly allege that they complained about contaminated sugar and opposed
Amalgamated's cover-up. As a direct result of their complaints, Mr. Waddoups was
suspended for three days and summarily fired on his next work day. See, e ^ , Bovle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985) (holding that allegation of employer's
violation of FDA standards was basis of public policy exception where fired employee
warned and threatened employer, continued to attempt to comply with FDA regulations and
eventually reported her employer to the FDA. "[A]ny one of those allegations would state a
cause of action." Id at 877); Sheets v. Teddv's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn.
1980) (holding that employee had a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy where he urged his employer to comply with state FDCA); Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employee who was
discharged where complaints concerned his employer's sale and delivery of adulterated milk
stated a claim under California law). Mr. Sparrow was harassed for cooperating with and
supporting Mr. Waddoups and was fired only days before Mr. Waddoups's suspension. See,
e.g., Reich v. Cambndgeport Air Systems. Inc.. 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (addressing
questions of fact raised by joint actors in employee-housecleaning meant "to impress on
5

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [their] favor."
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991).
12
IC\RA

employees not to be palsy with bad actors.").

IV.

FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT PREEMPT IDAHO'S CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE THE COURT WILL NOT BE
REQUIRED TO INTERPRET THE CBA.

Defendant Amalgamated concludes, and asks this Court to infer, that Section 301
preempts Plaintiffs' causes of action because Idaho bases the cause of action of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy on the parties' duties of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in the employment contract.6 However, "pre-emption cannot be inferred."
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier. 115 L. Ed. 2d 532, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2486 (1991).
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that:
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require
addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim
can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is
"independenfof the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.
Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 955 (Utah 1992) (quoting Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1988). Under the circumstances of
this case, there is no section 301 preemption.
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the United States Supreme Court held that "when
6

Defendant asserts that the basis of the Idaho cause of action on the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is extremely significant. The Idaho supreme court, on the other hand, refer
to such criticism as "hairsplitting" having no merit. Metcalf 778 P.2d at 752.
13
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resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract," the claim is preempted by § 301.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (holding that § 301 preempted a
state law tort action for bad-faith delay in making disability-benefit payments due under a
collective bargaining agreement).
The Allis-Chalmers Court drew the following distinction between Plaintiffs' claims
and claims arising out of agreements negotiated by the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement:
Section 301 on its face says nothing about the substance of what private
parties may agree to in a labor contract. Nor is there any suggestion
that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive
provisions of private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any
inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law would delegate to
unions and unionized employers the power to exempt themselves
from whatever state labor standards they disfavored. Clearly,
§ 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law.
In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of
contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under
that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or
establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.
*

*

*

14
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Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist
independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived
or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those
agreements. Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the
Wisconsin tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied
here confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or
employees independent of any right established by contract, or,
instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.
Id at 211-13 (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In other words, in lieu of its breathless argument, Defendant Amalgamated merely
needed to demonstrate that the right to conduct its business in a manner otherwise proscribed
by Idaho law was negotiated and made part of the Amalgamated collective bargaining
agreement. Plaintiffs cannot locate such a clause in the CBA.
Such a clause cannot be negotiated. The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is non-negotiable:
"While it is true that courts impose an obligation of good faith in every
aspect of the contractual relationship . . . the obligation of good faith is
'constructive' rather than 'implied'" because the obligation is imposed
by law and cannot be disclaimed.
PDO Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber. 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Olympus Hills
Shopping Ctr.. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs.. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah App.
1994) (quoting 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 654A(B) (2d ed. 1993)
(emphasis added))); see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 at n. 4 (Utah

15
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1985) (in first-party contract, the "duty to perform the contract in good faith cannot, by
definition, be waived by either party to the agreement") Because the duty of good faith
and fair dealing is non-negotiable, Plaintiffs' causes of action are not preempted under AllisChalmers because this Coun can determine whether the defendants have engaged in conduct
prohibited by Idaho law without referring to or interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement.
Defendant Amalgamated might be trying to assert — as an affirmative defense which
cannot form the basis of a motion to dismiss7 — that through the CBA and the adoption of
the grievance procedures, Plaintiffs consented to its state-law violations or waived their statelaw rights.8 Again, however, the United States Supreme Court has considered and rejected
such a conclusion. The Court set forth a point of law that this Defendant is in dire need of
learning — that Plaintiffs are masters of their complaint and this Defendant's shadowboxing9
with out-of-context terms cannot change this fact:

7

"As with any affirmative defense, [Amalgamated has] the burden of proving every
element necessary to establish that [its argument] bars" Plaintiffs' claims. Seale v. Gowans.
923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996).
8

Because, under any other theory, its references to grievance procedures would have
no merit with respect to the state-law causes of action.
9

See, e.g.. Defendant's Memo, at n. 3.
16
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It is true that when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to interpret
that agreement to decide whether the state claim survives. But the
presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive
argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the
well-pleaded complaint rule - that the plaintiff is the master of the
complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the
complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court. When a
plaintiff invokes a right created by a collective-bargaining agreement,
the plaintiff has chosen to plead what we have held must be regarded as
a federal claim, and removal is at the defendant's option. But a
defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action
that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into
one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the
claim shall be litigated. If a defendant could do so, the plaintiff would
be master of nothing.
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987).
In sum, Plaintiffs' claims are based upon state law. The Court will not need to refer
to the collective bargaining agreement in order to rule that firing employees who attempt to
remedy Amalgamated's poisoning of the food supply is conduct that Idaho does not condone.

17
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be
denied in its entirety.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ d a y of January, 1999.
CARR & WADDOUPS

iNT/T WADDOl
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Mr. W. Mark Gavre
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

- v.

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR.,

A

\ ^
W

Case No. 950900441

Plaintiffs,

Judge Stanton M. Taylor
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REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT

THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendant.
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I

I.

INTRODUCTION
In its opening memorandum, Amalgamated Sugar explained that plaintiffs' public policy

wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim under Idaho law
and because it is preempted by federal law. Under Idaho law, plaintiffs' claim fails for two
reasons. First, the claim is based on an implied contractual obligation not to terminate an
employee's employment in violation of public policy. Idaho courts have not found such an
implied contractual obligation where, as here, plaintiffs already had a collective bargaining
agreement that protected them from discharge without "just cause." Second, assuming arguendo
that plaintiffs can assert the claim, the claim nonetheless fails because plaintiffs did not engage in
public conduct which is required to state a public policy claim under Idaho law. In particular,
while plaintiffs argue that they were potential "whistleblowers," they never "blew the whistle" on
the Company.
Plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal labor law because the claim is an implied
contract claim and plaintiffs' employment contract was a collective bargaining agreement
governed by federal labor law. Accordingly, the claim can only be asserted as a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement claim under federal law. Plaintiffs do not assert such a claim.
Instead, plaintiffs posture their claim as a separate state-law contract claim in an effort to avoid
the preemptive effect of federal labor law. Plaintiffs' effort is unavailing because their claim is
necessarily dependent on their collective bargaining agreement (and hence governed by federal

260342.1

1182

law) and because even as a purported state-law contract claim, the claim is preempted by federal
labor law.
Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum makes a variety of arguments, but does not present
either law or facts sufficient to alter the conclusion that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Idaho
law and that their purported claim is barred by federal law.1
ARGUMENT
II.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW
A.

IDAHO LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS5 EMPLOYMENT WAS GOVERNED BY
A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.

Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for public policy wrongful discharge where an atwill employee is discharged in violation of Idaho public policy. Additionally, a public policy
wrongful discharge claim, like a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, is a contract claim, not a tort claim. Both claims rest on an implied contractual
obligation that is read into the underlying contract between the employee and the employer.
[T]his Court [declares its] intent to classify a cause of action for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a breach of
contract rather than a tort. All employment contracts terminable at
will are subject to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A
breach of the covenant is a breach of the employment contract, and
is not a tort. The potential recovery results in contract damages,

1

Amalgamated Sugar's Motion is a summary judgment motion because it goes beyond the pleadings and relies on
plaintiffs' depositions for certain basic facts. Plaintiffs cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on mere
allegations, nor can they dispute their own testimony.

260342.1
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not tort damages. Similarly, a cause of action for wrongful
termination of a contract of employment at will based on a
violation of public policy is a contract cause of action which results
in contract damages.
Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (Idaho 1996) (citations and internal quotations marks
omitted; emphasis added).
Idaho courts have not recognized an implied contractual obligation not to discharge in
violation of public policy where the employee is already protected by a just cause provision in a
collective bargaining agreement.2 See cases cited in Def. Opening Memo, at 12. Plaintiffs assert
that "Idaho acknowledged and does acknowledge the right of union workers to maintain a cause
of action based upon state law." PL Opposition Memo, at 5. Plaintiffs are incorrect, at least with
respect to the claim they assert. The one case cited by plaintiffs in support of their position
actually undermines it. Id. In Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., the plaintiff
"attempted] to unionize the hospital," but was unsuccessful when "a majority of the employees
rejected the attempt to unionize the hospital." 720 P.2d 632, 633 (Idaho 1986). Subsequently,
the plaintiff was allegedly discharged in "retaliation for [her] pro-union activities." Id. at 636.
On these facts, the plaintiff asserted that her discharge violated public policy. The plaintiffs
employment was never governed by a collective bargaining agreement, nor was the plaintiff

2

The one court to have addressed such a claim, rejected it: While at-will employees are protected from terminations
that violate public policy, "[tjhat protection however is not provided to employees whose discharge is contractually
protected by a just cause provision of a collective bargaining agreement." Laramee v. French & Bean Co.. 830
F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Vt. 1993).

260342.1
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protected by a "just cause" standard for discharge. In allowing the plaintiff to assert her public
policy claim, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it was recognizing the claim in the
context of at-will employment: "An employee at will may not. . . be discharged for a reason
contravening public policy." Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
In sum, there is no support in Idaho law for the notion that an implied contractual
obligation not to discharge in violation of public policy should be read into plaintiffs' collective
bargaining agreement which already protected plaintiffs' employment by permitting discharge
only where there was "just cause." Given that no Idaho case supports plaintiffs' argument, that
plaintiffs were already protected from wrongful discharge by their collective bargaining
agreement and that plaintiffs' employment contract was governed by federal law, there is no
reason for this Court to expand Idaho law in the novel manner urged by plaintiffs.
B.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A "WHISTLEBLOWER" PUBLIC
POLICY CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW,

Under Idaho law, a public policy wrongful discharge claim may be stated where an
employee engages in certain protected conduct of a public nature and is discharged because of
that conduct. There are three situations in which employees' conduct may be entitled to public
policy protection:
1. Where employees "refuse to commit unlawful acts";
2. Where employees "perform an important public obligation"; and
3. Where employees "exercise certain legal rights or privileges."

260342.1
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Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho 1990); see also Anderson v. Farm Bureau
Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 732 P.2d 699, 707 (Idaho App. 1987) (same). In light of the above
three criteria, a claim for public policy wrongful discharge may be stated where an employee is
discharged for refusing to commit perjury, for filing a worker's compensation claim, for serving
on a jury, or for complying with a court-issued subpoena. Id.; Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981,
986-87 (Idaho 1996).
A "whistleblower" public policy wrongful discharge claim may be stated where an
employee reports a significant statutory or regulatory violation to the appropriate public
authority. In Rav v. Nampa School District No. 131, a maintenance electrician reported "several
electrical and building code violations to the state inspector." 814 P.2d 17,21 (Idaho 1991). The
employee was allegedly discharged for reporting these safety violations to the public official. IdL
Given the plaintiffs position and the public official to whom he reported the violations, the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the employee could state a public policy claim as a
whistleblower. Id
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar committed a federal crime
by shipping contaminated sugar for human consumption in interstate commerce in violation of
the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act. Amended Complaint ^ 44; Sparrow Depo. at 46-7. While the
Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiffs were potential whistleblowers in that they supposedly
"threatened] to expose the [Company's] illegal activity," neither plaintiff contacted the FDA or
any other public authority.
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Complaintfflf23-44. In his deposition Sparrow testified that he did not raise the issue of
contaminated sugar with anyone at any time. Waddoups in his deposition testified that he
"never" said to the Company that he was thinking of going public with any concern about
contaminated sugar.

See Def. Opening Memo, at 10-11 (quoting plaintiffs' deposition

testimony).
Given that plaintiffs did not report their supposed concern about contaminated sugar to
any public authority, they cannot state a whistleblower public policy claim under Idaho law.
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of the three criteria for protected public conduct. Plaintiffs did not
refuse to commit an unlawful act (such as perjury) and did not exercise any public right or
privilege (such as serving on the jury). The third criteria — "performing] an important public
obligation" — is likewise not satisfied because plaintiffs do not even allege they did anything
public. Where, as here, an employee accuses company management of criminal conduct, the
employee can hardly claim to "perform an important public obligation" by talking to the criminal
about its own crime. Neither the public nor any regulatory or law enforcement authority would
be alerted to any matter of public concern by such conduct. In any case, there is no evidence of
any such communication in the instant case. Finally, plaintiffs do not cite any Idaho case law in
support of the notion that they may be public policy whistleblowers without "blowing the
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whistle" or taking any public action.3 PL Opposition Memo, at 6-7. Plaintiffs' claim is simply
groundless.
Amalgamated Sugar pointed out that generally states, including Utah, require
whistleblowing to be public, Le., the employee must report the employer's improper conduct to
the public authorities. This is especially true where, as here, the employer is accused of criminal
conduct. See Def. Opening Memo, at 15-16. In response, plaintiffs attempt to recharacterize
their claim and misstate Utah law on point. PL Opposition Memo, at 6-7.
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs accuse Amalgamated Sugar of violating the
criminal section of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and claim that they were
discharged for threatening to expose that "illegal activity." Amended Complaint ^ 40, 44. Now
plaintiffs argue that their public policy claim does not rest on "the enforcement of criminal
statutes," and admit that "their conduct [did not] advance[] this particular public policy."
PL Opposition Memo, at 6. Not only is this new position inconsistent with plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint, it also deprives their claim of any public policy foundation. Having given up the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and having failed to invoke any Idaho statute or court decision,
plaintiffs have no basis for their purported public policy. They merely assert a free floating,

3

Plaintiffs argue that "Idaho's version of the public policy exception is extremely broad." PL Opposition Memo, at
9. In support of this assertion, plaintiffs cite to Idaho Code § 72-1302 (preface to unemployment benefits statute).
Id. at 9n.3. This statutory provision does not support plaintiffs' position because the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled
that a public policy wrongful discharge claim based on § 72-1302 is "without merit." Section 72-1302 "does not
rise to the level of a statement of public policy which would prevent an employer from discharging an employee at
will." Rav v. Nampa School Dist.. 814 P.2d at 22.
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nonspecific policy favoring "uncontaminated food." Plaintiffs provide no foundation for this
supposed public policy, and make no effort to show that Idaho recognizes it as a basis for a
private right of action. PI. Opposition Memo, at 6. In short, in trying to escape the consequences
of their failure to report to any public authority the criminal conduct they allege, plaintiffs make
clear the groundlessness of their public policy claim.
With respect to Utah law, plaintiffs argue that a whistleblower need not report criminal
conduct to the public authorities. PL Opposition Memo, at 7. Plaintiffs rely on the out-of-date
Heslop v. Bank of Utah case for their argument.

Id.

In the subsequent Fox v. MCI

Communications decision, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that "if an employee reports a criminal
violation to an employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports,
that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public policy." 931 P.2d 857, 861
(Utah 1997). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that in order to state a
whistleblower claim, an employee alleging criminal conduct must report the conduct to the
public authorities. Rvan v. Dan's Food Stores, 350 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (1998) ("reporting to a
public authority criminal activity of the employer.... brings into play a clear and substantial
public policy"). The Utah Supreme Court also clarified its earlier decision by pointing out that in
Heslop both state and federal authorities were informed of the employer's illegal activities, the
plaintiff met with the Utah Attorney General's office as part of its investigation of employer, and
the plaintiffs internal reporting took place in this context. Id. at 10 n. 7.
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Utah law clearly requires a whistleblower, alleging criminal misconduct by his employer,
to report the illegal activity to the public authorities in order to state a claim. While plaintiffs'
claim is not based on Utah law, there is no reason to think that Idaho law would be any different
in light of its requirement that a whistleblower "perform an important public obligation" in order
to state a claim. Given that plaintiffs did not report the alleged illegal activity to any public
authority and did not even tell the Company they were thinking of doing so, there is simply no
basis for plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW
A.

FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS.

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29U.S.C. § 185, exclusively
governs claims for breach of collective bargaining agreements and also claims relating to
collective bargaining agreements. The United States Supreme Court has explained:
[This] Court has made clear that § 301 is a potent source of federal
labor law, for though state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
controversies involving collective bargaining agreements,... state
courts must apply federal law in deciding those claims, and indeed
any state-law cause of action for violation of collective bargaining
agreements is entirely displaced by federal law under § 301. State
law is thus ''preempted" by § 301 in that only the federal law
fashioned by the courts under § 301 governs the interpretation and
application of collective bargaining agreements.
Steelworkers v. Rawson. 495 U.S. 362, 368 (1990) (citations omitted).
While an individual may sue in state court on a claim relating to a collective bargaining
agreement, he must do so in compliance with the requirements of § 301. Where, as here, there is
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a grievance and arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement, a § 301 claim may
be asserted in court only where the plaintiff exhausted or attempted to exhaust the grievance and
arbitration procedure, the plaintiff pleads and proves that his union breached its duty of fair
representation to him, and the claim is brought within the six month statute of limitations period.
See Def. Opening Memo, at 16-18 (summarizing federal labor law); Del Costello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,172 (1983) (6-month statute of limitations).
B.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM CAN ONLY BE A S 301 CLAIM,

As explained above, plaintiffs' claim is an implied contract claim under Idaho law. See
p.3 above. The duty not to discharge an employee in violation of public policy is an implied
contractual obligation read into the underlying contract between the parties. As with the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a public policy claim is a claim for "breach of the
employment contract." Hummer v. Evans. 923 P.2d at 987. Because plaintiffs' employment
contract was a collective bargaining agreement, the implied contractual obligation at issue here is
read into the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, plaintiffs' claim is a claim for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement and is governed by § 301.
Plaintiffs clearly had opportunities to seek a remedy and to assert a proper claim under
§ 301. Plaintiffs could have filed grievances under the collective bargaining agreement which
would have favored them in many ways. The grievance process is efficient and would not have
cost plaintiffs anything. Plaintiffs would have been represented by their own union, and the
Company would have had the burden of persuasion on the issue of "just cause" for plaintiffs'
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discharge. The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration, and plaintiffs could have
been reinstated with back pay if they prevailed. If the outcome of arbitration were unfavorable to
plaintiffs, they still could have sought a remedy in court under § 301. Plaintiffs, however, did
none of the above. They ignored their contractual remedies under the collective bargaining
agreement and failed to assert a proper claim under § 301.
Plaintiffs appear to misunderstand how § 301 governs claims relating to collective
bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs declare that Amalgamated Sugar must argue (or must be
arguing) that plaintiffs relinquished all their state-law rights in the collective bargaining process
in order for their current claim to be governed by § 301. Plaintiffs insist that they did not
negotiate away their state-law rights, and therefore their current claim is unaffected by § 301. PL
Opposition Memo, at 15, 16. Plaintiffs are mistaken both about the law and the Company's
position.
Under § 301, an implied contract claim relating to collective bargaining agreement is
cognizable as a contract claim under § 301. Since collective bargaining agreements are not
confined to the four corners of labor agreement documents, implied contractual rights are
routinely asserted before labor arbitrators and in court under § 301. See Def. Opening Memo, at
20 n.3. Under the collective bargaining agreement in the instant case, plaintiffs' claim could
clearly have been asserted in the grievance and arbitration process and subsequently in court
under § 301. For example, in 1998 a union employee, who was discharged by Amalgamated
Sugar, filed a grievance which was taken to arbitration. The employee claimed that she was
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discharged in retaliation for planning to file a sex discrimination charge under state law. The
arbitrator ruled on the merits of the employee's retaliation claim. Although the arbitrator found
no retaliation on the facts of the case, he ordered Amalgamated Sugar to reinstate the employee
because of certain due process deficiencies in the Company's discipline of the employee.
Amalgamated Sugar Co. (Humphreys 1998) at 5,15-18, 30-31, enclosed herewith.
In sum, plaintiffs' implied contract claim is cognizable, and only cognizable, under
§ 301/ Plaintiffs could have pursued their claim through the grievance and arbitration process
and in court under § 301. They chose not to do so.
C.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM. AS A STATE-LAW CLAIM, IS
PREEMPTED BY S 301.

Plaintiffs appear to recognize that their claim, as a state-law claim, is preempted by § 301.
They therefore attempt to recharacterize their claim so as to escape federal labor law preemption.
Plaintiffs argue alternatively that their claim is a non-contract claim or is a contract claim wholly
unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement. Neither argument has any merit.

4

Plaintiffs argue that because the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is read into a contract by operation
of law, it gives rise to an independent right that may not be "disclaimed" or "waived." PL Opposition Memo, at 1516. On this basis plaintiffs apparently conclude that their claim is immune from the operation of § 301. Id.
Plaintiffs' argument misses the point. An implied contractual obligation is part of the underlying contract. If there
is a breach of the implied contractual obligation, a remedy may be sought as with any other breach of the contract.
Such a remedy, however, must be pursued in conformity with the terms of the contract and the governing law.
Amalgamated Sugar is not arguing that plaintiffs gave up or waived their rights to seek a remedy for the implied
contractual breach they allege, but only that they must pursue the remedy properly under § 301 which governs their
claim. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that an implied covenant claim is cognizable only as a claim based on the
collective bargaining agreement under federal law, and if such a claim is pursued under state law, it is preempted by
§301. Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343. 94 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1996) ("claim for breach of
(footnote continued on next page)
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First, plaintiffs argue that their claim, while admittedly based on their collective
bargaining agreement with the Company, is nonetheless not a contract claim:
Plaintiffs' claims are based on Amalgamated's breach of its duties
which arose because of its contract with Plaintiffs, but the claims
are not claims "on the contract."
PL Opposition Memo, at 10. Any duties of Amalgamated Sugar arising out of its contract with
plaintiffs are clearly contract duties. They cannot be anything else. It is nonsensical for
plaintiffs to argue that a claim based upon contractual duties is not a contract claim.
Second, plaintiffs argue that their implied contract claim is "separate and independent"
from the collective bargaining agreement. This argument is without foundation either in logic or
in case law. Given that the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a public policy wrongful
discharge claim, like an implied covenant claim, is a claim for "breach of the employment
contract," plaintiffs' argument is without merit. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs do not cite a single
case holding that an implied contract claim of any kind is independent and separate from the
underlying contract.

The Ninth Circuit (which provides the controlling federal labor law

applicable to Idaho) has ruled that state-law implied contract and implied covenant claims are
preempted by § 301 because the implied contractual obligations are part of the collective
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,

(footnote continued from previous page)
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also clearly preempted because such covenant is an implied term of [the
plaintiffs] CBA").
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599 (9th Cir. 1996) ("claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing is . . . preempted
because such covenant is an implied term of [the plaintiffs] CBA")-5
Even as a purported "separate" contract claim, plaintiffs' claim is still preempted by
§ 301. There are two grounds for the preemption of any such "separate" contract claim. First,
the claim concerns the employment of individuals covered by a collective bargaining agreement
that already contains a termination provision. Any resolution of the state-law claim would
involve construing the collective bargaining agreement, if only to comply with its procedural
requirements. See, e.g., Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.
1989) (when independent contract claim "concerns a job position governed by the [CBA], it is
completely preempted by Section 301"); Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.. 740
F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984) ("any independent agreement of employment could be

5

Plaintiffs cite the U.S. Supreme Court's Allis-Chalmers decision for the proposition that claims based upon
independent, nonnegotiable state-law rights are not preempted by § 301. PL Opposition Memo, at 14-15. Plaintiffs
misunderstand Allis-Chalmers. which has no application to plaintiffs' claim. Allis-Chalmers concerned a state-law
tort claim, not a contract claim, and in that context the Supreme Court inquired whether the state tort action
conferred a "nonnegotiable state-law right" that was "independent of any right established by contract." Clearly, an
implied contract obligation, even one imposed by operation of law, is not "independent o f but an integral part of
the contract, and therefore clearly within the scope of Section 301. In any case, in Allis-Chalmers the Supreme
Court found the tort action in question, bad-faith denial of disability benefits, preempted under § 301. See AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202,212-13,220 (1985).
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effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement" and is therefore preempted by
§301).
Second, plaintiffs' claim is inconsistent with their collective bargaining agreement and is
preempted by § 301 on that additional ground. Plaintiffs' claim would not require them to use or
exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedure and would not require them to assert a claim in
court within the limitation period applicable to their collective bargaining agreement. Because of
such inconsistencies, permitting plaintiffs' claim would frustrate and undermine the federal
system of labor relations and collective bargaining. Accordingly, the claim is preempted under
§301. Laramee, 830 F.Supp. at 807 (public policy wrongful discharge claim preempted by
§ 301: "An employee who sidesteps the grievance machinery provided in the [labor] contract
will have his independent suit against the employer... dismissed"); see also Def. Opening
Memo, at 21-22 (citing and quoting cases).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in Amalgamated Sugar's opening

memorandum, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law should be
dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, plaintiffs' Amended Complaint should also be dismissed
with prejudice.
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M<
DATED this( \ ' '-day of March, 1999.

W. MARK GAVRE
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company

260342.1

16

no?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

t°fi

day of March, 1999,1 caused to be hand-delivered a

true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT, to:
Trent J. Waddoups
CARR&WADDOUPS
8 East Broadway, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
A Professional Law Corporation

One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone 801-532-1234 $ Facsimile 801-536-6111
March 19,1999
W. Mark Gavre, Esq.

CLERK OF THE COURT
SECOND DISTRICT COURT
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden,Utah 84401
RE:

DOCUMENTS TO BE FILED

ENCLOSURES:

•

Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint

•

Return, self-addressed stamped
envelope

INSTRUCTIONS:

Please file the Reply Memorandum and
return the date/time-stamped copy in the
enclosed envelope. Thank you very much for
your assistance.

CLIENT NO.:

Waddoups/Sparrow v. Amalgamated
(00190.001)
WMG/Lani

By:
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT
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W. MARK GAVRE (4577)
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN (7951)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P. O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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m THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
#

sje j|e s|e j|e s|e

BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR.,

*

Case No. 950900441
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

Plaintiffs,

ORDER DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED
COMPLAINT

vs.
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendant.
* * * * * * *

This matter came on for hearing before the Court on Monday, March 29, 1999.
Defendant The Amalgamated Sugar Company was represented by W. Mark Gavre of Parsons
Behle & Latimer. Plaintiffs Blake William Waddoups and James Edward Sparrow, Jr. were
represented by Trent J. Waddoups of Carr & Waddoups. In a telephone conference call with
counsel for plaintiffs and defendant on Thursday, April 8, 1999, the Court orally issued its
decision in this case.
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On April 7, 1998, the Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims, but granting leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint
stating a claim under Idaho law for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

On

December 2, 1998, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint asserting a claim for wrongful discha^e
in violation of Idaho public policy. Plaintiffs allege that defendant illegally shipped contaminated
sugar, and that they were wrongfully discharged for objecting to or threatening to "blow the
whistle" on defendant's alleged conduct. On January 6, 1999 defendant filed its Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which motion has been fully briefed and argued.
Having considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, the Court

makes the

following decision. Plaintiffs' claim for public policy wrongful discharge under Idaho law is
dismissed with prejudice.

There are three grounds for this dismissal:

(a) Idaho law has

recognized the cause of action for public policy wrongful discharge only in the context of at-will
employment, and plaintiffs were employed under a collective bargaining agreement and were not
at-will employees; (b) plaintiffs did not report the alleged wrongdoing by defendant to any public
authority and therefore fail to state a whistleblower public policy wrongful discharge claim under
Idaho law; and (c) plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal labor law, specifically the Labor
Relations Management Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is granted, and
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and all claims and causes of action therein, is dismissed with
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prejudice.
DATED this /^dayofApi4
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BY THE COURT

STANTON M. TAYD
Second District Court Judgi

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

'Waddoupsv^5^
brney for Plaintiffs
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